英倫銀行的史無前例提議，限制個人穩定幣持有量於£10,000至£20,000，點燃了業界激烈反對，並突顯全球加密貨幣監管根本分歧。
英國以保障金融穩定為由，推動嚴格持有限制。但包括美國及歐盟在內的主要競爭對手，則選擇不設限的全面監管框架，或會削弱英國作為國際金融重鎮的地位。
擬議的上限對象為英倫銀行所稱的「系統性穩定幣」，這代表全球主要法域中對流通達到2,890億美元的數碼資產最為嚴苛的管控。業界領袖認為有關限制無法技術執行且經濟傷害甚深，Coinbase的Tom Duff Gordon警告這措施「對英國儲戶不利，對金融城不利，對英鎊不利」。如今穩定幣每年處理高達27.6萬億美元交易，超越Visa與Mastercard總和，監管分歧尤顯敏感。
相比之下，美國新近通過的GENIUS法案，確立全國性監管但無持有限制；歐盟的加密資產市場法規（MiCA）也同樣聚焦發行人要求而非持有人設限。
這一分歧體現了對數碼資產監管理念的爭議：是限制個人持有以保護傳統銀行，還是全面規管發行人並容許市場主導發展。結果將決定哪個法域能把握穩定幣市場爆發增長及轉型全球支付基建的潛力。
英倫銀行框架：詳細分析
英倫銀行的穩定幣監管方案重點，是防止官員所指的傳統銀行體系潛在「資金外流」而動搖金融穩定。在建議的框架下，「系統性穩定幣」將面臨史無前例的持有限制，此舉旨在過渡期內限制其發展，讓金融系統有時間適應數碼貨幣。
何謂系統性穩定幣，概念上及實踐上都極具挑戰。英倫銀行2023年11月的討論文件中，定義這類代幣為「現時或預計將來會在英國被廣泛用於支付」及其運作的支付系統「若廣泛用於零售支付將有可能對金融穩定構成風險」。 關鍵是決定標準不單依據交易量或市值，而是該資產若出現問題，會否影響「全英國大量用戶」。央行有權於穩定幣推出之時即作系統性定性，只要展現迅速擴大的潛力。
金融市場設施執行董事Sasha Mills於2025年7月的「建構未來市場：金融數碼化」演說中，對持有限制給出最詳盡解說。她稱央行認為，「至少在過渡期間，只要穩定幣用於系統性支付系統，便有需要設立上限，以減低銀行業資金大量快速外流帶來的金融穩定風險。」擬議上限為個人£10,000-£20,000，企業則為1,000萬鎊，將為「過渡性措施，讓金融系統能有時間適應新型數碼貨幣」。
設限背後動機，源於對存款移轉和系統穩定性的憂慮。Mills強調若容許穩定幣無限制增長，有可能因存款自傳統銀行外流至數碼資產，導致企業及家庭貸款供應突減。這反映更多央行對穩定幣在金融壓力時期加劇擠提過程的憂慮——因其24小時可用、即時結算的特性，提款潮或會進一步擴大。
實施時間表及範圍仍有變動空間，反映業界持續諮詢中的狀態。英倫銀行原訂2025年啟動新監管，但受業界強烈反彈而推遲。Mills於2025年7月指：「我們仍與業界交流、聽取意見，這些方案尚未最終敲定。」央行計劃於2025年底發表正式諮詢文件，最快到2026年才落實。
該框架專為英鎊計價的穩定幣設計，因英倫銀行認為「最可能廣泛用於」英國市場支付，反映央行對貨幣主權及影響本地支付系統的現實考慮。然而，若外幣穩定幣於本地零售支付取得相當規模，管轄範圍亦可能擴展。
執行和監管細節於官方說法中保持模糊，僅稱將與金融行為監管局合作，對發行人及服務供應商監控合規。央行暫未說明限制如何適用於多平台資產總持有，或如何監控跨境交易。這種不明確也成為業界質疑實際操作可行性的另一焦點。
諮詢過程自2023年11月討論文件後已有顯著變化，當時共收到47份正式回應，大多反對設上限。金融穩定副行長Sarah Breeden強調，這些建議「旨在支持安全創新，讓企業掌握所須管理的風險」，但業界意見一致質疑單一持有限制的技術可行性及經濟理據。
業界反對聲音：主要角色與論據
英國加密業界前所未有地集體反對英倫銀行穩定幣持有限制提議，主要公司及行業協會均指此舉技術上難以執行且經濟上打擊英國競爭力。
Coinbase為反對運動的重心，國際政策副總裁Tom Duff Gordon直言反對上限。他指「對穩定幣設限對英國儲戶、金融城，以至英鎊皆有害」，強調沒其他主要國家推動如此嚴苛限制。Coinbase的立場折射出更廣泛業界擔憂：如果英國獨自設限，或將被美國、歐盟等開放監管的地區甩在身後。
英國加密資產商業協會執行總監Simon Jennings帶領制訂了最具技術細節的反對理據。他質疑「若無新系統如數碼身份證，幾乎無法執行」，因「穩定幣發行方根本無法即時知道誰持有代幣。」他更形容追蹤穩定幣相當於「要追蹤紙幣持有情況，還要額外花費數百萬英鎊」，明顯與區塊鏈去中心化架構格格不入。
支付協會政策主管Riccardo Tordera-Ricchi則從金融傳統監管出發，指「既然現金、銀行戶口及電子錢包沒設上限，沒理由僅對穩定幣限額。」這反映業界主流聲音：設限一舉在其他可比金融工具中並無先例，純屬監管過度。
執行方面的種種挑戰，或是業界反對最有力論據。區塊鏈去中心化特質容許用戶透過多個錢包地址分散資產，無需中央登記。穩定幣發行人通常難以知道實際持幣者身份，交易在公鏈上以假名進行。這製造了一個業界專家眼中的「幾乎無法執行情景」，除非投入龐大新基建，包括數碼身份驗證、實時錢包監控及橫跨數千服務商協調。
技術實行問題還不止追蹤錢包，尚有更多高明的規避手法。用戶可輕易將資產分散到無限地址，或利用主打隱私的區塊鏈協議，亦可經完全無中介的去中心化交易所進行操作。業界認為，若要全面執法，監控成本以億計英鎊，但最終仍難防簡單的規避方法。
就英國競爭力而言，業界特別憂慮監管套利問題。領袖們警告，倘若設限過嚴，穩定幣活動將流向較寬鬆的地區。美國新通過的GENIUS法案，打造聯邦層面全面監管而無持有限制；而歐盟MiCA則同樣只著重發行人要求。業內團體認為，這會令英國企業處於競爭劣勢，甚至危及倫敦金融中心地位。
倫敦金融城的潛在影響亦早已超越加密產業範疇，傳統金融服務界也感到憂慮 放心，以下為所需內容的繁體香港中文翻譯，markdown links (如有) 已略過：
憂慮英國整個金融科技生態系統會受到更廣泛影響。帝國商學院（Imperial Business School）的專家 Gilles Chemla 指出：「倫敦擁有領導數碼經濟所需的人才、市場及歷史，但在推行穩定幣監管框架方面的延誤，正在削弱這種優勢。」英國最近失去了全球金融科技投資排名，被阿聯酋（UAE）取代，部分原因正是後者在加密貨幣監管方面更為明確，包括與幣安（Binance）達成的二十億美元協議。
跨境交易的挑戰為執法帶來了更多複雜性，行業團體認為監管機構未有充分處理相關問題。穩定幣運作於全球區塊鏈網絡之上，交易可以無縫跨越司法管轄，令國家層面的持有上限難以在沒有國際協作機制下執行——而這些機制目前並不存在。業界代表亦指出，區塊鏈技術這個基本特性，令以地域劃分為本的擁有權限制幾乎無法兌現。
市場轉移風險亦是另一個主要業界論點，多個持份者警告，實施持有上限可能會將合法用戶推向無監管的替代選項。業界指出，一些對加密貨幣有嚴格限制的司法地區，即使全面禁止，地下點對點網絡依然活躍，這意味著實施持有上限可能達不到預期效果，反而會減少對穩定幣運作的監管透明度。
隨著英倫銀行（BoE）就有關諮詢的進行，業界遊說行動和協調亦日趨激烈。英國加密資產商業委員會（UK Cryptoasset Business Council）已舉辦多場國會接待活動，吸引超過150位政界及業界代表出席；而支付協會（The Payments Association）則向當局正式遞交回應，重點闡述技術執行上的挑戰。多個業界協會共同調整訊息，以強調競爭劣勢和實踐可行性問題，一致反對該措施，團結跨越加密貨幣生態圈不同領域。
全球監管格局：比較分析
全球穩定幣監管環境展現出主要司法轄區截然不同的理念：美國和歐盟採用全面監管框架，但均未有加入英倫銀行提出的個人持有上限。這種分歧凸顯數碼資產監管上不同的取態，並牽動國際競爭力。
美國路線：GENIUS 法案框架
美國於2025年7月通過《GENIUS 法案》，建立了全球最全面的穩定幣監管體系，並由特朗普總統簽署成法，獲得兩黨國會支持。該法為「支付型穩定幣」制訂聯邦監管，採取雙軌制，根據市值由聯邦或州政府監管。
GENIUS 法案對穩定幣的監管重點，僅限於發行商而非個人持有者。貨幣監理署負責非銀行發行商監管，聯邦儲備局則監察銀行子公司，當市值達一百億美元便須接受聯邦監管。這種做法與英國提出的個人持有上限大相逕庭，將監管焦點放在系統性發行商，但不限制市場參與者持有。
美國穩定幣監管的基石，是要求百分百以高流動性資產作準備金，包括美元、聯儲鈔票、短期國債及合資格貨幣市場基金。發行商必須每月公開準備金組合及進行獨立審計，確保透明度而不限制個人持有份額。這種以發行商為本而非限制持有者的制度，體現了美國監管機制更傾向促進市場效率與創新。
美國法律有意不設持有上限，是政策選擇上傾向市場導向而非行政手段。聯儲局主席鮑威爾亦曾強調，穩定幣需要監管，但重點應放在發行商的安全與健全，而非限制持有人。這做法旨在透過促進而非限制穩定幣應用，鞏固美元的全球儲備貨幣地位。
業界普遍正面回應 GENIUS 法案，主要穩定幣發行商讚賞其監管清晰度和合乎比例。貨幣監理署署長 Jonathan Gould 表示，該法案「將徹底改變金融服務行業」，提供監管穩定性，同時保留創新激勵。法案的成功說明業界更青睞於針對發行商的全面監管，而不是限制持有的政策。
歐盟框架：加密資產市場(MiCA)規例
歐盟的加密資產市場（MiCA）規例於2023年6月生效，分階段於2024年12月前全面實施，建立了全面的穩定幣監管，但未有設下個人持有上限。該框架區分資產參照代幣（ARTs，由多種資產支持）與電子貨幣代幣（EMTs，對應單一法定貨幣）。
MiCA 規定 ART 發行商須獲國家主管部門審批，EMT 則只限獲授權信貸機構或電子貨幣公司發行。對達至特定規模的「重要」發行商，歐洲銀行管理局會加強監察，分級監管但不限制個人持有，這點與美國重點監管發行商類似。
儲備資產規定要求一對一現金及高流動資產支持，並設有多元化及本地化限額，規定三至六成準備金要存放於歐盟商業銀行。季度審計報告及交易監察確保全面規管，但無持有上限。框架通過規定發行商責任以保障消費者，而非限制市場准入。
實施進度亦展現 MiCA 的可行性，符合要求的穩定幣已在歐盟市場流通，未符資格的則遭下架。18個月過渡期令現有服務商順利合規，市場未出現混亂，證明只針對發行商監管一樣可達政策目標，毋須限制持有。
國家層面的監管使27成員國標準一致，同時容許地方當局監管小型發行商，這種聯邦模式確保監管一致，毋須中央追蹤個人持有，與英國所建議的個人上限相反。
其他主要司法管轄區
日本於2023年6月修訂《支付服務法》，建立全球首套完整穩定幣監管體系。金融廳規定只有銀行、信託公司及持牌匯款商方可發行，且必須以高流動性資產全數支持，惟並無設下個人持有上限，說明即使監管嚴謹亦毋須限制用戶。
新加坡金管局（MAS）的制度，專注於與新加坡元或G10貨幣掛鈎的單一貨幣穩定幣，自2023年8月《支付服務法》修訂起生效。發行人超過500萬新加坡元流通量需獲主要支付機構牌照，並須嚴格儲備及贖回標準。與其他主要市場一樣，新加坡辦到全面監管，而無需個人持有上限。
加拿大現時採用加拿大證監會（CSA）第21-333號公告，進行臨時證券監管，聯邦與省級權責出現重疊。框架只容許於合規平台上流通以加元或美元計價的穩定幣，亦強制要求發行商披露及合規，但即使要求嚴格，目前並未設持有上限，新聯邦審慎規管尚在制定。
香港自2024年3月推出穩定幣監管沙盒，2025年8月《穩定幣條例》生效，對本地發行商及全球港元穩定幣強制發牌。金管局監管法幣掛鈎穩定幣，要求完善管治及儲備，但無個人持有上限。多間大型金融機構如渣打銀行已參與沙盒，足證業界普遍接受以發行商為主的監管。
比較分析：理念分歧
美國推崇市場導向，主張以全面監管發行商來促進創新及增強美元全球競爭力，並無設限市場參與。GENIUS 法案的聯邦—州雙軌設計，既提供彈性又確保安全標準一致，體現美國優先市場效率而非行政干預的理念。
歐盟則以謹慎為原則，強調消費者保障及金融穩定，為成員國設立統一標準，以本地化及多元化規定鞏固監管……
（如需續譯其餘段落，請通知我！）obligations rather than individual ownership limitations, demonstrating that comprehensive oversight need not restrict market participation.
以日本、新加坡及香港為首的亞洲監管創新，展現了透過全面的發行人監督、儲備要求和治理標準達致金融穩定的另類做法，而非依賴個人持有量限制。這些框架指出，只要有合適的監管安排，穩定幣發行人可在不設人為市場准入限制的情況下安全運作。
英國建議的持有量上限在主要司法管轄區中屬獨特監管方式，美國、歐盟或亞洲主要金融中心均未有類似限制。這種分歧引起人們對英國競爭地位的疑問，以及就穩定幣金融穩定目標而言，持有量限制與發行人全面監管哪一者更有效。
Technical and Economic Analysis
Stablecoins represent a fundamental evolution in digital payment infrastructure, with technical mechanisms designed to maintain price stability while enabling programmable money functionality. Understanding these systems' operational characteristics provides crucial context for evaluating the effectiveness and feasibility of proposed ownership restrictions.
穩定幣是數碼支付基建的重要變革，其技術設計旨在維持價格穩定同時實現可編程貨幣功能。了解這些系統的運作特點，有助評估所提出持有量限制措施的成效及可行性。
穩定幣維持價格穩定主要有三種模式，每種模式的風險特徵及經濟影響各異。法幣抵押型穩定幣約佔2,890億美元市場的九成，其穩定來源於傳統貨幣儲備，由託管銀行持有。例如Tether（USDT）流通量達1,430億美元，Circle發行的USDC市值640億美元。這些系統透過直接贖回機制，用戶可按面值把代幣兌換成相關法幣，以確保穩定。
儲備支持模型的風險特性及監管含義差異顯著。法幣抵押型穩定幣依賴傳統銀行的託管安排，增強與現有金融基建的依賴，並提供最高的穩定性及流動性。以加密資產超額抵押（如MakerDAO的DAI）的系統則利用自動清算機制，在市場波動時維持穩定。而算術穩定幣於TerraUSD崩潰後僅佔市場不足0.2%，其通過編程調整供應嘗試維持穩定，但已顯示出嚴重系統性風險。
「銀行存款替代論」成為傳統金融機構及監管機關的關注點，惟實證數據顯示在適當監管框架下風險可控。國際結算銀行研究指出，穩定幣因其全年無休的特性，比傳統銀行業務時間的限制，更易於在銀行壓力時引發存款轉移；但美聯儲研究則指，只要有相應審慎措施與央行流動性支持，相關風險可控。
國際監管機構就系統性風險的評估標準，側重規模、關聯度、網絡效應、替代性及營運複雜程度，而非武斷的持有門檻。金融穩定理事會框架強調「同一業務同一風險同一監管」原則，主張對穩定幣應如同傳統貨幣市場工具一樣監管，而毋須額外設持有量限制。
網絡效應及支付系統經濟學證明穩定幣在成本及速度上具顛覆傳統支付基建潛力。2024年穩定幣總交易額達27.6萬億美元，超越Visa及Mastercard總和，年度自然增長達28%。跨境匯款通過穩定幣費用僅0.5-3%，相較傳統方式收費6.35%，且結算時間以分鐘計算而非數日。這些經濟優勢顯示，若設持有量上限，可能會限制這項優越支付科技的普及。
市場集中度分析發現，主要穩定幣發行人高度集中，Tether雖面對儲備透明度質疑，仍佔58.84%市場份額。這種集中現象意味，加強發行人監管或較設持有量限制更有效，因只需監督少數具系統重要性的發行人，比監控數百萬持有人的執法挑戰更少。
儲備資產的質素，大概是穩定幣穩定性的最關鍵因素，不同儲備模式帶來不同系統風險。高質流動資產如國債及央行存款，能於市場壓力時維持穩定，而商業票據及企業債可能帶來傳染風險。美國及歐盟近期監管要求規定了儲備組成標準，而無設持有者限制，反映決策者認為發行人監管較限制持有更有效。
各地央行的銀行業影響模型顯示，穩定幣崛起可能令傳統存款減少，尤其是個人用戶尋求更高回報選擇。但這或是市場分配效率提升，並非系統風險，因獲充份資產支持的穩定幣，能以更優技術提供相似貨幣功能。英倫銀行自家研究指，只要有合適央行流動性設施，流動性風險「長遠而言是可控的」。
跨境資金流分析證實穩定幣在促進國際支付及資金流通方面發揮作用，每月跨境交易額約3.6萬億美元。這一全球性特徵意味國內持有量限制未必有效，因用戶可經境外平台或去中心化協議繞過本地監管。
交易成本經濟學為穩定幣普及提供有力理據。區塊鏈系統相對傳統代理銀行網絡帶來大量效率提升。穩定幣的電子商貿交易手續費約0.1%，遠低於信用卡的3.5%，而可編程貨幣的原子結算及智能合約功能，亦為傳統支付系統難以達成。
資金流通及周期顯示穩定幣以支付媒介角色為主，非儲值工具，用戶持有週期短，表示活躍於商業交易。因此持有量上限的實效或低於預期，因用戶主要用於交易流通，不會長期囤積。
市場微結構分析反映，多個交易所及區塊鏈網絡內，有複雜的套利機制維持穩定幣價格穩定。做市商及授權參與者通過贖回與發行持續調整供求，有效進行價格發現，而無需中央介入。設持有量限制，或會妨礙參與者持有足夠存貨以進行有效套利，影響這些市場機制。
Historical Context and Precedent Cases
Understanding previous attempts to regulate digital assets and comparable financial restrictions provides valuable context for evaluating the likely effectiveness of stablecoin ownership caps and their broader implications for financial system stability.
過往對數碼資產持有的限制嘗試，一般成效有限甚至適得其反，資深用戶往往能繞過限制，而正規參與者反而需面對合規負擔。中國自2017至2021年多次規管行動全面禁絕加密貨幣買賣，雖一度減少本地交易量，卻未能杜絕用戶透過地下P2P網絡繼續參與。同樣地，印度推行加密資產限制時，市場亦能適應監管轉變，未有徹底消滅數碼資產活動。
傳統金融服務上設持有量限制的經驗亦有喜有憂。例如Glass-Steagall法案分隔商業及投資銀行業務，數十年確實促進市場定位，但最終敵不過金融創新及競爭壓力而被取代。2008年金融危機後，貨幣市場基金監管重點放於流動性要求及贖回閘門，並無設個人持有上限，反映監管者認同發行人監管更為有效。
國際經驗顯示，主要金融中心對同類金融工具甚少設個人持有上限。歐盟UCITS指令對共同投資計劃實施全面發行人規管，未有限制投資者參與。同樣，美國對貨幣市場基金設嚴格的儲備和流動性準則，並允許無限個人持有，體現管理系統性風險的另一方法。
Failed regulatory proposals in other jurisdictions provide cautionaryexamples about the challenges of implementing digital asset ownership restrictions. Russia's proposed digital asset holding limits faced technical implementation challenges and industry opposition before being abandoned in favor of comprehensive taxation and reporting requirements. Venezuela's attempts to restrict cryptocurrency usage through the Petro digital currency and associated regulations largely failed due to enforcement difficulties and market adaptation.
舉例說明落實數碼資產持有限制所遇到的挑戰。俄羅斯曾提出數碼資產持有上限，但因技術實施困難同業界反對，最終放棄，轉而實施全面稅務及申報規定。委內瑞拉試圖透過發行國家數碼貨幣「Petro」同相關規管來限制加密貨幣使用，但因執法困難同市場適應能力強，最終成效不彰。
Central Bank Digital Currency development represents an alternative approach to addressing stablecoin policy concerns without imposing ownership restrictions on private digital assets. However, President Trump's executive order banning federal CBDC development signals American preference for private stablecoin solutions, while European and Chinese CBDC initiatives proceed with different design characteristics and policy objectives. The relative success of private stablecoins versus CBDCs will likely influence future regulatory approaches toward ownership restrictions.
央行數碼貨幣（CBDC）發展提供解決穩定幣政策關注的另一種路徑，毋須對私人數碼資產設持有限制。不過，特朗普總統以行政命令禁止聯邦CBDC發展，表現出美國較傾向私人穩定幣方案；與此同時，歐洲及中國的CBDC項目則各自朝住唔同技術設計與政策目標發展。未來於持有限制上的監管取態，可能會受私人穩定幣與CBDC相對成敗所影響。
Banking regulation precedents from traditional finance demonstrate both successful and unsuccessful approaches to managing systemic risks through structural limitations. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation coverage limits of $250,000 per account provide consumer protection without restricting overall bank participation, while Regulation Y's merchant banking investment restrictions have proven adaptable to changing market conditions. These examples suggest that time-limited or context-specific restrictions might prove more sustainable than absolute ownership caps.
傳統金融嘅銀行監管先例反映，用結構性限制去管理系統性風險，有得亦有失。例如聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）對每個賬戶保額設$250,000上限，能保障消費者但又冇限制銀行整體參與；而Regulation Y對商業銀行的投資限制，亦展現咗能隨市場情況而作調整。呢啲例子顯示，有限時或針對特定情景的限制，比起絕對持有上限，可能更可持續。
Capital controls and currency restrictions offer historical examples of governments attempting to limit individual participation in alternative monetary systems. The Bretton Woods system's capital controls maintained currency stability for decades but ultimately collapsed when technological and economic forces made restrictions unsustainable. More recent examples including Cyprus's deposit controls during the 2013 banking crisis demonstrated that temporary restrictions might be feasible during acute crises but prove difficult to maintain over extended periods.
資本管制及貨幣限制屬於政府限制個人參與另類貨幣體系的歷史實例。布雷頓森林體系下的資本管制，令貨幣穩定維持咗幾十年，但最後都抵不住技術同經濟發展帶來的壓力而解體。近期例如塞浦路斯2013年銀行危機時實施存款管制，都顯示限時限制於危機爆發時或可執行，但長遠有限難度。
Electronic money regulation evolution provides directly relevant precedents for stablecoin oversight. The European Union's Electronic Money Directive established comprehensive issuer requirements for prepaid cards and digital payment systems without imposing individual holding limits. This framework has successfully regulated electronic money instruments for over two decades, suggesting that well-designed issuer oversight can achieve policy objectives without ownership restrictions.
電子貨幣監管發展為穩定幣監管提供咗直接借鏡。歐盟的《電子貨幣指令》對預付卡及電子支付系統設有一套完整發行人規定，但並無就個人持有量設上限。呢個框架行之有效超過二十年，反映良好設計嘅發行人監管可以喺唔設持有上限之下達成政策目標。
Payment system regulation history demonstrates regulatory preference for institutional oversight rather than individual participation limits. The Federal Reserve's oversight of systemically important payment systems focuses on operational resilience, risk management, and interoperability standards without restricting individual transaction sizes or holdings. This approach has maintained financial stability while allowing innovation in payment technologies and business models.
支付系統監管歷史顯示，監管機構較偏向對機構進行審查，而非限制個人參與。聯邦儲備局對系統重要支付系統的監督，重點在操作韌性、風險管理及互通標準，未有對個人交易額或持有量設限。呢種做法既守住金融穩定，亦容許支付技術同商業模式繼續創新。
Financial crisis responses generally emphasize institutional strengthening rather than individual access restrictions. The 2008 financial crisis led to enhanced bank capital requirements, liquidity standards, and resolution procedures without imposing individual deposit or investment limits. Similarly, the European sovereign debt crisis prompted institutional reforms including banking union and enhanced supervision rather than restricting individual participation in government debt markets.
金融危機應對策略通常集中於加強機構層面，而唔係收緊個人參與。2008年金融海嘯之後，加強銀行資本要求、流動性標準及解決程序，但無對個人存款或投資設限。同樣，歐洲主權債務危機激發咗一系列包括銀行聯盟、加強監督等機構性改革，都唔係從限制個人對政府債券市場參與入手。
Regulatory arbitrage examples from financial history demonstrate the challenges of maintaining restrictions when alternative jurisdictions offer more permissive frameworks. The Eurodollar market's development in response to US banking regulations illustrates how financial activity migrates to more accommodating legal environments. Similarly, the growth of offshore financial centers reflects market adaptation to onerous domestic regulations, suggesting that UK stablecoin restrictions could drive activity to competing jurisdictions.
金融歷史上，監管套利例子展示咗當有其他司法管轄區提供較寬鬆規管時，維持限制面對困難。例如歐元美元市場正正係因美國銀行監管而興起—金融活動會遷移到規管較寬鬆地區。同理，離岸金融中心崛起，亦係市場應對嚴格本土監管嘅適應，意味住如果英國對穩定幣設限，相關業務可能轉移到其他競爭地區。
Innovation and regulation balance has historically favored approaches that channel rather than restrict technological advancement. The Internet's development faced initial regulatory uncertainty but ultimately thrived under frameworks that addressed legitimate policy concerns while preserving innovation incentives. Electronic securities trading, online banking, and mobile payments all faced regulatory skepticism before achieving mainstream acceptance through comprehensive oversight rather than usage restrictions.
創新與監管之間，歷來多傾向引導多於限制技術進步。互聯網早期都面對政策不明，但最終都係喺兼顧政策訴求同鼓勵創新下茁壯成長。電子證券交易、網上銀行、手機支付等，都歷經監管質疑，最後都係靠全面審查制度，而唔係限制用戶使用，得以成為主流。
Stakeholder Perspectives Deep Dive
The stablecoin ownership cap debate has mobilized diverse constituencies across traditional finance, crypto industries, and policy communities, revealing fundamental disagreements about digital asset regulation philosophy and the appropriate balance between innovation and stability.
有關穩定幣持有上限的討論，已經動員咗傳統金融、加密產業同政策界各方，暴露出對數碼資產監管理念，以及創新與穩定應如何平衡等根本性分歧。
Traditional Financial Institutions
Banking industry concerns center on competitive displacement and systemic stability, with major institutions expressing mixed views about stablecoin growth and proposed regulatory responses. The Bank Policy Institute, representing large US commercial banks, has warned that unchecked stablecoin expansion could trigger massive deposit outflows, potentially reaching $6.6 trillion and threatening credit availability. However, many banks simultaneously view stablecoins as technological improvements deserving integration with traditional payment systems rather than restriction through ownership caps.
銀行業最關注競爭被取代同系統性穩定問題，各大機構對穩定幣增長及相關監管取態意見分歧。例如代表美國大型銀行嘅Bank Policy Institute曾警告，穩定幣不受限制咁擴張，可能會引發史無前例嘅存款外流，金額可高達6.6萬億美元，進一步威脅信貸供應。不過，好多銀行一方面都認為穩定幣係技術進步，可考慮納入傳統支付系統，而唔一定要用持有上限定死佢。
Payment processor positioning reveals industry adaptation to stablecoin adoption rather than resistance to the technology itself. Stripe's acquisition of Bridge to enable business stablecoin transactions demonstrates major processors embracing digital assets while charging approximately half the fees of traditional card payments. Mastercard and Visa have both announced stablecoin integration initiatives, suggesting incumbent payment companies view the technology as complementary rather than competitive to their core business models.
支付處理商方面可以見到，業界愈來愈傾向採納穩定幣技術，而唔係純粹抗拒。Stripe收購Bridge、開展商業穩定幣交易，用戶手續費只係傳統信用卡約一半，顯示龍頭支付商樂於擁抱數碼資產。Mastercard同Visa都曾公布穩定幣整合計劃，反映傳統支付公司視穩定幣為現有業務的補充而非威脅。
Credit union and building society perspectives have received less public attention but represent important considerations for retail financial services. These institutions typically emphasize member services over profit maximization, potentially making them more sympathetic to consumer benefits from stablecoin adoption. However, their business models depend heavily on deposit funding, creating similar concerns about displacement that motivate larger banks' regulatory caution.
信用合作社同建屋互助社方面雖然較少被討論，但對零售金融服務都有重要影響。呢類機構著重會員服務多於追逐利潤，可能對穩定幣帶來的消費者好處更有同情。不過，佢哋業務模式都非常依賴存款資金來源，所以都會有同大型銀行一樣對資金被分流的憂慮，推動其取謹慎立場。
Regulatory compliance departments across traditional financial institutions express concern about the implementation complexity and costs of monitoring stablecoin ownership caps across customer relationships. Major banks already invest heavily in transaction monitoring systems for anti-money laundering and know-your-customer compliance, but stablecoin oversight would require entirely new technological capabilities for blockchain analysis and cross-platform coordination.
傳統金融機構的合規部普遍擔心，要就持有上限實行監控，技術複雜度同成本會大幅提升。現時大型銀行已經為打擊洗黑錢同「認識客戶」規定投放大量監察資源，但要管理穩定幣持有量監控，涉及全新區塊鏈分析技術同跨平台協調，所需既能力同成本遠高過現有系統。
Crypto Industry Segments
Stablecoin issuers have been uniformly opposed to ownership caps while expressing willingness to accept comprehensive reserve and governance requirements. Tether, despite facing ongoing regulatory scrutiny about reserve transparency, has emphasized that artificial ownership restrictions would undermine stablecoins' utility for legitimate commercial transactions. Circle has positioned itself as supporting "thoughtful regulation" while opposing caps that would "hamper innovation and U.S. leadership in digital assets."
穩定幣發行方一致反對設立持有上限，但表示願意接受全面儲備同治理要求。即使Tether一直受到外界質疑其儲備透明度，佢亦多次強調人為持有限制會削弱穩定幣用於合法商業交易的功能。Circle則一邊稱支持「審慎監管」，一邊反對影響創新及損害美國數字資產領導地位的持有上限。
Digital asset trading platforms face unique operational challenges from ownership restrictions due to their role as intermediaries holding customer assets in omnibus wallets. Major exchanges argue that monitoring individual customer exposure across multiple platforms would require unprecedented coordination and real-time data sharing that could compromise competitive strategies and customer privacy. Some platforms have indicated they might restrict services to UK customers rather than implement complex ownership monitoring systems.
數碼資產交易平台因為經常用大戶錢包存放客戶資產，所以持有上限對其日常運作構成獨特難題。大型交易所認為，要監控個別用戶跨多個平台的持倉，須要前所未有的協調力度同實時資料共享，會影響競爭策略同損害客戶私隱。有啲平台甚至表明，寧願限制英國用戶服務範疇，都唔想實行複雜持有量監控。
DeFi protocol implications present particularly complex considerations as decentralized finance applications often integrate stablecoins as fundamental infrastructure for lending, trading, and yield generation. Many DeFi protocols operate through smart contracts with varying degrees of decentralization, making traditional regulatory compliance difficult or impossible. The Treasury Department has acknowledged exploring embedded compliance mechanisms through smart contract modifications, but technical implementation remains largely theoretical.
去中心化金融（DeFi）協議有更複雜情況，因為穩定幣經常係DeFi產品借出、交易同產生收益的核心基礎設施。好多DeFi協議運作是通過智能合約，而去中心化程度唔同，傳統監管措施根本無法落實。美國財政部雖承認會考慮在智能合約層面加入合規機制，但相關技術應用至今仍屬理論層面。
Institutional adoption considerations reflect growing corporate and investment management interest in stablecoins for treasury management and cross-border payments. Major corporations including Tesla, MicroStrategy, and Square hold significant cryptocurrency positions, while asset managers increasingly offer crypto investment products. Ownership caps could limit institutional participation in legitimate business activities, potentially undermining the UK's competitiveness in attracting crypto-related business investment.
機構採納方面愈見重視穩定幣於企業財務管理及跨境支付。特斯拉、MicroStrategy、Square等大型企業都持有大量加密資產，資產管理人亦愈來愈多加密產品供應。設立持有上限可能會令機構參與正常商業活動受限，有機會削弱英國吸引加密行業商業投資的吸引力。
Mining and infrastructure providers represent an often-overlooked stakeholder group whose operations could face indirect impacts from ownership restrictions. Cryptocurrency miners, validator nodes, and blockchain infrastructure providers often hold stablecoins for operational purposes including electricity payments, equipment purchases, and cross-border transactions. Ownership caps could increase operational complexity and costs for these essential blockchain infrastructure providers.
礦工同區塊鏈基建營運商經常被忽略，但都可能受持有限制間接影響。加密貨幣礦工、驗證節點及相關基建供應商，經常為支付電費、購買設備或進行跨境結算持有穩定幣。施加上限只會令佢哋日常營運更加複雜及成本增加。
Policy and Academic Views
Financial stability experts have expressed divergent views about the necessity and effectiveness of stablecoin ownership caps 金融穩定專家對設立穩定幣持有上限的必要性及效用意見分歧versus alternative regulatory approaches. The Financial Stability Board's recommendations emphasize comprehensive regulation addressing "same activity, same risk, same regulation" without explicitly endorsing ownership restrictions. International Monetary Fund analysis suggests that well-regulated stablecoin systems could enhance rather than threaten financial stability by providing resilient payment infrastructure.
相對於其他監管方式，金融穩定委員會（FSB）建議強調全面監管，著重「同一活動、同一風險、同一規管」，但並無明確支持設有持有量限制。國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）分析指出，規管良好的穩定幣系統有機會通過提供具韌性的支付基礎設施，提升而非威脅金融穩定。
Academic research institutions have produced extensive analysis of stablecoin systemic risk, generally concluding that properly regulated issuers pose manageable threats to financial stability. Bank for International Settlements research indicates that comprehensive reserve requirements and supervisory oversight can address most systemic concerns without restricting individual participation. Federal Reserve Bank research has similarly emphasized issuer regulation over holder restrictions as more effective policy approaches.
學術研究機構對穩定幣的系統性風險進行了大量分析，普遍認為只要發行人獲得適當監管，對金融穩定所構成的威脅是可控的。國際清算銀行的研究指出，通過設定全面的儲備要求和監督措施，便可解決大多數系統性顧慮，而無需限制個人參與。美國聯邦儲備銀行的研究亦強調，規管發行人比起限制持有人，屬於更有效的政策方法。
Think tank policy recommendations reflect broader ideological divisions about digital asset regulation and government intervention in financial markets. The Atlantic Council has emphasized stablecoins' role in extending dollar dominance globally, arguing that ownership restrictions could undermine American strategic interests. The Brookings Institution has noted legitimate concerns about illicit finance while questioning whether blanket caps represent proportionate responses to identified risks.
智庫的政策建議反映出圍繞數碼資產監管及政府介入金融市場的更廣泛意識形態分歧。大西洋理事會強調穩定幣對推動美元全球主導地位的作用，並認為設有限制持有權的措施，可能會損害美國的戰略利益。布魯金斯學會則指出對非法資金流動的合理關注，但同時質疑全面設限是否與實際風險相稱。
International organization perspectives generally favor comprehensive regulatory frameworks over ownership restrictions, with the Bank for International Settlements, International Monetary Fund, and Financial Stability Board all emphasizing issuer oversight as primary policy tools. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has recommended risk-based approaches that address specific stablecoin characteristics rather than imposing uniform ownership limitations across diverse use cases and user types.
國際組織普遍傾向於採用全面監管框架，而非設立持有量限制，國際清算銀行、國際貨幣基金組織及金融穩定委員會均強調將發行人監管作為主要政策工具。經濟合作與發展組織（OECD）則建議採用以風險為本的方法，處理穩定幣的特定特質，而不是對各種用例及用戶類型，一刀切地實施統一持有上限。
Privacy and civil liberties organizations have expressed significant concern about the surveillance implications of comprehensive ownership monitoring required for cap enforcement. The Electronic Frontier Foundation and similar groups argue that stablecoin oversight should focus on transparency and consumer protection rather than transaction surveillance that could undermine financial privacy rights. These concerns have gained political traction in jurisdictions emphasizing individual privacy protection.
私隱及公民自由組織對於全面持有量監控所涉及之監察問題極為關注。電子前線基金會及類似組織主張，穩定幣監管應著重透明度及消費者保障，而不應以監控交易作為手段去削弱金融私隱權。這些憂慮在著重個人私隱保障的地區越來越受政治重視。
Consumer advocacy groups present mixed perspectives on stablecoin ownership caps, with some supporting restrictions as consumer protection measures while others emphasize access to superior payment technology. Consumer Reports has noted stablecoins' potential benefits for unbanked populations and cross-border payments while acknowledging legitimate concerns about investor protection and systemic risks. These groups generally favor disclosure and education over ownership restrictions as primary consumer protection mechanisms.
消費者倡議團體對於穩定幣持有量上限的看法分歧，有部份認為限制屬於保障消費者的措施，亦有團體強調應促進大眾接觸更優越的支付技術。Consumer Reports（消費者報告）曾指出穩定幣對無銀行人口及跨境支付具潛在好處，同時承認投資者保障及系統性風險的合理關注。總體而言，這些團體傾向以資訊披露及教育作為主要消費者保障手段，而非實施持有上限。
Fintech industry associations across multiple jurisdictions have generally opposed ownership caps while supporting comprehensive regulatory frameworks that provide legal certainty without stifling innovation. The Financial Technology Association in the US and similar organizations in Europe and Asia have emphasized that artificial restrictions could drive innovation to more permissive jurisdictions while failing to address underlying policy concerns about stablecoin risks.
多個司法管轄區的金融科技業界協會普遍反對設立持有上限，同時支持提供法律確定性的全面監管框架，而不窒礙創新。美國金融科技協會及歐洲、亞洲類似組織皆強調，設下人為限制或會令創新流向監管較寬鬆的地區，同時未能解決與穩定幣風險有關的根本政策問題。
Legal scholars and practitioners have raised constitutional and practical concerns about ownership cap enforcement, particularly regarding financial privacy rights and the feasibility of monitoring decentralized blockchain networks. Legal analysis suggests that comprehensive ownership monitoring could face judicial challenges under privacy protections while proving practically ineffective against sophisticated evasion techniques.
法律學者及執業者對執行持有上限提出了憲制及實務方面的憂慮，特別是有關金融私隱權及監控去中心化區塊鏈網絡的可行性。法律分析認為，全面的持有量監察制度，有可能受隱私保障條款挑戰，且難以對抗高階規避技術，實際成效存疑。
Implementation Challenges and Practical Considerations
The technical and operational complexities of enforcing stablecoin ownership caps present formidable challenges that extend far beyond traditional financial regulation, requiring unprecedented surveillance capabilities and raising fundamental questions about privacy, effectiveness, and economic costs.
落實穩定幣持有上限所涉及的技術及營運挑戰，遠超傳統金融監管，需要前所未有的監察能力，並對私隱、成效及經濟成本產生根本性疑問。
Digital identity verification requirements represent perhaps the most significant implementation hurdle, as effective ownership monitoring would necessitate linking every blockchain wallet address to verified real-world identities. Current KYC and AML systems in traditional finance operate through centralized intermediaries like banks and brokers, but stablecoins function on permissionless blockchain networks where users can create unlimited wallet addresses without any intermediary oversight. Comprehensive enforcement would require mandatory identity verification for all wallet creation, fundamentally altering the decentralized nature of blockchain systems.
數碼身份驗證要求或許是執行時最大的障礙，因為有效監控持有量，需要將每個區塊鏈錢包地址，與經認證的實名身份連結。現時傳統金融的KYC及AML制度，經由銀行﹑券商等集中中介執行，但穩定幣則運行於無許可鏈上，用戶可無限創建錢包地址，無須中介審查。要做到全面執行，便需要全部錢包開設均強制實名認證，這根本會改變區塊鏈系統的去中心化本質。
Cross-border transaction monitoring capabilities face inherent limitations due to blockchain networks' global and permissionless characteristics. Stablecoins operate across multiple blockchain protocols including Ethereum, Tron, and various Layer 2 solutions, with transactions crossing jurisdictional boundaries seamlessly. Monitoring cross-border flows would require unprecedented international cooperation and technical infrastructure that currently does not exist, while users could easily circumvent restrictions by routing transactions through foreign platforms or decentralized exchanges operating beyond any single jurisdiction's regulatory reach.
跨境交易監控因區塊鏈本身的全球化及無許可特性而受限。穩定幣橫跨以太坊、Tron及多種L2協議，在各司法管轄區無縫流通。要監控跨境資金流，必須建立現時並不存在的國際協調及技術基建，而用戶亦可輕易透過外國平台或運作於監管以外的去中心化交易所遷就規避限制。
Privacy implications and surveillance concerns have emerged as significant policy considerations, as comprehensive ownership monitoring would require real-time tracking of all stablecoin transactions and holdings across multiple platforms. Such surveillance capabilities would exceed those currently deployed for traditional financial instruments, potentially creating new risks for financial privacy and civil liberties. The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation and similar privacy frameworks could complicate implementation of comprehensive monitoring systems, particularly regarding data retention and cross-border sharing requirements.
私隱問題及監控憂慮已成為重要政策考量，全面監測持有量須即時追蹤所有平台上的穩定幣持倉及交易。所需監控能力將遠超現有傳統金融監管，可能對金融私隱及公民自由帶來新風險。歐盟GDPR及其他類似私隱法例預期會進一步令實施大型監控系統複雜化，尤其是在資料保留及跨境傳送上。
Technology infrastructure needs for effective ownership cap enforcement would require massive investments in blockchain analytics capabilities, real-time monitoring systems, and coordination platforms linking thousands of service providers. Current blockchain analytics companies like Chainalysis and Elliptic provide transaction tracking for law enforcement and compliance purposes, but scaling these capabilities to monitor hundreds of millions of wallet addresses in real-time would require exponentially greater computational resources and technical sophistication.
要有效執行持有上限，相關技術基建需要在區塊鏈分析能力、即時監控系統，以及串連全球數以千計服務供應商的平台上作出巨額投資。現時的區塊鏈分析公司如Chainalysis、Elliptic等只為執法及合規提供交易追蹤，但要將這些功能提升至可即時監控數億個錢包地址，所需的運算資源和技術複雜度將倍增。
Compliance costs for service providers could prove prohibitive for smaller companies while creating barriers to entry for new participants. Comprehensive ownership monitoring would require specialized personnel including blockchain analysts, compliance specialists, and technical infrastructure teams, potentially costing millions of pounds annually for larger platforms. These costs could drive market consolidation by making comprehensive compliance feasible only for well-capitalized incumbents, potentially reducing competition and innovation in digital asset services.
服務供應商的合規成本或高得超出小型公司負荷，並對新進者形成重大壁壘。要實施全面持有監控，必須聘請區塊鏈分析師、合規專才及技術團隊，大型平台每年開支可達數百萬英鎊。這些成本或會令市場進一步集中，只有資本雄厚者可持續經營，從而壓縮數碼資產服務的競爭與創新空間。
Underground and peer-to-peer market displacement risks represent a fundamental challenge to ownership cap effectiveness, as sophisticated users could easily circumvent restrictions through decentralized protocols and privacy-focused blockchain networks. Historical examples from jurisdictions with crypto restrictions demonstrate that prohibition often drives activity underground rather than eliminating it, potentially reducing regulatory oversight while failing to achieve policy objectives. Decentralized exchanges, peer-to-peer trading protocols, and privacy coins provide readily available alternatives for users seeking to avoid ownership monitoring.
地下市場及點對點交易的轉移風險，根本地挑戰持有上限的效果，因為有經驗的用戶可透過去中心化協議及私隱區塊鏈網絡輕鬆規避限制。多個實施加密資產管制的司法管轄區經驗均顯示，禁令往往只令活動轉入地下，無法根治，同時減少監管能見度，未能實現政策目標。去中心化交易所、點對點交易協議及私隱幣，為避開持有監控者提供隨手可得的替代方案。
Regulatory arbitrage and jurisdiction shopping concerns reflect the global nature of blockchain networks and the ease with which users and businesses can relocate to more permissive regulatory environments. The recent migration of crypto businesses from restrictive jurisdictions to more accommodating ones demonstrates market sensitivity to regulatory approaches, suggesting that overly restrictive ownership caps could drive legitimate activity abroad while failing to prevent determined circumvention.
監管套利及地區選擇問題反映區塊鏈網絡的全球屬性，用戶及公司可以輕易轉移至監管較寬鬆地區。近期大批加密業務由受限地區遷往寬鬆地區，顯示市場對監管方式高度敏感，暗示過嚴格的持有上限或會驅使正規活動外流，又難以防止有心人規避。
Technical evasion methods available to users include wallet address fragmentation, privacy-focused blockchain protocols, decentralized mixing services, and atomic swaps between different cryptocurrencies. Users could maintain ownership below cap thresholds across hundreds of wallet addresses while using automated tools to coordinate transactions, effectively maintaining large positions while appearing compliant with individual ownership limits. More sophisticated users might employ privacy coins, decentralized exchanges, or cross-chain protocols to obfuscate ownership entirely.
用戶可採用的技術性規避方法包括：分散多個錢包地址、採用私隱區塊鏈協議、使用去中心化混幣服務，以及利用不同加密幣間的原子互換。透過這些技術，用戶可以在數百個錢包分散持有量，每個錢包合乎上限，但實際持有總量遠超限制。技術熟練者更能用私隱幣、去中心化交易所、跨鏈協議，令持有人身份變得難以追蹤。
Enforcement agency capabilities would require substantial expansion to address the technical complexities of blockchain monitoring and investigation. Traditional financial regulators lack the specialized technical expertise required for comprehensive cryptocurrency oversight, necessitating significant hiring and training programs. Law enforcement agencies would need enhanced blockchain analysis capabilities while regulatory bodies would require new technological infrastructure for real-time monitoring and compliance assessment.
執法機構的能力亦需大幅擴展，方能應對區塊鏈監察及調查所涉及的技術複雜性。傳統金融監管機構普遍缺乏專門的加密貨幣監管技術，需大規模招聘及培訓。執法部門要提升區塊鏈分析能力，監管機構則需要發展全新科技基礎建設，以便即時監控及進行合規評估。
International coordination requirements for effective ownership cap enforcement would necessitate unprecedented cooperation between regulatory agencies across multiple jurisdictions, as stablecoin transactions frequently cross borders within minutes or seconds. Existing mutual legal
（原文未完，斷句至此）assistance treaties and regulatory cooperation agreements were designed for traditional financial systems with clear jurisdictional boundaries, making them inadequate for blockchain-based systems operating across global networks simultaneously.
協助條約同監管合作協議，以往係為有清晰司法管轄範圍嘅傳統金融系統而設，因此對於而家同時跨越全球網絡運作嘅區塊鏈系統，變得唔再適用。
Data protection and privacy compliance issues arise from the extensive personal information collection and sharing required for comprehensive ownership monitoring. Financial privacy advocates argue that such surveillance exceeds reasonable regulatory requirements while potentially creating new vulnerabilities for data breaches and misuse. Compliance with existing privacy regulations while implementing comprehensive ownership monitoring presents complex legal challenges that have not been fully addressed in current regulatory proposals.
由於全面監察資產擁有權需要大量收集同共享個人資料，數據保障同私隱合規問題隨之而來。有財務私隱倡議者指出，呢類監察已經超越咗合理監管要求，同時有機會引入更多數據外洩同濫用嘅風險。現時監管建議未有充分處理，在落實全面資產擁有權監控時，要同時遵守現有私隱法規，會產生一連串複雜法律難題。
System reliability and operational resilience requirements for ownership monitoring infrastructure would need to meet the same standards as critical financial infrastructure, operating continuously with minimal downtime and robust cybersecurity protections. The complexity of monitoring multiple blockchain networks simultaneously while maintaining accurate ownership records creates potential single points of failure that could disrupt legitimate stablecoin usage if monitoring systems experience technical problems.
資產擁有權監察基礎設施喺系統可靠性同營運韌力方面，需達到同關鍵金融基建一樣嘅標準，要確保全天候無間斷運作，以及有強大網絡安全措施。實際同時監控多個區塊鏈網絡、又要保持準確擁有權紀錄，會形成潛在單點失效，假如監察系統出現技術問題，可能令合法穩定幣用途受阻。
Market Impact Analysis
The potential implementation of stablecoin ownership caps would create significant ripple effects throughout digital asset markets and broader financial systems, with implications extending far beyond immediate compliance requirements to fundamental questions about innovation, competition, and economic efficiency.
如果穩定幣擁有權設限落實，將會對數字資產市場同更廣泛金融系統造成嚴重連鎖影響，除咗即時合規要求之外，更會影響根本性嘅創新、競爭同經濟效率問題。
Stablecoin market size and growth projections indicate the economic scale affected by potential ownership restrictions. With current market capitalization of $289.4 billion and annual transaction volumes of $27.6 trillion, stablecoins have achieved mainstream adoption across multiple use cases including cross-border payments, DeFi protocols, and corporate treasury management. Coinbase's institutional research forecasts potential growth to $1.2 trillion market capitalization by 2028, while McKinsey analysis suggests continued exponential expansion if regulatory clarity emerges. Ownership caps could significantly constrain this growth trajectory by limiting individual and business participation in legitimate commercial activities.
穩定幣市場規模及增長預測反映出擁有權限制將會影響住龐大經濟規模。目前市值達到2,894億美元，年交易額高達27.6萬億美元，穩定幣已經喺跨境支付、DeFi協議、企業財資管理等領域獲得主流應用。Coinbase嘅機構研究預計，去到2028年市值有機會升至1.2萬億美元，McKinsey分析亦指出，只要監管明朗可望爆發指數式增長。如果實施擁有權上限，可能大大壓縮增長空間，限制個人同商業合法參與。
UK crypto market positioning faces substantial risks from restrictive ownership caps relative to international competitors. Britain currently ranks behind the UAE in fintech investment attraction, attributed partly to regulatory uncertainty around digital assets. The proposed caps could accelerate this competitive decline by driving stablecoin issuers, exchanges, and related businesses to more permissive jurisdictions offering comprehensive regulatory frameworks without ownership restrictions. Major crypto companies including Binance have already relocated significant operations from restrictive regulatory environments, demonstrating market sensitivity to policy approaches.
英國加密市場定位，面對住來自國際競爭對手嘅重大風險。現時英國喺金融科技投資吸引力方面，已經排喺阿聯酋之後，部分原因就係圍繞數字資產嘅監管不明朗。今次提議設限，可能進一步加速競爭力下滑，令穩定幣發行商、交易所及相關企業轉向冇持有量限制、規管較完善嘅地區。主要加密公司（例如Binance）已經因監管環境嚴苛而轉移大量業務，反映市場對政策取態極敏感。
Potential capital flight scenarios could emerge if ownership caps drive legitimate users and businesses to foreign platforms or overseas jurisdictions. Cross-border blockchain transactions occur seamlessly within minutes, making regulatory arbitrage technically trivial for sophisticated users. Business customers requiring stablecoin holdings exceeding proposed caps might relocate treasury operations to jurisdictions without such restrictions, potentially reducing UK-based financial activity and associated tax revenues.
如果擁有權設限，會導致合法用戶同商業用家流向外國平台或海外地區，有機會出現資本外流。區塊鏈跨境交易可以幾分鐘內完成，對精明用家嚟講，監管套利變得非常容易。啲需要超過持有上限嘅商業客戶，可能會將財資運作遷往冇此類限制嘅司法地區，令本地金融活動同相關稅收下跌。
Innovation ecosystem implications extend beyond stablecoin markets to broader fintech and blockchain development. Restrictive ownership policies could signal broader regulatory hostility to digital asset innovation, potentially deterring investment in UK-based blockchain companies and research initiatives. The City of London's position as a global financial innovation hub depends partly on regulatory approaches that balance legitimate oversight with innovation incentives, making ownership caps potentially counterproductive to broader economic development objectives.
創新生態圈受影響並不限於穩定幣市場，仲會波及整體金融科技同區塊鏈產業。設立擁有權限制，有可能釋放對數字資產創新敵視嘅監管訊號，打擊投資者對英國本土區塊鏈公司同研究項目嘅信心。倫敦金融城作為全球金融創新樞紐，正正係靠住在監管同創新誘因之間取得平衡，設限反而同整體經濟發展大計背道而馳。
Start-up and fintech company considerations reveal particular vulnerabilities to ownership restrictions among smaller companies that rely on stablecoins for efficient cross-border payments, treasury management, and operational flexibility. Many blockchain companies operate with international teams and customer bases, requiring digital asset holdings for routine business operations. Ownership caps could increase operational costs and complexity for these companies while providing competitive advantages to traditional financial incumbents less reliant on digital asset infrastructure.
初創公司同金融科技企業會特別容易受持有權限制影響——佢哋多數依靠穩定幣實現高效率跨境支付、財資管理同操作彈性。好多區塊鏈公司本身團隊同客戶群都係國際化，需要持有數字資產作日常營運。設限可能令佢哋營運成本升高同運作加複雜，相反傳統金融巨頭因為唔使依賴呢啲數字資產基建，反而得到額外競爭優勢。
Institutional adoption impact could prove particularly significant as major corporations and investment managers increasingly integrate stablecoins into treasury operations and payment systems. Companies using stablecoins for cross-border supplier payments, employee compensation, or treasury management might face operational disruptions from ownership restrictions. Asset managers offering crypto investment products could find their strategies constrained by individual holding limits, potentially reducing product competitiveness versus offerings from jurisdictions without such restrictions.
機構採納方面影響亦會殊為重要，因為大企業同資產管理人不斷將穩定幣納入財資操作同支付系統。有需要利用穩定幣做跨境供應商付款、員工薪酬或者財資管理嘅企業，可能會因限制而導致運作受阻。資產管理公司推售加密投資產品，都會因個人持有上限影響策略，喺限制較少地區嘅產品面前競爭力下降。
DeFi protocol disruption represents a complex category of market impacts, as decentralized finance applications rely heavily on stablecoin liquidity for lending, trading, and yield generation activities. Individual ownership caps could fragment liquidity provision across multiple accounts and platforms, potentially reducing operational efficiency and increasing systemic risks through coordination challenges. Some DeFi protocols might become technically infeasible if core participants cannot maintain sufficient stablecoin holdings for market-making and arbitrage activities.
DeFi協議受阻，算係較複雜嘅市場衝擊。去中心化金融應用主要依靠穩定幣流動性做借貸、交易及收益生產。若設立個人持有上限，會令流動性供應分散喺多個戶口同平台，可能令運作效率下降，協調困難亦帶來系統風險。部分DeFi協議一旦主要參與者無法維持足夠持有量，基本上喺技術上都行唔通，市場造市同套利活動會受阻。
Payment system efficiency could decline if ownership caps prevent businesses from maintaining working balances sufficient for routine operations. Companies using stablecoins for payroll, supplier payments, or customer refunds might face operational disruptions from artificial holding limits. Cross-border payment efficiency, where stablecoins offer substantial cost and speed advantages over traditional correspondent banking, could deteriorate if businesses cannot hold sufficient balances for transaction facilitation.
如果持有權上限令企業無法維持足夠嘅營運資金，支付系統嘅效率會明顯下降。一啲用穩定幣做出糧、供應商付款、顧客服款等日常業務嘅公司，會因設限引發營運困難。跨境支付方面，穩定幣帶來成本同速度優勢都會打折扣，特別係無法維持必需結餘時，交易效率會明顯倒退。
Market maker and arbitrage impacts present systemic considerations for stablecoin price stability mechanisms. Professional market makers maintain substantial stablecoin inventories to provide liquidity across multiple exchanges and facilitate arbitrage operations that maintain price stability. Ownership caps could disrupt these operations by preventing market makers from holding sufficient inventory, potentially increasing price volatility and reducing overall market efficiency.
做市商同套利操作方面，穩定幣價格穩定機制好講求系統性。專業做市商一般會預備大量穩定幣存貨，以便跨平台供應流動性兼進行套利維持價格平穩。如果設限令做市商無法持有足夠資金，整體市場價格波動性會加大，令市場效率下降。
Competitive dynamics between stablecoin issuers could shift significantly if ownership caps create artificial scarcity effects or advantage certain business models over others. Issuers focusing on retail users might benefit from caps that limit institutional concentration, while those serving business customers could face competitive disadvantages. These market distortions could reduce innovation incentives and overall industry competitiveness versus international alternatives.
穩定幣發行商之間嘅競爭格局都有可能被人為設限扭曲。例如偏向個人用戶發展嘅發行商，可能因上限壓制機構集資而獲益；但主要服務商業客戶嘅發行商則會失去競爭優勢。呢種市場扭曲，有機會降低創新誘因，影響整體產業同國際對手比較下嘅競爭力。
Banking sector substitution effects represent complex dynamics that could prove counterproductive to policy objectives. If ownership caps prevent efficient stablecoin adoption for legitimate use cases, businesses and individuals might seek alternative digital asset solutions including privacy coins, foreign-issued stablecoins, or direct cryptocurrency holdings. Such substitution could reduce rather than enhance financial stability by pushing activity toward less regulated alternatives.
銀行業替代效應都係一個複雜動態，最終可能同政策目的背道而馳。如果擁有權設限令合法用途都無法高效採納穩定幣，企業同個人會選擇其他替代數字資產，例如私隱幣、外地發行嘅穩定幣、甚至直接持有加密貨幣。呢種轉移會將活動推去更少監管領域，未必係增進金融穩定，反而可能削弱咗。
Cross-border trade facilitation impacts could prove particularly significant for UK businesses engaged in international commerce. Stablecoins provide substantial advantages for cross-border payments including reduced costs, faster settlement, and 24/7 availability. Ownership restrictions could force businesses to rely on less efficient traditional payment systems, potentially reducing UK competitiveness in global trade and commerce.
對於從事國際貿易嘅英國企業，跨境交易便利性亦會受到重大影響。穩定幣喺跨境支付方面，帶來成本低、結算快、全年無休等優勢。設限之下，企業可能被迫退而求其次，依賴低效率嘅傳統支付系統，拉低咗英國喺全球商貿嘅競爭力。
Investment and venture capital implications extend to broader blockchain and fintech investment patterns, as venture capital firms and institutional investors evaluate regulatory environments when making allocation decisions. Restrictive ownership policies could signal unfavorable business conditions for blockchain companies, potentially reducing investment flows and deterring entrepreneur talent from establishing operations in the UK market.
投資同風險資本流動都會因監管環境受影響。風投公司同機構投資者分配資金時，好著重監管環境。過嚴持有政策會釋放出不利營商環境訊號，有機會減少資金流入，甚至阻嚇創業人才落戶本地。
Final thougths
The trajectory of stablecoin ownership caps will likely determine not only the immediate regulatory environment but also the UK's long-term positioning in global digital asset markets, with implications extending far beyond crypto-specific considerations to broader questions about financial innovation and international competitiveness.
穩定幣持有上限最終將會影響唔止即時監管環境，仲會決定住英國長遠喺全球數字資產市場嘅定位，影響範圍不僅限於加密領域，更延伸至金融創新同國際競爭力等廣泛議題。
Consultation process timeline indicates continued uncertainty through 2025, with the Bank of England planning formal consultation later this year following extensive industry engagement. Sasha Mills' July 2025 acknowledgment that "we are still engaging with industry and listening to feedback" suggests genuine consideration of industry concerns rather than predetermined regulatory outcomes. The extended consultation timeline reflects both the technical complexity of implementation and the strength of industry opposition, creating opportunities for substantive modifications to the original proposals.
諮詢程序預示住到2025年仍然存有不確定性，英倫銀行亦會於今年晚些時候展開正式諮詢，繼續進行業界交流。Sasha Mills於2025年7月指「我哋仍然同業界溝通，聽取意見」，反映相關方面正在真誠考慮行業訴求，而唔係預設立場。諮詢時間拉長，一方面體現實施技術複雜性，一方面反映行業反對力量，留有空間對原有建議作出重大修改。
Industry lobbying effectiveness has demonstrated considerable influence on regulatory thinking, with major trade associations coordinating sophisticated technical and economic arguments against ownership caps. TheUK Cryptoasset Business Council’s parliamentary reception events and formal consultation responses have engaged political stakeholders beyond traditional regulatory channels, while international industry participation has highlighted competitive implications for UK financial services leadership. The unified industry opposition contrasts with typically fragmented crypto industry political engagement, suggesting elevated stakes and coordination capabilities.
英國加密資產商業協會（UK Cryptoasset Business Council）在國會舉行的招待活動及正式諮詢回應，已經動員到傳統監管渠道以外的政治持份者，國際業界的參與亦突顯英國金融服務領導地位所面對的競爭挑戰。業界一反以往加密貨幣業普遍分化的政治參與，現在呈現出罕見，一致的反對聲音，反映事態嚴重，以及業界協調的能力提升。
Possible compromise positions could emerge from ongoing consultation processes, potentially including higher ownership thresholds, graduated implementation timelines, or exemptions for specific use cases including business operations and DeFi protocols. Alternative approaches might focus on enhanced disclosure requirements, mandatory insurance coverage, or risk-based supervision rather than absolute ownership limits. The Bank of England's acknowledgment of industry feedback suggests willingness to consider modifications that address policy concerns while reducing implementation complexity.
現時持續進行的諮詢過程有機會帶來妥協方案，或包括提高擁有權的門檻、分階段實施的時間表，或針對特定用途（如業務運作或去中心化金融（DeFi）協議）設立豁免。另類方案或會集中於加強披露要求、強制保險保障，或按風險監管，而非單純設立硬性的擁有上限。英倫銀行（Bank of England）對業界意見的回應，亦顯示有意考慮修訂方案，以解決政策顧慮並簡化實施難度。
International coordination prospects remain limited due to fundamental philosophical differences between major jurisdictions. The United States’ GENIUS Act explicitly rejects ownership caps while the European Union’s MiCA regulation similarly focuses on issuer requirements rather than holder restrictions. Asian financial centers including Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan have adopted comprehensive oversight without ownership limitations, suggesting that international harmonisation would likely favor less restrictive approaches rather than UK-style caps.
由於主要法域間存在根本性理念差異，國際間的政策協調前景有限。美國的GENIUS法案明確否定設立持有上限，歐盟的MiCA規例同樣強調發行方的要求，而非限制持有方。新加坡、香港及日本等亞洲金融中心，均已實施全面監管但無持有量限制，意味著未來國際協調如有進展，更有可能走向較寬鬆而非英國式的嚴格上限政策。
Regulatory arbitrage acceleration could intensify if the UK proceeds with ownership caps while other jurisdictions maintain more permissive frameworks. The ease of relocating digital asset operations across jurisdictions, combined with blockchain networks’ inherently global nature, suggests that restrictive policies could prove self-defeating by driving legitimate activity abroad while failing to prevent determined circumvention. Recent examples of crypto business migration from restrictive jurisdictions demonstrate market sensitivity to regulatory approaches.
如果英國繼續推行擁有上限，而其他國家地區則保持寬鬆框架，監管套利現象將進一步惡化。數碼資產業務極易跨境轉移，加上區塊鏈本身的全球性，嚴苛政策很可能弄巧反拙——導致合規業務流失海外，卻依然阻止不了有決心繞過規管的活動。近來有加密公司因監管嚴格而遷出等實例，亦反映市場對監管取向極為敏感。
CBDC development implications present both competitive and complementary considerations for stablecoin regulation. While President Trump’s executive order prohibits federal CBDC development in the United States, the UK continues exploring digital pound possibilities. Successful private stablecoin adoption could demonstrate market demand for digital payment solutions while providing regulatory experience relevant to CBDC design. Conversely, restrictive stablecoin policies could accelerate CBDC development as alternative approaches to digital payment innovation.
央行數碼貨幣（CBDC）的發展，對穩定幣監管帶來既有競爭亦有互補的考慮。美國總統特朗普下令禁止聯邦開發CBDC之際，英國仍在探索數碼英鎊的可能性。私人穩定幣如成功推廣，將顯示市場對數碼支付方案的需求，並讓監管機構獲得規劃CBDC的相關經驗。相反，如對穩定幣的規管過於嚴厲，則可能加快CBDC作為另類數碼支付創新的步伐。
Technology evolution scenarios suggest that blockchain and digital asset systems will continue developing in ways that challenge traditional regulatory approaches. Enhanced privacy technologies, cross-chain interoperability, and decentralized autonomous organization governance could make ownership monitoring increasingly difficult regardless of regulatory requirements. Policymakers may need to acknowledge technological realities when designing sustainable regulatory frameworks rather than attempting to constrain technological development through administrative restrictions.
技術演變預示區塊鏈與數碼資產系統將持續發展，日益挑戰傳統監管方式。隨着更強的隱私保障技術、鏈間互操作性及去中心化自治組織（DAO）治理等推展，即使有監管要求，持有狀況也愈來愈難以監控。政策制定者設計可持續監管框架時，宜正視技術現實，而非單靠行政手段去限制技術進步。
Financial services industry transformation will likely continue with or without specific stablecoin ownership caps, as broader digitalization trends affect traditional banking, payments, and investment management. Major financial institutions are already integrating digital asset capabilities while fintech companies develop blockchain-based alternatives to traditional services. Ownership caps could influence the pace and location of this transformation but are unlikely to prevent fundamental industry evolution.
無論是否設立穩定幣擁有上限，金融服務業的轉型都會持續，因更廣泛的數碼化趨勢正衝擊傳統銀行、支付及投資管理。大型金融機構已開始整合數碼資產功能，金融科技公司亦開發區塊鏈為基礎的服務，取代傳統業務。擁有上限或會影響這些轉型的速度及地區分布，但難以根本改變行業演變大勢。
Political economy considerations reflect broader questions about the appropriate role of government in financial innovation and market development. The tension between financial stability concerns and innovation promotion represents classic regulatory trade-offs that extend beyond stablecoin-specific issues. Political support for restrictive approaches may vary with economic conditions, technological developments, and international competitive pressures, suggesting that current policy positions may prove unsustainable over longer time horizons.
政治經濟考慮，其實是對政府在金融創新與市場發展中扮演什麼適當角色的更深層次提問。監管部署於金融穩定與鼓勵創新之間的張力，是不單止針對穩定幣的經典權衡。在經濟環境、技術發展與國際競爭壓力影響下，對限制式政策的政治支持或會出現波動，意味現時的政策立場未必能長遠維持。
Long-term financial system evolution will likely see continued integration between traditional and digital asset systems regardless of specific regulatory approaches. Central bank digital currencies, programmable money, and blockchain-based payment systems represent technological trajectories that transcend current policy debates about stablecoin ownership caps. Regulatory frameworks that attempt to constrain rather than channel these developments may prove ineffective or counterproductive over time.
長遠看，金融體系將繼續推進傳統與數碼資產之間的融合，無論監管取態如何。央行數碼貨幣、可編程貨幣及區塊鏈支付系統等科技路向，早已超越現時關於穩定幣擁有上限的政策爭議。嘗試約束而非引導這些發展的監管框架，長遠可能會變得無效，甚至產生反效果。
Scenario planning implications suggest several potential outcomes depending on policy decisions and industry responses. Successful implementation of ownership caps could theoretically slow stablecoin adoption while preserving traditional banking system stability, though enforcement challenges make this outcome uncertain. Industry adaptation through technical workarounds or jurisdictional migration could make caps ineffective while imposing compliance costs on legitimate participants. International competitive pressures could force policy reversals if restrictive approaches prove economically disadvantageous versus competitor jurisdictions.
多種未來情景規劃顯示，結果將取決於政策決定及業界應對。一旦持有上限成功落實，理論上能減慢穩定幣普及速度，同時維持傳統銀行體系穩定，但執行困難令其成效成疑。業界或會透過技術手段或遷移至其他法域適應新規，令上限難以收效，亦會加重合規負擔。若嚴格政策被證明較競爭對手法域吃虧，國際壓力或會迫使逆轉政策。
Institutional learning and adaptation will likely occur as regulators gain experience with digital asset oversight and market participants develop compliance capabilities. Early implementation challenges could prompt policy modifications, while technological developments may require entirely new regulatory approaches. The dynamic nature of digital asset markets suggests that current policy debates represent early stages of much longer regulatory evolution rather than definitive policy settlements.
隨着監管機構積累數碼資產監督經驗，市場參與者加強合規能力，制度學習與適應亦會發生。早期實施遇到困難或會推動政策修訂，而技術發展甚至可能催生全新監管模式。數碼資產市場的高度動態性，說明現時的政策爭論更多只是漫長監管演化的初步階段，遠未到達最終定案。
Key Takeaways
The Bank of England’s proposed stablecoin ownership caps represent a pivotal moment in global digital asset regulation, crystallizing fundamental tensions between financial stability concerns and innovation promotion that will shape the future of money and payments. While the central bank’s caution about deposit displacement and systemic risks reflects legitimate policy concerns, the proposed restrictions face formidable implementation challenges and strong industry opposition that question both their feasibility and effectiveness.
英倫銀行提出的穩定幣持有上限，標誌著全球數碼資產監管進入關鍵時刻，將金融穩定的顧慮與鼓勵創新的目標之間的根本矛盾具體化，並對貨幣及支付的未來產生深遠影響。雖然央行對存款轉移及系統性風險的審慎態度屬合理政策考慮，但所提出的限制實施難度極高，亦遭受業界強烈反對，令其可行性與有效性均成疑問。
The core regulatory tension between stability and innovation manifests most clearly in the divergent approaches adopted by major jurisdictions. The UK’s proposed individual ownership caps stand alone among developed economies, with the United States GENIUS Act, European Union MiCA regulation, and frameworks in Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong all achieving comprehensive oversight without holder restrictions. This isolation suggests either regulatory pioneering or policy misjudgment, with the ultimate assessment depending on implementation success and market outcomes.
圍繞穩定與創新的核心監管矛盾，最明顯體現在各大法域采取的截然不同做法。英國提出設立個人持有上限，在已發展經濟體中獨自前行；美國GENIUS法案、歐盟MiCA規範，以及日本、新加坡、香港的監管制度，均主張無設持有量限制下達至全面監督。這種孤立局面，可解讀為監管先驅或政策誤判，最終成績取決於實踐效果及市場反應。
Global competitive dimensions create immediate strategic implications for UK financial services leadership, as restrictive ownership policies could drive legitimate stablecoin activity to more permissive jurisdictions while failing to prevent sophisticated circumvention. The ease of blockchain-based regulatory arbitrage, combined with London’s traditional dependence on international financial activity, suggests that competitive considerations may ultimately prove decisive in policy formation regardless of theoretical regulatory preferences.
全球競爭局面，已對英國金融服務領導地位構成即時戰略衝擊。嚴格擁有政策可能將合法穩定幣活動推向較寬鬆法域，但對阻止高階繞規卻幫助不大。倫敦歷來依賴國際金融活動，加上區塊鏈監管套利容易，長遠來說，競爭因素或會成為制定政策的決定性考慮，而非單純的監管偏好。
Implementation likelihood appears increasingly uncertain given the combination of technical enforcement challenges, unified industry opposition, and limited international precedent for similar restrictions. The Bank of England’s extended consultation timeline and acknowledgment of industry feedback indicate genuine reconsideration of the original proposals, though political and institutional commitments to financial stability may prevent complete abandonment of ownership limitations.
由於技術執行困難、業界一致反對，加上缺乏國際先例，擬議的限制能否真正推行，前景漸趨不明。英倫銀行拉長諮詢時間並認真回應業界意見，顯示擬議措施正面臨實質性再考慮，惟政治和機構對金融穩定的執著，或難讓擁有限制被徹底放棄。
Broader crypto regulation evolution will likely favor comprehensive issuer oversight over individual ownership restrictions, as demonstrated by successful regulatory frameworks in other major jurisdictions. The emphasis on reserve requirements, governance standards, and supervisory oversight provides effective policy tools for addressing legitimate stablecoin risks without constraining beneficial innovation or creating artificial market distortions through ownership caps.
更廣泛的加密貨幣監管進展，很可能會像其他主要法域的成功制度一樣，傾向於發行人全面監管多於限制個別持有。強調儲備要求、治理標準及監察權力，被視為有效管理穩定幣潛在風險的政策工具，既不會壓制有益創新，亦可避免因設立擁有上限而引致的市場扭曲。
The stablecoin ownership cap debate ultimately reflects deeper questions about the appropriate regulatory response to financial innovation and the balance between public policy objectives and market-driven technological development. As digital assets continue integrating with traditional financial systems, policymakers face choices that will determine whether they successfully channel innovation toward beneficial outcomes or inadvertently constrain technological progress through well-intentioned but ultimately counterproductive restrictions.
圍繞穩定幣持有上限的爭議，其實反映了對於金融創新應如何規管、公共政策與市場科技進步之間如何平衡的深層提問。隨着數碼資產日益融入傳統金融體系，決策者將面對抉擇——是有效引導創新帶來裨益，抑或因好心但適得其反的限制，誤困科技發展。
The UK’s decision on stablecoin ownership caps will provide crucial evidence about the effectiveness of restrictive approaches versus comprehensive regulation, with implications extending far beyond digital assets to broader questions about financial innovation policy and international competitiveness in rapidly evolving global markets.
英國對穩定幣持有上限的決定，將成為限制式做法與全面監管間成效的關鍵例證，其意義不僅限於數碼資產，更將觸及金融創新政策、全球市場競爭等更廣闊的問題。