區塊鏈網絡最初設計為無需信任的系統，礦工與驗證者本應作為中立的交易排序仲裁者，主要通過區塊補貼及 Gas 費獲得報酬，以保障網絡安全。隨著最大可提取價值（MEV）的出現，這種中立原則已徹底改變，亦重塑了去中心化生態的激勵機制。
MEV 在區塊鏈經濟學上構成范式轉移，將驗證者由被動交易處理者變成主動的金融行為者，透過有策略地操控交易順序以提取額外利潤。根據 Flashbots 研究，這個複雜的地下經濟僅在以太坊自 2020 年起已估值超過 6.75 億美元，預計隨 DeFi 普及，每年 MEV 提取金額有望升至數十億。
MEV 原稱「礦工可提取價值」，源於以太坊分層證明時期，指礦工可透過有意排序、插入或審查區塊內交易而獲利。2022 年 9 月以太坊轉向權益證明後，MEV 轉為「最大可提取價值」，反映驗證者及專門的「搜尋者」有更多機會，通過利用整個生態系內複雜的交易依賴性去挖掘利潤。
這種轉變對區塊鏈的中立性構成根本挑戰。區塊生產由以往重視網絡安全的技術職能，演變成參與者要運用先進算法、高效基建及細緻市場分析，把握短暫套利、清算及協議漏洞機會的財務工程遊戲。如伊利諾伊大學的 Ari Juels 在其 2019 年開創性論文指出：「加密貨幣如要成為公平開放的金融平台，必須正視參與者試圖更改交易處理順序獲利的內在誘因。」
MEV 的增長與 DeFi 迅速擴張息息相關。推動借貸、去中心化交易所以及衍生協議的複雜智能合約互動，為利用策略性交易排序以提取價值提供了沃土。這現象引發區塊鏈民主化承諾的核心疑問，因為精明的 MEV 挖掘者經常憑技術及資本優勢壓倒一般用戶。
了解 MEV 操作機制：從概念到實踐
MEV 操控本質源於區塊鏈處理交易的非原子性。與傳統金融市場即時結算不同，鏈上交易分為兩階段：先進入內存池（mempool）排隊，然後被驗證者排序並寫入最終區塊。這個時間差——以太坊一般為 12 秒，其他鏈略有不同——創造了可被利用的資訊不對稱和排序機會。
區塊生產過程令驗證者由被動交易者轉變為主動市場參與者，能通過多種方式提取價值：
交易排序策略
最簡單的 MEV 策略是重新排序交易以讓驗證者受益。舉例，當有大額未完成交易在 mempool 將左右資產價格，驗證者可選擇在其前（搶跑）、後（尾隨）插入自己交易，或前後包夾（三明治攻擊）。據 MEV-Explore 監測，這類排序約佔全部已知 MEV 活動 70%。
以 2023 年 7 月為例，一名交易員在 Uniswap 嘗試購買價值 50 萬美元的 GMX 代幣時，被 MEV 機械人偵測到並執行三明治攻擊。機械人先買入 15 萬美元 GMX 拉高價格，再讓目標交易被高價成交，最後賣出持倉，單一交易獲利 7,500 美元，令原本交易者額外多付 1.5%。
套利機會
不同協議間同一資產價格出現差異時，自然會產生套利機會。MEV 機械人會全天候監控像 Uniswap、SushiSwap、Curve 等交易所價格，利用即時不平衡狀況執行套利。這類交易有助市場價格一致，但提取的價值原本可回饋一般交易者。
進階套利機械人會透過複雜算法串連多個協議交易提升利潤。例如發現 ETH 在 Uniswap 抄底，馬上買入，然後立即在 Balancer 高價賣出——全部於一個區塊內原子執行，消弭中間波動風險，使套利走向零風險。
Flashbots 數據顯示，套利型 MEV 佔以太坊可提取價值約 65-75%，波動市期間每日可提取金額屢超 100 萬美元。動盪時套利機會更明顯，因各協議價格發現機制暫時不同步。
清算機制
Aave、Compound、MakerDAO 等借貸協議會自動清算未達抵押門檻的借款，以維持資金安全。當借款人抵押品價值跌穿標準，其頭寸可被清算，為 MEV 機械人帶來機會。專門清算的機械人會互相競逐先行執行，賺取 5-10% 清算罰金。
舉例，2023 年 3 月 USDC 脫鉤事件間，MEV 機械人協助清算逾 2.5 億美元頭寸，單是清算獎勵便約 1,500 萬美元。相關交易手續費更曾飆至 200 gwei（平時平均僅 30 gwei），反映驗證者會優先處理高利潤清算交易。
另一實例，2023 年 5 月一名 Aave 借款者用 100 ETH（時值約 18 萬美元）抵押 12 萬 USDC。當 ETH 跌穿 1,800 美元，該頭寸被標記可清算。MEV 機械人發現機會，先還清 6 萬美元（頭寸一半），獲得 50 ETH（扣除 10% 罰金），扣除約 600 美元燃料費，單次賺 5,400 美元。
即時流動性供應（JIT Liquidity）
更進階的 MEV 策略是在大額交易發生前即時提供流動性，交易完成後立刻撤走，稱為 JIT 流動性供應。這讓 MEV 挖掘者可收集手續費而避免無常損失。精準供應流動性，原本該歸長期流動性提供者的價值反被攫取。
Flashbots 指出，JIT 流動性約佔全部 MEV 提取得 10-15%，主要集中於 Uniswap v3 和其他集中流動性協議。該機制技術要求高，但盈利豐厚，大型參與者在高波動市可日賺 5 萬美元或以上。
市場影響與 DeFi 動態：效率與公平的拉鋸
MEV 對市場動態的影響，在去中心化金融中的效率與公平性之間帶來根本矛盾。從流動性供應到協議治理，MEV 幾乎改變了 DeFi 每一個運作環節。
市場效率與流動性效應
MEV 套利無疑加強了 DeFi 協議之間的價格效率。迅速捕捉價差機會的套利機械人，可令資產於各去中心化交易所保持一致估值。區塊鏈數據公司 Chainalysis 研究指出，主要 DEX 間價格偏差通常不超過 15 秒——而早年 DeFi 需以分鐘計，現時效率提升全賴 MEV 套利。
但這效益的代價由普通用戶承擔。MEV 提取實際成為 DeFi 交易的隱形稅，估算一般用戶每宗交易會因三明治及其他策略損失 0.5% 至 1% 價值。這尤其對技術能力不足、不能使用私有通道或高級路由算法的散戶影響明顯。
弔詭的是，MEV 既可提升亦可削弱流動性。套利行為維持不同平台價格一致，提高資本運用效率，但三明治威脅令大額公開交易受抑制，促使流動性分流至私有渠道，加速 Cowswap 等新式抗 MEV 點對點、分批競價協議的興起，以減少提取風險。
Validator Economics and
Centralization Pressures
中心化壓力
The emergence of MEV has fundamentally altered the economic incentives for block producers.
MEV（最大可提取價值）的出現徹底改變了區塊生產者的經濟誘因。
Prior to MEV awareness, validators primarily earned income from block rewards and transaction fees.
在出現MEV之前，驗證者的主要收入來自區塊獎勵和交易手續費。
Today, MEV extraction constitutes a significant portion of validator economics, with industry data suggesting that top Ethereum validators derive 40-60% of their total revenue from MEV-related activities.
現時，MEV提取已經成為驗證者收益的重要部分，業界數據顯示，頂級以太坊驗證者的總收入中有40-60%來自與MEV有關的活動。
This shift has intensified the competitive landscape for validators, with significant implications for network decentralization.
這種轉變加劇了驗證者之間的競爭，對網絡的去中心化產生了重大的影響。
As MEV extraction requires sophisticated technical infrastructure and specialized knowledge, advantages accrue to larger, better-capitalized operators.
由於MEV提取涉及高端技術以及專業知識，更大規模及資本充裕的營運者因此佔據優勢。
The resulting specialization has led to increasing concentration in the validator ecosystem, with the top 10 Ethereum validators consistently producing over 85% of blocks containing significant MEV extraction, according to 2023 data from Rated Network.
這種專業化趨勢令驗證者生態圈更加集中，根據Rated Network 2023年的數據，前十名的以太坊驗證者長期生產超過85%涉及重大MEV提取的區塊。
The economics are compelling: A study by the Ethereum Foundation found that validators with optimized MEV extraction capabilities earn 135% more than validators without such capabilities.
經濟誘因十分顯著：以太坊基金會的一項研究顯示，具備優化MEV提取能力的驗證者，比起沒有這些能力的驗證者多賺135%。
This profit differential drives centralization, as smaller validators either join larger pools or exit the ecosystem entirely.
這種利潤差距驅使系統走向中心化，規模較小的驗證者要麼加入大型驗證池，要麼乾脆退出生態圈。
The long-term implications for blockchain decentralization remain concerning, with some researchers suggesting that MEV could eventually push most blockchains toward oligopolistic validator structures.
這種情況對區塊鏈的去中心化長遠威脅，部分研究者認為，MEV最終有機會讓大多數區塊鏈變成寡頭壟斷的驗證架構。
Protocol Design and Adaptation
協議設計與應對
Protocol designers have been forced to adapt to the reality of MEV, incorporating defensive mechanisms to protect users and maintain protocol integrity.
協議設計者被迫正視MEV現實，並加入防禦機制去保障用戶及協議的完整性。
Automated market makers (AMMs) have implemented features like:
自動化做市商（AMMs）紛紛實施以下功能：
-
Slippage Tolerances: Allowing users to specify maximum acceptable price deviations, protecting against sandwich attacks
滑點容忍度：容許用戶設定最大可接受的價格偏差，防止受到三明治攻擊 -
Transaction Deadlines: Automatically failing transactions that remain pending for too long, reducing exposure to price manipulation
交易截止時間：自動拒絕長時間掛起的交易，減少遇到價格操控的風險 -
Time-Weighted Average Pricing: Executing large orders over multiple blocks to reduce price impact and MEV exposure
時間加權平均價格：將大型訂單分批在多個區塊內執行，減低價格影響及MEV風險
These adaptations improve user protection but increase protocol complexity and often reduce capital efficiency.
這些改動加強了用戶保障，但同時提升了協議的複雜性，亦往往令資本效率下降。
The trade-off between MEV resistance and protocol functionality remains a central challenge for DeFi designers.
如何在抗MEV能力和協議功能性之間取得平衡，仍然是DeFi設計者的核心難題。
Some protocols have embraced more radical approaches, such as Pendle Finance's use of Merkle tree-based commitments to hide transaction details until execution, effectively eliminating front-running opportunities.
有部分協議採用更激進措施，例如Pendle Finance利用Merkle樹承諾去隱藏交易詳情，直到交易執行一刻才公開資料，基本上消除了搶先交易（front-running）的機會。
Lending protocols have similarly evolved, implementing tiered liquidation systems that distribute opportunities more evenly and reduce the winner-takes-all dynamics of traditional liquidation markets.
借貸協議亦相應演變，實施分級清算系統，更平均地分配清算機會，同時減弱傳統清算市場的「贏家通吃」效應。
For example, Aave v3 introduced a Dutch auction mechanism for liquidations that gradually increases liquidation bonuses over time, reducing the incentive for gas price wars and potentially decreasing MEV extraction from liquidation events.
例如，Aave v3為清算引入荷蘭式拍賣機制，清算獎勵會隨時間遞增，減低爭奪gas價的動機，從而潛在減少來自清算活動的MEV提取。
Technological Arms Race and Ecosystem Responses
科技軍備競賽與生態圈回應
The lucrative nature of MEV has sparked a technological arms race, with various stakeholders developing increasingly sophisticated systems to extract, distribute, or mitigate MEV.
MEV利益可觀，帶動一場科技軍備競賽，各方持份者均發展出日益複雜的系統去提取、分配或減輕MEV。
This competition has driven significant innovation in blockchain infrastructure while raising important questions about equitable participation.
這種競爭促進了區塊鏈基建的重大創新，同時引發公平參與等重要問題。
Specialized MEV Infrastructure
專業MEV基建
The MEV ecosystem has spawned purpose-built infrastructure designed to streamline value extraction.
MEV生態衍生出多個針對性基建，旨在簡化價值提取流程。
Flashbots, the most prominent example, developed MEV-Boost - a middleware service that creates a marketplace for block space.
當中以Flashbots最具代表性，開發出MEV-Boost — 一款為區塊空間打造的中介市場系統。
This system allows validators to auction their block-building rights to specialized builders who optimize transaction ordering for MEV extraction.
該系統讓驗證者把建立區塊的權利拍賣給專門優化交易排序、方便提取MEV的建塊者。
The builder returns a portion of the extracted value to the validator, creating a mutually beneficial arrangement.
建塊者會將部分提取到的價值回贈給驗證者，實現雙方共贏。
MEV-Boost's market dominance is striking: since Ethereum's transition to proof-of-stake, over 90% of blocks have been produced using this infrastructure.
MEV-Boost在市場主導地位相當明顯：自以太坊轉用權益證明（PoS）以來，超過90%區塊是經這套基礎設施產生。
This widespread adoption has effectively created a shadow market for transaction ordering rights, with daily MEV-Boost auctions regularly exceeding $1 million in total value.
這種普及令交易排序權基本上形成一個地下市場，每日MEV-Boost的拍賣總值經常超過100萬美元。
While improving gas efficiency by reducing failed transactions, this system has drawn criticism for exacerbating centralization and potentially creating systemic risks through its dominance of block production.
雖然此系統可以減少交易失敗提升gas效率，但亦受到批評指其加劇中心化，並因壟斷區塊生產帶來系統性風險。
Related infrastructure includes specialized mempool observation systems, strategic transaction routing services, and MEV-aware wallet integrations.
相關基建還包括專業的mempool監控系統、策略性交易路由服務以及支持MEV防護的钱包集成等。
Major DeFi players like 1inch and Matcha have incorporated MEV protection directly into their interfaces, routing transactions through protective relayers that shield users from common extraction strategies.
主流DeFi項目如1inch、Matcha已於界面直接加入MEV防護，把交易送到防護中繼器，保護用戶免受常見提取策略影響。
Privacy-Preserving Technologies
保護私隱的新技術
A technological counterpoint to MEV extraction has emerged in the form of privacy-preserving transaction protocols.
為對抗MEV提取，新興技術著力於保護私隱的交易協議。
These systems employ cryptographic techniques to obscure transaction details until execution, theoretically eliminating the information asymmetries that enable MEV extraction.
這些系統透過密碼學技術，隱藏交易詳情到執行一刻，理論上能消除致使MEV提取的資訊不對稱。
Approaches include:
方案包括：
-
Encrypted Mempools: Systems like Shutter Network and SUAVE encrypt transaction data using threshold cryptography, preventing MEV extractors from viewing pending transactions
加密Mempool：如Shutter Network同SUAVE等系統運用門檻密碼學，加密交易資料，防止MEV提取者看到待處理交易 -
Commit-Reveal Schemes: Protocols where users first commit to a transaction hash, then reveal the actual transaction details only after inclusion in a block
提交-揭示機制：用戶先提交交易雜湊值，只有交易入區塊後才公開實際詳情 -
Zero-Knowledge Proofs: Advanced cryptographic constructions that allow transaction validation without revealing transaction details
零知識證明：可驗證交易而無需暴露詳情的高端密碼學方案
While promising, these solutions face significant technical challenges, including increased computational overhead, complex key management requirements, and compatibility issues with existing smart contracts.
儘管有潛力，上述方案亦面對重大技術挑戰，包括計算負擔大增、密鑰管理複雜，以及與現有智能合約兼容性等問題。
Early implementations have shown promise - Shutter Network's testnet demonstrated a 89% reduction in front-running during controlled experiments—but production-ready systems remain in development.
初步結果樂觀 — Shutter Network測試網在實驗中搶先交易減少達89%，但真正可大規模應用的系統仍處於開發階段。
Regulatory Considerations and Institutional Engagement
監管考慮與機構參與
The regulatory landscape surrounding MEV remains nebulous, with practices like front-running and transaction reordering occupying legal gray areas in decentralized systems.
圍繞MEV的監管環境依然模糊，搶先交易和交易重排序等行為在去中心化系統中屬法律灰色地帶。
Traditional financial markets have clear regulations against similar activities, with front-running explicitly prohibited under most securities laws.
傳統金融市場明確禁止類似行為，大多數證券法規明文禁搶先交易。
However, blockchain's pseudonymous nature and global operation complicate regulatory enforcement.
但區塊鏈的偽匿名特質與全球化運作，令執法大為複雜。
Recent enforcement actions suggest growing regulatory interest in MEV-related activities.
近期執法行動顯示監管者正對MEV相關行為日益關注。
In March 2023, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought charges against a trading firm for allegedly manipulating liquidation markets on a major DeFi protocol, signaling that authorities may view certain MEV strategies as forms of market manipulation despite occurring on permissionless networks.
2023年3月，美國商品期貨交易委員會（CFTC）指控一間公司涉嫌操控一個主流DeFi協議的清算市場，顯示即使相關行為發生於無許可網絡，當局可能亦會將某些MEV策略視為市場操縱。
This regulatory uncertainty hasn't deterred institutional participation.
這種監管不確定性未有阻礙機構參與。
Traditional finance firms have increasingly allocated resources to MEV strategies, applying sophisticated quantitative techniques to on-chain markets.
傳統金融機構不斷加大對MEV策略的投資，將高階量化技術應用於鏈上市場。
Jump Trading, Cumberland, and other established market makers have established dedicated MEV teams, while venture capital has flowed into MEV infrastructure startups.
Jump Trading、Cumberland等大型做市商紛紛成立MEV戰隊，同時創投資金湧進MEV基建新創業務。
Notably, Flashbots raised $60 million at a $1 billion valuation in early 2023, underscoring institutional confidence in MEV's long-term value proposition.
值得一提，Flashbots於2023年初成功融資6000萬美元，估值達10億美元，反映機構對MEV長遠價值持強烈信心。
The institutionalization of MEV brings both benefits and concerns: improved market surveillance and risk management practices may enhance ecosystem stability, but institutional advantages in capital and technology risk accelerating centralization trends already evident in MEV extraction.
MEV走向機構化既有利亦有憂：提升市場監控及風險管理或有助生態圈穩定，然而機構在資本與技術上的優勢，或會令本已中心化趨勢的MEV競賽加劇。
Future Trajectories and Systemic Implications
未來走勢與系統性影響
The evolution of MEV practices continues to reshape blockchain economics, with several emerging trends likely to define its future development.
MEV手法不斷演變，持續重塑區塊鏈經濟，一些新興趨勢極大可能決定其未來發展。
Understanding these trajectories is essential for protocols, users, and regulators seeking to navigate the complex incentives at play in decentralized systems.
協議、用戶及監管者必須理解這些走勢，才能應對去中心化生態中錯綜複雜的激勵機制。
Cross-Chain and Layer 2 MEV Dynamics
跨鏈及第二層MEV動態
As blockchain activity increasingly migrates to Layer 2 solutions and alternative Layer 1 networks, MEV extraction is following suit - but with important differences in mechanism and distribution.
隨著鏈上活動日益轉移至Layer 2解決方案及另類Layer 1區塊鏈，MEV提取亦隨之轉向，但其機制及分配方式有顯著不同。
On optimistic rollups like Arbitrum and Optimism, the sequencer role (which orders transactions before submitting them to Ethereum) creates a centralized point for potential MEV extraction.
在Arbitrum、Optimism等optimistic rollup中，排程器（sequencer）負責交易排序和送往以太坊，此舉成為潛在MEV提取的集中點。
This centralization potentially simplifies MEV capture while creating new governance challenges around sequencer revenue distribution.
這種中心化一方面令MEV捕捉更簡單，另一方面則帶來有關排程器收入分配的治理新挑戰。
Data from L2Beat indicates that Layer 2 networks processed over $50 billion in transaction volume in Q1 2024, creating significant MEV opportunities.
據L2Beat數據，2024年第一季Layer 2網絡處理的交易量超過500億美元，帶來可觀的MEV機會。
However, the distribution mechanisms differ substantially from Layer 1 systems.
但其分配機制與Layer 1系統大不相同。
Optimism, for instance, has implemented retroactive public goods funding using a portion of sequencer MEV revenue, effectively socializing extraction profits to support ecosystem development.
以Optimism為例，協議已將排程器MEV部分收益用於補貼公共產品，變相把提取收益社會化以扶持生態發展。
This approach offers a potential template for redistributing MEV value beyond validators and searchers.
這種做法為將MEV價值分配延伸至驗證者和搜尋者以外提供了一個參考範例。
Cross-chain MEV represents a further frontier, with sophisticated arbitrageurs exploiting price differences between assets on different blockchains.
跨鏈MEV則是更高階的領域，有資深套利者專門利用多條區塊鏈不同資產價格的差距。
These opportunities require complex infrastructure spanning multiple networks and often involve specialized bridge mechanisms.
相關套利需部署跨多網絡的複雜基建，並時常涉及專用的橋接方法。
While technically challenging, cross-chain MEV potentially offers larger extraction opportunities due to the fragmentation of liquidity across ecosystems.
儘管技術難度高，跨鏈MEV因流動性分散於不同生態，帶來更大提取利潤空間。
MEV Redistribution Mechanisms
MEV再分配機制
Recognition of MEV's systemic importance has sparked innovation in redistribution mechanisms, with various protocols experimenting with approaches to share extraction value more equitably:
各界意識到MEV的系統性影響，促使一系列分配機制創新，多個協議嘗試用新方法令價值分配更公平：
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MEV Auctions: Systems where validators auction transaction ordering rights, with proceeds partially returned to users
MEV拍賣：驗證者將交易排序權拍賣，部分收益回饋用戶 -
Protocol-Owned MEV: Designs
（下文未完，請提供後續内容以便翻譯。）where protocols capture and redistribute MEV value through governance-controlled mechanisms
當協議透過由治理控制的機制捕捉及再分配MEV的價值
- User Rebates: Direct compensation to users who have been affected by MEV extraction, calculated based on transaction characteristics
- 用戶回贈：直接根據交易特徵向受MEV提取影響的用戶作出補償
Ethereum researcher Vitalik Buterin has advocated for protocolitization of MEV - incorporating MEV capture and distribution directly into protocol design rather than treating it as an externality. Proposals like proposer-builder separation (PBS) aim to create more transparent and equitable markets for block space while preserving the economic incentives that MEV provides for network security.
以太坊研究員Vitalik Buterin提倡將MEV「協議化」，即將MEV的捕捉及分配直接納入協議設計之內，而不是只當作一項外部性處理。類似「提案者-建造者分離」(PBS)這類建議，目標是為區塊空間建立更透明及更公平的市場，同時保留MEV對網絡安全帶來的經濟誘因。
Some protocols have implemented innovative approaches to MEV redistribution. CoWSwap uses batch auctions and off-chain solvers to capture MEV and return it to users through improved execution prices. Similarly, Osmosis on the Cosmos ecosystem employs a threshold-based mechanism where a portion of MEV profits are returned to the protocol treasury, funding ongoing development and liquidity incentives.
有些協議已經實施了創新的MEV再分配方法。CoWSwap利用批次拍賣及鏈下解決方案來捕捉MEV，並透過更佳的執行價格將價值回饋給用戶。同樣地，Cosmos生態系統上的Osmosis使用門檻式機制，將部分MEV利潤分回協議國庫，以資助持續發展及流動性激勵。
Technical Innovations in MEV Mitigation
Technical approaches to MEV mitigation continue to evolve, with several promising directions:
針對減緩MEV的技術方案持續進化，出現多個具潛力的新方向：
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Time-Based Ordering: Protocols like Chainlink's Fair Sequencing Services (FSS) implement time-based transaction ordering, removing validator discretion in sequencing
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基於時間排序：如Chainlink的公平排序服務(FSS)這類協議，以時間為基準安排交易順序，消除驗證者在排序上的自主權
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Threshold Encryption: Systems that keep transaction details encrypted until execution, preventing front-running and sandwich attacks
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門檻加密：讓交易細節在執行前保持加密，從而防止前置交易及夾擊攻擊
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Batch Auctions: Mechanisms that collect multiple transactions and execute them at a uniform clearing price, eliminating ordering advantages
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批次拍賣：機制會集中多筆交易，以統一結算價同時執行，消除排序優勢
Research from Stanford University's Blockchain Research Center suggests that time-based ordering mechanisms can reduce extractable MEV by up to 90% in certain protocols, though with trade-offs in execution latency and throughput. These approaches represent a promising direction for reducing the negative externalities of MEV while preserving its beneficial effects on market efficiency.
史丹福大學區塊鏈研究中心的研究顯示，基於時間排序的機制在某些協議中能減少高達90%的可提取MEV，但會帶來執行延遲及處理量的取捨。這些方法為減輕MEV負面外部性提供了有前景的方向，同時保留其對市場效率的正面作用。
Governance and Power Distribution
Perhaps the most consequential question surrounding MEV concerns its long-term impact on blockchain governance and power distribution. As MEV extraction becomes increasingly professionalized and capital-intensive, the concentration of these capabilities among a small set of specialized firms raises concerns about influence over protocol development and governance.
或許圍繞MEV最大的重要問題，是它對區塊鏈治理及權力分配的長遠影響。隨著MEV提取變得越來越專業化及資本密集，能力集中於少數專門機構，引發大家對協議發展及治理受到影響的擔憂。
Research by Cornell University's Initiative for Cryptocurrencies and Contracts (IC3) suggests that entities controlling significant MEV extraction capability can potentially influence governance votes through subtle economic incentives, even without holding large token positions directly. This influence operates through various channels, including preferential transaction ordering for aligned proposals and strategic transaction censorship during contentious governance votes.
康奈爾大學IC3的研究指出，掌控大量MEV提取能力的機構，即使未直接持有大量代幣，也能透過細微的經濟誘因影響治理投票。這種影響可經多種渠道實現，包括對符合自身利益的提案給予優先交易排序，以及在爭議性治理投票期間進行策略性交易審查。
The response to these governance challenges remains uncertain. Some protocols have implemented governance mechanisms explicitly designed to resist MEV-driven influence, including multi-stage voting processes and time-locked execution periods. Others have embraced MEV as an inherent aspect of on-chain governance, designing systems that make extraction opportunities transparent and accessible to diverse participants.
對於這些治理挑戰，目前回應還未明朗。有些協議已實行專門設計來抗衡MEV影響的治理機制，包括多階段投票流程及延時執行期等。亦有協議則接受MEV是鏈上治理的本質部分，系統設計使提取機會變得公開透明，多元參與者都可觸及。
Final thoughts
The MEV economy represents a fundamental evolution in blockchain incentive structures, transforming validators from passive transaction processors into active market participants with complex financial motivations. This transformation challenges simplistic narratives about blockchain as a purely neutral infrastructure while creating new opportunities for financial innovation and protocol design.
MEV經濟體代表了區塊鏈激勵結構的根本進化，令驗證者從被動的交易處理者，變成擁有複雜金融動機的主動市場參與者。這種轉變打破了區塊鏈作為純粹中立基礎設施的簡單說法，同時為金融創新及協議設計帶來新機遇。
Understanding MEV requires acknowledging its duality: it simultaneously enhances market efficiency through rapid arbitrage and price discovery while potentially undermining equitable access through systematic advantages for technically sophisticated participants. This tension between efficiency and fairness defines the ongoing debate around MEV's role in decentralized ecosystems.
要理解MEV，必須正視它的雙重性：一方面，MEV加快套利及價格發現，提升市場效率；另一方面，技術先進的參與者可憑系統性優勢，削弱公平參與。這種效率與公平的拉鋸，就是MEV在去中心化生態中角色爭議的核心。
For developers and protocol designers, the MEV-aware future demands careful consideration of transaction ordering mechanisms, privacy preserving techniques, and value distribution systems. The strategic choices made today around MEV extraction and mitigation will shape the economic landscape of blockchain for years to come. For users, knowledge of MEV dynamics enables more informed participation in decentralized finance. Understanding the invisible costs of transaction ordering, the risks of public mempool exposure, and the available protection mechanisms allows users to navigate the complex DeFi landscape more effectively.
對於開發者及協議設計者而言，具MEV意識的未來需要仔細考慮交易排序機制、保密技術及價值分配制度。現時圍繞MEV提取及減緩所作的策略選擇，將長遠塑造區塊鏈的經濟格局。對於用戶來說，了解MEV動態可幫助更明智地參與去中心化金融。掌握交易排序的隱形成本、公開內存池帶來的風險，以及可用的保障機制，能讓用戶更有效地在複雜的DeFi生態中導航。