加密貨幣曾被視為匿名與財務自由的避風港。但到了 2025 年，現實是只要你用過加密貨幣，多半就有人盯上了你的錢包。
世界各地的執法單位和區塊鏈分析公司正在利用先進工具——甚至人工智慧——追蹤交易、將數位錢包與真實身份連結。由於加密貨幣公開帳本的本質，每一筆交易都明碼留痕，調查人員早已學會如何沿途追蹤。
本篇深入解析 2025 年的加密監控現況：全球對透明度的推動、Chainalysis 等公司的能力、FBI 及其他機構如何追查非法資金、AI 在區塊鏈監控的角色，以及隱私與監管間的持續攻防。
全球共同推進加密透明化
到 2025 年，各國政府都加緊努力，試圖揭露過去神祕的加密世界。全球金融犯罪監管組織——金融行動工作組（FATF）正敦促各國落實更嚴格的加密交易規範。不過進展不一——截至 2025 年 4 月，評估過的 138 個司法轄區中，只有 40 個「大致遵循」FATF 的虛擬資產標準，雖然較前一年 32 個增加不少。FATF 警告監管缺口造成全球弱點：數位貨幣無國界，「一地監管失靈，全球都受影響」，該機構於 2025 年 6 月報告中如此指出。
監管者面臨一大挑戰，就是識別加密活動幕後的身分。交易紀錄以假名進行——綁定的是錢包地址而非真名——讓追查個人或團體有一定難度。FATF 指出，全球執法機關「仍難確認虛擬資產交易背後是誰」。這種不透明性吸引了犯罪分子，從勒索軟體組織到毒販都愛用加密貨幣。事實上，根據 Chainalysis 數據，僅 2024 年，非法加密地址就收取了高達 510 億美元的加密資產。如此驚人數字已讓金融監管機構拉響警報。
2022–2025 年，各年度加密服務遭竊累積金額。2025 年的駭客與失竊資金激增，超越先前任何年份。
一些具有地緣政治影響力的高調加密犯罪也加快了監管步伐。如 2025 年 2 月 ByBit 交易所被駭——損失高達 15 億美元，被認為是北韓政府支持的 Lazarus Group 所為。美國官員指出，這類駭客行動資助了非法武器項目，而全球各國正緊急制止流氓政權利用加密貨幣。早在 ByBit 事件前，北韓駭客於 2024 年就假冒 IT 工作者滲透十餘家加密公司。北韓的行為凸顯了美、歐、亞等地監管與執法單位對加密資金流的高度關注。例如歐盟已推出全面加密監管法案（MiCA），並在全球落實「旅行規則」，要求交易所對大筆轉帳分享身分訊息。美國監管機關也加大力度，目標如副司法部長 Lisa Monaco 所言：「確保加密貨幣不是犯罪分子的避風港。」
這些全球趨勢帶出一個新現實：數兆美元的加密資產已成主流，正規企業與不法之徒皆在使用。問題不再是執法單位是否「能」監控加密活動，而是能力有多強——以及他們能看見多少。到了 2025 年，答案是：他們看得見的遠超過過去。區塊鏈監控已升級為高度專業產業。
Chainalysis 與區塊鏈監控公司的崛起
若要找出加密監控的代表，Chainalysis 當仁不讓。自 2014 年成立於紐約，該公司已經成為全球政府、銀行與交易所的區塊鏈情報首選平台。Chainalysis 的核心使命就是將鏈上活動映射至現實世界實體——即揭露誰控制哪些加密錢包，並運用機器學習結合「偵探工作」實現這一點。 Chainalysis 的數據規模令人咋舌：截至 2025 年，他們已識別 10.7 萬個實體（如交易所、暗網市場、詐騙集團等），將逾 10 億個錢包地址歸類於同一主體集群，協助追回共 126 億美元失竊加密資產。
那麼，像 Chainalysis 這種公司如何在假名區塊鏈上辨識身分？首先是所謂「落地驗證」（ground-truth attribution），即以明確證據將特定地址和已知實體服務連結。例如，大型交易所公開其比特幣存款地址、或調查人員從案件得知某犯罪集團錢包，這些即成為鏈上指標。Chainalysis 的全球情報團隊會蒐集這類資料點（包括難以接觸或受制裁地區），輸入自家資料庫。經確認的連結成為機器學習演算法進一步推展的基礎。
第二層則是集群推論（clustering heuristics）。區塊鏈交易本身藏有線索：例如在比特幣，若兩個地址共同作為一筆交易輸入，很可能屬於同一擁有者（常見推論方式）。Chainalysis 及業界同儕運用數百種推論手法，有的通用、有的針對特定服務設計。他們掃描數十鏈、數十億筆交易，以模式識別群組極可能屬同主之錢包地址。透過專屬流程與機器學習模型，還能辨認資金移動中的「獨特模式」，不斷優化推論準確度。最終就生成了一份加密世界地圖──隨機地址海洋化身為標註集群，如「交易所 X」、「暗網市場 Y」、「詐騙集團 Z」或「張三的錢包」等。如 Chainalysis 所言，許多交易所客戶還主動提交錢包資料協助驗證集群，形成私部門與執法單位之間的資料交叉驗證循環。
實際應用上，只要你的私人錢包和知名交易所、商戶或服務有過互動，Chainalysis 很有可能已標註部分地址、甚至將你群組在某集群內。他們的 Reactor 平台讓分析師得以可視化追蹤錢包交易圖譜，追查資金流向。例如從某個嫌疑地址追蹤，發現曾從標註為勒索軟體錢包的集群收到 5 BTC，又往某大型交易所轉帳 2 BTC——調查人員即可進一步傳喚該交易所的客戶資訊。事實上，Chainalysis 強調將鏈上數據與現實身分相連才是終極目標：「去匿名化」就是將假名地址與外部資訊（如 KYC 資料、開源情報）串接。他們自豪資料的精確度，稱參與的交易所以每日數千筆地址協助更新，其差異率趨近於零。簡而言之，Chainalysis 等公司就像區塊鏈的羅塞塔石，將密碼學地址譯釋成現實中的已知實體。
Chainalysis 並非唯一業者。Elliptic、TRM Labs 等競爭對手亦提供類似的區塊鏈分析及合規工具。這些公司支援 25 條以上主流鏈（含比特幣、以太坊等）及數千種代幣與 NFT。分析工具亦與加密應用多元化同步進化：就算嫌犯將資金從比特幣 UTXO 交易轉為以太坊 DeFi 協議再次換進穩定幣，系統也會盡力追蹤。現代區塊鏈情報平台也能跨鏈追查資金流向——例如 TRM Labs 就主打「一鍵橫跨鏈追蹤」，依賴 7400 萬以上跨鏈換幣紀錄資料庫。洗錢者若嘗試透過跨鏈橋將以太坊兌換成比特幣試圖躲避監控，調查人員也能串聯線索。
意味著到了 2025 年，加密貨幣用戶的假名保護比過去更單薄。錢包位址本身或許查不出持有人，但只要與生態圈有互動就會留下線索。是否曾轉帳到受管制交易所？若有，該交易所極可能運行自動化交易監控，以辨識資金來源風險。各大交易所與加密業者愈來愈倚賴此類區塊鏈監控以符合法規。他們會評估進帳資金的錢包歷史、資金溯源、甚至地理分布。高風險轉帳──例如曾在知名暗網毒品市場錢包中的幣──會自動被標記，啟動審查或凍結機制。交易所可能要求用戶解釋來源，提交可疑活動報告，甚至若無法解釋便停權凍結資產。據 Chainalysis 指南，多數平台至少會請用戶解釋並有可能送交監管通報；若發現嚴重紅旗，則可暫時凍資甚至直接封鎖。與加密貨幣早年「荒野」歲月截然不同——2025 年，只要碰觸染黑資金…… crypto is likely to set off alarms at exchanges.
加密貨幣很可能會在交易所引發警報。
Importantly, exchanges have no ability to stop a suspicious crypto deposit mid-flight (since blockchains themselves are open networks) – but once the funds land in a user’s account, they can and will prevent those coins from moving further into the traditional financial system. For example, if someone sends you Bitcoin that passed through a sanctioned mixer, the exchange might lock your account when you try to cash out. They can freeze the funds, report the incident to law enforcement, and refuse to release the crypto back to you if it’s tied to criminal activity. This illustrates a key point: your “anonymous” crypto wallet is not as private as you might think. The big picture of your wallet’s activity – how much it holds, where it’s been, and whom it interacted with – may be known to compliance databases. Chainalysis itself markets a product called KYT (Know Your Transaction) used by businesses to screen transfers in real time and assign risk scores, ensuring that “on-ramps and off-ramps are aware of which addresses should be blacklisted or have funds frozen”. In practice, this means if your wallet has a link (even several hops away) to something nefarious on-chain, you could find your exchange account under scrutiny. Crypto entrepreneurs sometimes lament “address blacklisting” as an emerging reality akin to how banks handle suspicious fiat funds.
重要的是，交易所無法在加密貨幣存款傳送途中阻擋可疑的資金（因為區塊鏈本身是開放網路）——但一旦資金到達用戶帳戶，他們就可以而且會防止這些幣進一步進入傳統金融體系。例如，如果有人轉給你曾經通過受制裁混幣器的比特幣，當你試圖兌現時，交易所可能會鎖定你的帳戶。他們可以凍結資金，向執法單位通報此事件，如果該筆加密貨幣涉及犯罪活動，也拒絕將其退還給你。這說明了一個重點：你的「匿名」加密錢包，其實並不如你想的那麼隱私。你的錢包活動全貌——持有多少、去過哪裡、跟誰互動過——也許都掌握在合規資料庫裡。Chainalysis 本身就推廣一款名為 KYT（Know Your Transaction，了解你的交易）的產品，協助企業即時篩查轉帳並分配風險評分，確保「法幣出入口知道哪些地址應該列入黑名單或凍結資金」。事實上，這意味著即使你錢包和鏈上的某些惡意行為只間接有聯繫（即使中間有多層跳轉），你的交易所帳戶也可能遭受審查。加密貨幣創業者們有時會感嘆「地址黑名單」成為新興現實，猶如銀行應對可疑法幣資金。
From a neutral perspective, blockchain surveillance firms cast themselves as bringing trust and safety to crypto. By tracing illicit funds, they help recover stolen assets and assist law enforcement in holding bad actors accountable. Chainalysis frequently publishes case studies celebrating such successes. In one example from 2025, the company revealed how its tools helped the FBI track and freeze millions of dollars in ransom that hackers extorted from Caesars Entertainment in a high-profile casino ransomware attack. The hackers thought converting their ransom to cryptocurrency would let them vanish with the money – but agents, using Chainalysis, traced the payments across multiple wallets and even across blockchains as the criminals tried to launder funds via the Avalanche network. With quick action, they had a bridge operator freeze a large portion of the loot mid-transfer, and later they froze more at an exchange where the thieves tried to cash out. The takeaway, as Chainalysis put it, is that crypto’s transparency can turn the tables on criminals, making it possible to follow the money in ways they didn’t expect. Each such success, they argue, “helps refine methodologies and build precedent” – effectively making the blockchain safer over time.
從中立角度來看，區塊鏈監控公司把自己定位成為加密貨幣帶來信任和安全感的單位。透過追蹤非法資金，他們協助追回被竊資產，並幫助執法部門追究壞人責任。Chainalysis 經常發表案例分析來慶祝這些成果。以 2025 年的一個案例為例，該公司揭露其工具如何協助 FBI 追蹤並凍結駭客從 Caesars 娛樂集團大規模賭場勒索案中所勒索的數百萬美元贖金。駭客原以為把贖金轉成加密貨幣就能神隱帶走這筆錢——但調查人員運用 Chainalysis，追查資金在多個錢包之間、甚至不同區塊鏈間移動，當罪犯嘗試透過 Avalanche 網路洗錢時也未能逃脫。行動迅速，他們讓橋接服務營運商在資金轉移中途凍結了一大部分贓款，之後也在竊賊試圖現金出場時凍結了更多資產。Chainalysis 指出，這件事的啟示是加密貨幣的透明性能反守為攻，有助於用意想不到的方式追蹤資金流。每次成功，他們都強調「有助於精進手法、建立先例」，讓區塊鏈隨時間變得更安全。
Of course, the flip side of this pervasive surveillance is a growing debate about privacy and civil liberties in the crypto space. As we’ll explore, not everyone is comfortable with private companies mapping out who owns what crypto. But first, let’s look more at how government agencies themselves have embraced these tools to unmask crypto users involved in crimes.
當然，這種無所不在的監控也引發越來越多關於加密領域隱私及公民自由的辯論。正如我們將會深入探討的，並非每個人都能接受私人公司繪製誰擁有什麼加密貨幣的地圖。但首先，讓我們先看看政府機構本身如何採用這些工具來揭穿涉案的加密用戶身份。
How the FBI and Law Enforcement Track Crypto Crime
FBI 及執法單位如何追查加密貨幣犯罪
Not long ago, a blockchain investigator in law enforcement was a rarity; in 2025, it’s practically a staple of major agencies. The FBI, IRS, U.S. Secret Service, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Europol, Interpol – all have dedicated cryptocurrency units or task forces now. They have trained crypto-tracing experts and they subscribe to tools from firms like Chainalysis, TRM Labs, and Elliptic. In the U.S., federal agencies have poured resources into crypto enforcement: the Department of Justice launched a “National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team” (NCET) focusing on illicit use of digital assets, and although its structure may evolve with changing administrations, the priority on crypto crime remains high.
不久以前，執法單位的區塊鏈調查員還十分罕見；到了 2025 年，這已成為主要機關的標配。FBI、國稅局（IRS）、美國特勤局、國土安全調查局（HSI）、歐洲刑警組織、國際刑警組織等，現皆設有專責的加密貨幣小組或任務隊。他們訓練了專業的加密追蹤人員，也訂閱了 Chainalysis、TRM Labs、Elliptic 等公司的工具。在美國，聯邦機構也投入大量資源打擊加密執法：司法部成立了「全國加密貨幣執法小組」（NCET），重點針對數位資產的不法使用。儘管其架構可能隨政府更迭而調整，但加密犯罪一直都是高度優先事項。
The message from top officials has been clear and consistent. “Cryptocurrency is not a safe haven for criminals,” declared Deputy AG Lisa Monaco when announcing the largest financial seizure in DOJ history – the recovery of $3.6 billion in Bitcoin from the 2016 Bitfinex exchange hack. In that 2022 case, investigators spent years following the digital paper trail. The accused launderers, a married couple in New York, had moved the stolen bitcoins through thousands of transactions, hoping to erase their origin. But agents traced those funds through a “labyrinth of transactions” and ultimately seized 94,000 BTC after uncovering the private keys in a cloud storage account. The case was a watershed, showing that even years later, the feds could hunt down crypto loot. As Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Polite Jr. put it, “we can follow the money through the blockchain, and we will not allow cryptocurrency to be a zone of lawlessness”.
高層官員的訊息非常明確一致。「加密貨幣不是犯罪分子的避風港」，副司法部長 Lisa Monaco 宣布美司法部史上最大金融扣押案——追回 2016 年 Bitfinex 交易所駭客事件的 36 億美元比特幣時這樣宣示。在 2022 年那宗案件，調查人員花了數年追查數位資金流。被控洗錢的紐約夫妻，把贓比特幣分散到數千筆交易，意圖抹去其來源，但調查人員在「盤根錯節的交易迷宮」中成功追蹤這些資金，最終在雲端儲存帳戶查出私鑰，得以扣押 94,000 枚比特幣。這案堪稱分水嶺，證明即使過了好幾年，聯邦政府仍能追討加密贓款。助理司法部長 Kenneth Polite Jr. 也強調：「我們可以透過區塊鏈追蹤資金流，絕不容許加密貨幣成為法外之地。」
How exactly do law enforcement crypto investigations work? In practice, they often unfold in stages familiar from traditional financial probes – but turbocharged by blockchain data. According to a Chainalysis explainer, a typical law enforcement workflow is:
那麼執法單位的加密犯罪調查實際上怎麼進行？實務上流程通常和傳統金融調查相似，但由區塊鏈數據強力加速。根據 Chainalysis 的說明，典型執法工作流程如下：
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Gather intelligence: Identify relevant wallet addresses and transactions, often via reports from victims, exchanges, or informants. Agents will collect any known addresses tied to the suspects or crime (for example, a ransomware victim provides the Bitcoin address where they sent payment).
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Follow the blockchain trail: Using blockchain analysis software, investigators trace the flow of funds from those addresses. They look for clues such as: Do the funds end up at a known exchange or service? Are they funneled through mixers or cross-chain swaps? Are there links to other crimes or known criminal wallets? Modern tools produce visual graphs and risk assessments, flagging, for instance, if a wallet that received money is associated with “darknet market activity” or “sanctioned entity”. This step often reveals where the suspect cashed out or where they are holding funds.
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Subpoena and seize: If the analysis shows crypto going into a certain exchange or platform, law enforcement will send a legal request to that business for information. Thanks to KYC rules, major exchanges can often provide the real name, email, and transaction logs of the account that received the crypto. With that in hand, agents can obtain warrants to seize funds or make arrests. In many jurisdictions, courts have affirmed that crypto assets are property that can be frozen and seized just like bank funds. U.S. authorities, for example, routinely get seizure warrants for exchange accounts or even for private wallets (if they can get the keys).
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情資蒐集：識別相關錢包地址與交易，通常來源包括受害人、交易所、或線民舉報。調查人員會蒐集所有已知與嫌犯或犯罪有關聯的地址（例如勒索病毒受害者提供其付款的比特幣地址）。
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追蹤區塊鏈資金流：運用區塊鏈分析軟體，調查人員追蹤這些地址的資金流向。他們會尋找一些線索，例如：資金是否流向已知交易所或服務？有沒有被導入混幣器或跨鏈交換？有沒有與其他犯罪案件或已知犯罪錢包的聯繫？現代工具會生成視覺化圖表和風險評分，例如標註收到資金的錢包是否涉及「暗網市場活動」或「受制裁實體」。這步通常可辨認嫌犯在哪裡出金或持有資金。
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傳喚及扣押：如果分析顯示資金進入某交易所或平台，執法單位就會發送法律請求給該業者洽詢資訊。由於有 KYC（了解你的客戶）規定，主流交易所通常能提供收到加密貨幣帳戶的真實姓名、電子郵件與交易記錄。有了這些資訊，調查人員就可申請扣押資金或逮捕令。在多數司法管轄區，法院都已確認加密資產是能像銀行資金一樣被凍結及扣押的「財產」。美國當局便常申請扣押交易所帳戶，甚至是私人錢包（如果能取得金鑰）。
We’ve seen this play out repeatedly. In a 2023 ransomware case, the FBI traced $15 million in Bitcoin paid by a Las Vegas casino (an incident involving the Scattered Spider hacking group) across various wallets and chains. Investigators monitored the money as hackers tried to split it and convert it via an Avalanche Bridge. Acting swiftly, they worked with a crypto bridge company to freeze a chunk mid-transfer, and then with an exchange (Gate.io) to lock down another portion when the criminals tried to deposit funds there. Court documents from that case included detailed Chainalysis Reactor graphs showing how the ransom moved through “Extortion Wallet 1” and “Extortion Wallet 2,” was combined, bridged, and swapped into stablecoins and Monero, and ultimately landed in an exchange wallet – where authorities intervened. Each arrow on those graphs represented a clue that agents followed to reclaim victim funds. In the end, millions were recovered, months after the initial crime, underscoring that crypto payments are not beyond reach of the law.
這過程我們多次見過。2023 年一宗勒索病毒案中，FBI 追蹤拉斯維加斯賭場支付給 Scattered Spider 駭客組織的 1,500 萬美元比特幣，流經多個錢包與區塊鏈。駭客試圖將資金分拆並繞過 Avalanche 跨鏈橋兌換，調查人員及時聯繫跨鏈橋公司，在傳輸途中凍結部分資金，之後又與交易所（Gate.io）合作，在駭客試圖入金時再度鎖定資金。法院文件記載了詳盡的 Chainalysis Reactor 分析圖表，還原贖金如何在「勒索錢包1」、「勒索錢包2」間串聯流動，再透過橋接和兌換進入穩定幣和門羅幣，最終流入交易所錢包——警方介入回收。圖上的每個箭頭，都是調查人員追蹤並追回受害資金的線索。最終，數百萬美元被追回，距離犯案已數月之久，突顯加密支付並非法律觸及不到。
Globally, there have been similar successes. European police have dismantled darknet marketplaces and traced cryptocurrency profits; London’s Metropolitan Police seized over $500 million worth of crypto in various investigations. International operations have taken down ransomware gangs – in 2024, a coordinated effort by U.S. and European agencies led to the dismantling of the infamous LockBit ransomware group and others, contributing to a 35% drop in ransomware payments that year. Each of these cases relied on the ability to track the money and often to freeze it in time. Law enforcement now collaborates closely with exchanges and blockchain businesses, creating networks of information sharing. Many countries have laws requiring crypto companies to comply with freeze requests or turnover orders, just like banks do. And if perpetrators think they can hide in jurisdictions with lax rules, agencies increasingly cooperate across borders (with mutual legal assistance treaties and informal info exchanges) to ensure even cross-border crypto flows can be followed.
全球類似的成功也屢見不鮮。歐洲警方剷除多個暗網市場並追查其加密貨幣利潤，倫敦大都會警察廳在多起調查中查扣逾 5 億美元加密資產。國際執法合作更瓦解了多個勒索軟體集團——2024 年，美國與歐洲單位聯手鎖定臭名昭著的 LockBit 勒索團伙等，導致當年勒索付款金額銳減 35%。上述每宗案件皆仰賴追蹤資金甚至及時凍結資金的能力。執法單位現今與交易所及區塊鏈業者密切合作，建立訊息共享網絡。許多國家已有法規，要求加密公司如同銀行一樣，配合凍結要求或交付命令。如果罪犯以為可藏身於規管鬆散的地區，執法機構也越來越多跨境合作（包括司法互助條約與非正式資料交換），以確保即使跨國加密金流也能完整追蹤。
It’s important to note that while agencies have new high-tech tools, classic sleuthing still plays a big role. In the Bitfinex case, the “break” was finding the private keys in an online account belonging to the suspects – essentially, an old-fashioned search warrant yielding a digital key to the treasure. In other cases, undercover agents might infiltrate online forums or use informants to get criminals to reveal a wallet address. Once an address is known, the blockchain does the rest by immaculately preserving the transaction history. Unlike cash that can pass hand-to-hand with no record, every crypto move is etched in a ledger that anyone (including the FBI) can inspect. This permanence is a boon for forensic investigators: even years later, they can analyze transactions when new analytic techniques become available or when a suspect is identified.
必須指出，即便機構現在有新型高科技工具，傳統偵查依然舉足輕重。例如 Bitfinex 案真正突破口，就是在嫌犯的線上帳戶查到私鑰——說穿了，就是傳統的搜索令讓他們取得數位金鑰寶藏。其他案子中，臥底探員或許滲透網路論壇、運用線人誘使嫌犯洩漏錢包地址。一旦拿到地址，區塊鏈會「自動」保留完整交易紀錄。和可無跡可尋的現金流不同，每筆加密資金流動都永久紀錄在分類帳上，任何人（包括 FBI）都能查看。這種永久性是鑑識人員的福音：即使多年後，隨新技術發展或嫌犯曝光，仍能追查當年交易。
As a result, the federal government has amassed quite a war chest of seized crypto. By late 2022, U.S. agencies had confiscated at least $7.1 billion worth of cryptocurrency from criminal cases. Other countries have seized billions more. Governments now even face the question of what to do with all these digital assets – whether to auction them, hold them, or use them for victim compensation. Those are new
結果是，聯邦政府已經累積了一大筆查扣的加密資產。至 2022 年底，美國政府機關已自刑案中沒收至少 71 億美元的加密貨幣。其他國家沒收的則更多。如今，各國政府甚至面臨如何處理這些龐大數位資產的新問題——到底該拍賣、持有，還是用於彌補受害人損失？這些都是全新的議題。problems that didn’t exist a decade ago.
從一般加密貨幣持有者的角度來看，值得注意的是，執法單位其實不一定需要你犯錯才能鎖定你──他們只需要一個接觸點。如果你的幣曾經經過需要 KYC（實名驗證）的交易所，或你曾向經過 KYC 驗證的商家付款，鍥而不捨的調查人員最終可以透過傳票將這些紀錄與你連結起來。即使你並未觸犯任何法律，只要你的交易涉及到與不法資金有關聯的地址，你的紀錄也可能受到檢視。舉例來說，如果你無心收到曾經流經被駭交易所錢包的比特幣，而調查人員正在追蹤那起駭客事件，你的地址就有可能被追蹤到。你可能會接到警方上門，或收到交易所寄來的通知電子郵件。因此，有些隱私倡議者警告，現行用來打擊犯罪的監管基礎設施，也可能拿來大規模監控守法用戶。
但從執法者的角度來看，這些工具確實是有針對性地在運作。他們在打擊的是勒索軟體、詐騙、毒品、兒童剝削、恐怖主義資金等最嚴重犯罪。當他們在區塊鏈上「追蹤金流」時，和調閱銀行帳戶紀錄類似，只不過往往阻力更小、效率更高。當然他們也面臨困難：犯罪分子不斷變換手法，跨國司法管轄造成查緝延遲，有些技術工具可能讓金流路徑變得難以追蹤。這種貓捉老鼠的技巧我們稍後會討論。不過截至 2025 年，大方向很明確：警方能追蹤加密貨幣，而且已經規模化在做。比特幣「不可追蹤」的迷思，早已被如 Bitfinex 破案等許多案例徹底擊碎。
值得強調的一點是，執法單位不僅在被動反應犯罪，還越來越積極主動。各國機關現在會利用區塊鏈分析來獲取情報：例如繪製整個犯罪網絡圖，或辨識出原本並不在偵查名單上的嫌疑人。舉例來說，若某個暗網市場被查緝並曝光了其錢包地址，調查員就能追查和它有互動的買家與賣家。這些人即使一開始是匿名的，也會因此成為新一輪調查對象。區塊鏈資料現在不僅僅是檢方起訴的證據，更是主動揭露犯罪網絡的情報來源。某一案例中，美國調查人員用分析工具追蹤網路販運鴉片類藥物的資金流，成功破獲一條重要的芬太尼（Fentanyl）毒品供應鏈，並配合TRM Labs工具查獲了 1,500 萬美元加密貨幣資產（TRM 於 2023 年報導）。每一次破案都強化了這個觀念——區塊鏈世界和傳統金融一樣，也能有效對抗犯罪。
AI：區塊鏈上的新「千里眼」
2025 年加密貨幣監控領域最大的發展之一，就是人工智慧崛起成為監查人力的倍增器。區塊鏈每天有數百萬筆橫跨多條鏈的交易，單靠人工分析或傳統的規則系統根本跟不上。這時就輪到 AI 上場了。機器學習模型已經在巡邏區塊鏈，偵測人類可能忽略的異常與模式。這類技術現今既用於合規（交易所以及金融機構內部），也運用在調查領域。
比如說，加密貨幣交易所現在開始把 AI 系統當作合規骨幹。Binance（幣安）全球金融情報部門負責人 Nils Andersen-Röed 表示：「AI 可以即時監控，辨識異常模式、理解複雜行為，而這些是過去人工難以做到的。」根據業界報告統計，至 2025 年已有超過 65% 的交易所採用 AI 演算法進行預測分析和詐騙偵測，比幾年前大幅成長。自 2021 年以來，AI 在加密貨幣合規領域的應用增長超過 150%，足見其必要性。這些系統匯入實時交易數據和用戶行為紀錄，反覆學習何謂「正常」與「可疑」行為。舉例來說，AI 可能會學到某位用戶通常只在美國上班時段、經美國 IP 進行交易——如果有一天凌晨 3 點該帳戶忽然從俄羅斯 IP 發送加密貨幣，且模式近似典型洗錢手法，AI 馬上就能拉警報。Andersen-Röed 進一步指出，在 Binance 內部，AI 模型甚至能預先模擬犯罪分子的洗錢手法、測試交易所防護機制，看是否有漏洞可被攻擊。AI 也積極追蹤外部威脅如釣魚網站——自動識別新註冊的詐騙網域，聯絡移除服務商，直接在源頭保護用戶安全。
對執法單位和區塊鏈情報公司而言，AI 允許他們用前所未有的速度與規模篩選大量區塊鏈資料。橫跨數百筆交易或多幣別間的非法活動，很難用固定規則發現，但機器學習尤其擅長挖掘這種隱性聯繫。例如 TRM Labs 開發的「Signatures」系統，運用機器學習自動抓出本來會被忽略的異常交易模式——像是一群地址交易都刻意壓在申報門檻下，或新型 mixer 服務利用演算法反覆洗幣。AI 若訓練於已知的不法行為案例，便能推廣到新型詐騙與犯罪。Chainalysis 同樣在分群與異常偵測應用機器學習演算法；可以想見，他們的系統會日益精準辨認出各種洗錢手法的「鏈上指紋」。
更厲害的是，AI 能巧妙結合鏈上與鏈下數據。例如有研究人員討論用自然語言處理 (NLP) 掃描暗網論壇，找出特定錢包地址被討論的紀錄，或比對網路犯罪分子在聊天室描述行為的內容與實際鏈上活動。AI 可能偵測到某一 DeFi 協議突然交易量激增，並與駭客論壇上的 exploit 討論關聯起來。這種「訊息融合」拓展了加密監控的涵義——不只看地址，而是全套數位足跡。
從交易所對錢包掌握的角度來看，AI 帶來的是更快、更全面的用戶側寫。一個成熟的 AI 理論上能分析你錢包的整段歷史，推斷你是散戶還是機構？是否曾參加賭博類 dApp？資金自託還是來自交易所帳戶？有些 AI 模型會從你的資金與高風險地址的關聯深度、流動時間、金額與模式等多面向評估風險分數，不再只是黑名單／白名單，而是風險光譜。舉例來說，即使你只因偶然間，間接收到某些曾經經過制裁地址的代幣（即便很小一筆、時間也很久遠），智能 AI 系統能標記出該情境、同時評估相關的減緩因子（例如事件發生已兩年，金額極小）。這種細緻程度會決定你的錢包被深度調查，還是僅作預警監控。
另一個前線則是 AI 身份對應功能。如果你曾經在線上把錢包地址和個人資訊做過任何連結，例如在 Twitter 公開發表 Ethereum 地址，AI 網頁爬蟲就能抓到並把你真實身份串連起來。業界也積極開發 OSINT（開源情報）整合，例如自動搜尋全網上錢包地址曝光紀錄、論壇貼文的交易所收款帳號、GitHub 捐款等，加深錢包所有人的側寫。於是監控觸角甚至延伸超出區塊鏈本身。
從正面來看，AI 幫加密貨幣產業實質遏止不少犯罪。Binance 公布 2023 年，AI 系統協助預防了超過 12 億美元的非法交易，包含擋下疑似流向詐騙地址的出金或自動偵查帳號異常行為、提前阻止駭客盜帳。本質上，AI 的「彈性」非常關鍵——雖然犯罪分子不斷變換花招，但機器學習能近乎即時自動調整規則。Andersen-Röed 形容 Binance 的機器學習模型會不斷以新威脅為素材更新演算法，「保持對於快速市場、突發大額、量化機器人與惡意客戶的即時反應」。換句話說，如同部署全天候、效率遠勝於人力的AI 警察。
更科幻一些，現在有人開始實驗「自主型 AI」（agentic AI）——也就是能自行進化的 AI 特工，未來能自主尋找漏洞，甚至即時回應跨鏈攻擊。雖然仍屬於早期階段，構想是未來 AI 系統不只是標記可疑行為，還能自動採取行動，例如隔離嫌疑資金、主動與合約互動來阻止新 exploit。AI 和零知識密碼學技術的結合也逐漸成型，可望找到監控與隱私間的新平衡。零知識證明（ZKP）讓用戶能夠證明合規（例如「我的錢包未涉及恐怖主義資金」）但不用揭露所有交易細節。Andersen-Röed 指出，結合先進 AI 與保護隱私的 ZKP 技術，或許可以兼得「更聰明的風險偵測」和「內建型合規」而不犧牲用戶隱私。2025 年已有數十個項目在探索 ZKP 解決方案，例如允許你用密碼學證明通過 AML（反洗錢）檢查，而無須曝露所有交易歷史。這是一個既能滿足監管，也尊重個人隱私的發展趨勢。
然而，就像 AI 強化了「好人」的力量的同時，它也also supercharging the bad actors – a true cat-and-mouse dynamic. Criminals have started using AI to conceal their tracks and scam victims, which complicates the surveillance picture. The FBI issued a warning in late 2024 that criminals are exploiting generative AI to carry out fraud and schemes on a larger scale. For example, AI-generated text and deepfake images have enabled extremely convincing phishing campaigns and impersonation scams. Fraudsters can instantly create thousands of personalized scam emails with flawless grammar – something that used to be a giveaway for detecting fraud. They fabricate entire fake identities and social media profiles using AI-generated profile pictures, making it harder for investigators (and users) to distinguish real from fake. We’re seeing AI deepfakes of CEOs or loved ones in video calls to trick people into approving transfers or giving up keys. In Brazil, there have been reports of AI chatbots being used to socially engineer crypto investors, or malware that uses machine learning to adapt its attack depending on the target’s behavior.
甚至連壞人也因此被大幅增強——形成一場真正的貓抓老鼠遊戲。犯罪分子已開始利用 AI 來隱藏行蹤與詐騙受害者，讓監控變得更加複雜。FBI 在 2024 年底發布警告，犯罪分子正在濫用生成式 AI 大規模進行詐騙和各種陰謀。例如，AI 產生的文字和深偽圖像讓釣魚攻擊與冒充詐騙極具欺騙性。詐騙集團能夠一瞬間產出成千上萬封語法完美且客製化的詐騙信件——過去這種語法錯誤常是辨識詐騙的線索。他們用 AI 產生的個人頭像製作完整的虛假身份與社群帳號，使調查人員（及一般用戶）更難分辨真假。我們甚至看見用 AI 做的 CEO 或親友視訊深偽，騙人同意匯款或洩漏金鑰。在巴西，還有報導指出駭客利用 AI 聊天機器人來操作加密貨幣投資人，甚至用機器學習惡意軟體，依照受害者行為調整攻擊方式。
Even on the blockchain side, AI can help criminals. There’s speculation that AI could be used to create smarter coin mixing algorithms that learn to evade known tracing heuristics, or to automatically generate new addresses and transaction patterns that confound detection. For instance, a laundering bot could use reinforcement learning to continuously randomize its paths in response to what patterns tend to get flagged by exchanges. If exchanges deploy AI, criminals want to know its blind spots and exploit them.
就連在區塊鏈這一端，AI 也能幫助犯罪分子。有些推測認為，AI 可能會被用來打造更聰明的混幣算法，學會規避已知的追蹤規則，或自動生成新的地址和交易模式來迷惑監控。例如，洗錢機器人可以用強化學習，根據哪些行為容易被交易所偵測，持續隨機化路徑。如果交易所開始運用 AI，犯罪方自然就想找出它的盲點並加以利用。
A vivid example of the lengths criminals go is the ongoing battle over privacy coins like Monero. Monero is designed with built-in privacy features (obscured addresses and amounts), making it very hard to trace. For years, chain analytics firms largely had to shrug when Monero entered the picture. However, a leaked Chainalysis training video in 2024 suggested that even Monero might not be entirely off-limits. In that leak, a Chainalysis representative discussed methods to track Monero transactions by running a large number of “malicious” Monero nodes to collect user IP addresses and timing information. Essentially, by owning many nodes in the Monero network, Chainalysis could observe when transactions hit the network from particular IPs and use statistical analysis (along with introducing some decoy traffic) to reduce the anonymity set. This was not a complete break of Monero’s cryptography – notably, Chainalysis admitted in the same video that Monero remains unlinkable and untraceable in the traditional sense (you can’t definitively link inputs to outputs or see amounts). But even partial tracing through network-layer attacks shows the determination to pierce every veil. Privacy advocates took solace in the fact that Monero’s core privacy was still solid for most users, while Chainalysis defenders argued that “they are just doing their job… kind of like whitehat hackers making Monero more secure” by finding weaknesses. The cat-and-mouse game continues: as Monero developers improve the protocol to foil such snooping, analytics firms innovate new techniques.
最能體現犯罪分子用心的例子，就是關於 Monero 這類隱私幣的攻防戰。Monero 天生設計了隱藏地址和金額的隱私功能，讓追蹤變得極為困難。多年來，鏈上數據分析公司面對 Monero 時幾乎只能攤手表示無解。不過，2024 年洩漏的一支 Chainalysis 培訓影片 顯示，甚至 Monero 也不是完全無法監控。在那段洩漏內容中，有 Chainalysis 員工討論如何透過運行大量“惡意” Monero 節點，收集用戶 IP 與時間資訊來追蹤交易。基本上，如果 Chainalysis 擁有網路裡很多節點，就能觀察哪些交易是從特定 IP 傳送進網路，並結合引入假流量及統計分析，來縮小匿名集。這雖然不是破解 Monero 密碼學本身——值得注意的是 Chainalysis 在同段影片也坦承 Monero 在傳統意義下仍然是無法連結、無法追蹤的（無法明確對應輸入、輸出或金額）。但連這種網路層的部分追蹤，都展現了風險揭露決心。隱私倡議者認為，Monero 大多數用戶的核心隱私依然鞏固；而 Chainalysis 支持者則聲稱，“他們只是盡職……有點像白帽駭客幫忙找出 Monero 漏洞”，讓它更安全。這場貓捉老鼠持續進行：Monero 開發團隊努力改善協議抵禦偵測，分析公司則想出新對策。
The Cat-and-Mouse: Privacy Tech vs. Blockchain Forensics
貓捉老鼠大戰：隱私科技 vs. 區塊鏈溯源
All this surveillance has unsurprisingly spurred a counter-movement among privacy-minded crypto users and adversaries of law enforcement. A privacy arms race is unfolding in parallel with the rise of crypto surveillance. On one side are the blockchain sleuths and government regulators; on the other side are privacy advocates, technologists, and of course criminals, all trying to maintain anonymity in the crypto sphere.
這一切監控，毫不意外也促使加密貨幣圈中的隱私支持者與尋求規避執法的人展開反擊。於是，一場隱私軍備競賽同步於加密監控興起而展開。一邊是區塊鏈偵探與政府監管；另一邊則有隱私倡議者、科技專家與犯罪分子，大家都想保住加密世界中的匿名性。
The simplest tool in the privacy toolkit has been the cryptocurrency mixer – services or protocols that mix together many users’ coins, obfuscating the trails. A mixer takes in coins from Alice, Bob, and Carol, then pays them back out (minus a fee) in different pieces, such that it’s unclear which output belongs to whom. Mixers have been around for Bitcoin since its early days, and on Ethereum there are smart-contract based mixers like Tornado Cash. For a while, mixers were highly effective at breaking investigative trails, forcing analysts to treat mixed funds as a dead-end (or at least highly suspicious if they emerged from the mixer).
隱私工具箱中最簡單的工具，就是加密貨幣混幣器——這類服務或協議會把多位使用者的幣混合在一起，讓追蹤路徑模糊。混幣器收到 Alice、Bob、Carol 的幣之後，會以不同的組合（扣掉服務費）再發回去，讓人無法判斷每筆輸出究竟屬於誰。比特幣從早期就有混幣器；以太坊上也出現基於智能合約的 Tornado Cash 等混幣工具。混幣器曾一度非常有效地讓調查變成死路，分析人員必須把混過的資金視為追不下去（或者只要混過就極度可疑）。
But 2022–2025 saw a concerted crackdown on mixers – a sign of how serious authorities are about crypto surveillance. In an unprecedented move, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Tornado Cash in August 2022, effectively outlawing U.S. persons from using it. The sanction cited Tornado’s role in laundering over $455 million stolen by North Korea’s Lazarus Group (from the Axie Infinity/Ronin bridge hack) and more than $1 billion in illicit funds overall. This was the first time a decentralized software protocol was added to the sanctions list. The impact was dramatic: Tornado Cash’s usage plummeted by about 85% after the sanctions. Law-abiding users fled for fear of legal consequences, and even many illicit actors stayed away since the service was now so closely watched. North Korean hackers, who had heavily used Tornado, largely abandoned it and shifted back to old-school Bitcoin mixers, according to blockchain analysis.
但 2022–2025 年間，混幣器遭遇了聯合鎮壓，顯示政府對加密監控的決心。美國財政部海外資產控制辦公室（OFAC）在 2022 年 8 月首度對 Tornado Cash 實施制裁，等於全面禁止美國人使用。這項制裁是因為 Tornado 協助北韓 Lazarus 集團洗去超過 4.55 億美元（Axie Infinity/Ronin Bridge 事件）以及超過 10 億美元非法資金，這也是史上首度將去中心化軟體協議列入制裁清單。制裁效果劇烈：Tornado Cash 用量大跌約 85%。遵法用戶為免法律風險迅速撤離，甚至很多不法份子也因服務被嚴密監控而選擇遠離。區塊鏈分析指北韓駭客在 Tornado 被封後大幅棄用，轉回傳統比特幣混幣器。
The U.S. government didn’t stop at sanctions. In 2023, the DOJ unsealed indictments against Tornado Cash’s developers, accusing them of facilitating money laundering and sanctions violations. One developer was arrested in 2023 and another was added to the U.S. sanctions list. These moves sent a clear signal: those who build or run public mixing tools can be held accountable if their services are used heavily by criminals. It has been a chilling message for the privacy coin community. While some argue that code is speech and tools like Tornado had legitimate uses (e.g., providing financial privacy for law-abiding users), authorities effectively equated them with financial institutions that failed to implement any AML controls.
美國政府並未止於制裁本身。2023 年，司法部公開起訴 Tornado Cash 的開發者，指控其協助洗錢與違反制裁。同年有一位開發者遭逮捕，另一位被列入美國制裁名單。這一連串動作清楚表達：只要你打造或營運公共混幣工具，若你的服務被大量犯罪分子濫用，亦可能被追究責任。這對隱私幣社群是一記冷酷警告。雖然有論者主張，程式即言論，而 Tornado 等工具其實有合法用途（例如讓守法者獲得財務隱私），但官方已形同把這些協議當作完全沒有反洗錢管制的金融機構來看待。
In response to the Tornado crackdown, crypto launderers have been adapting. As mentioned, North Korean entities shifted to alternatives – for example, a mixer called “Sinbad” (believed by U.S. Treasury to be run by North Koreans) became a favored tumbler for them after Tornado was blacklisted. Others have broken up their laundering across multiple smaller mixers or chain hopping (moving illicit funds through a series of different cryptocurrencies and blockchains to confuse trackers). Chainalysis reported trends of criminals increasingly using cross-chain bridges and even decentralized exchange swaps instead of one big mixer that attracts attention. The analytics community has responded by expanding cross-chain tracing capabilities, as noted earlier, to not lose the scent as funds morph from one form to another.
面對 Tornado 受打壓，洗錢者也在調整策略。如前所述，北韓相關實體轉往其他工具——例如被美國財政部認為同樣出自北韓的 "Sinbad" 混幣器，Tornado 被拉黑後成為他們的新歡。另有一些人則將洗錢拆分到多個小型混幣器，或採用跨鏈 (chain hopping) 的方法，將資金在不同幣種和區塊鏈之間跳轉，增加追蹤難度。Chainalysis 指出，犯罪者日益倚重跨鏈橋與去中心化交易所換幣，不再一股腦把洗錢都丟給一個混幣器，以免引人注目。資料分析團隊也針對這些變化，積極強化跨鏈追蹤，防止資金在不同樣貌間消失蹤影。
Privacy-centric cryptocurrencies, often called privacy coins, are another part of this contest. Monero (XMR) and Zcash (ZEC) are the leading examples. These coins use cryptographic techniques to hide transaction details, making them far more private by default than Bitcoin or Ethereum. For years, Monero has been a thorn in the side of investigators – Chainalysis’s own reports often footnote that certain stats exclude Monero because it’s not traceable with their methods. Criminal markets like dark web sites have long accepted Monero for this reason. However, privacy coins have not achieved mass adoption for various reasons (regulatory pressure on exchanges to delist them, and convenience – Bitcoin and stablecoins remain more liquid). Thus, criminals often face a dilemma: they can convert stolen loot into Monero for anonymity, but eventually if they want to cash out to fiat, they likely must convert back to a traceable coin to use a major exchange, reintroducing traceability at that point. Still, as long as they remain in Monero, they enjoy a cloak.
以隱私為核心的加密貨幣（即所謂的隱私幣）則是戰場上的另一主角。Monero（XMR）與 Zcash（ZEC）最為知名，這些幣用密碼學手段隱藏交易細節，天生比比特幣或以太幣（ETH）更具匿名性。長年來，Monero 是調查人員的頭痛對象——就連 Chainalysis 的報告也常註明某些統計數據未包括 Monero，因為他們無法追蹤。許多犯罪市集如暗網也正因這一點優先接受 Monero。然而，這類隱私幣始終沒能大規模普及，主因包括：交易所因監管壓力下架，以及便利性——比特幣與穩定幣流動性還是最好。因此，犯罪分子常陷入兩難：要匿名就要把贓款轉成 Monero，但如果想換回法幣，最終還是得兌回能追蹤的主流幣種，上交易所的一刻又打開了蛛絲馬跡。但只要他們還留在 Monero，就仍有一層保護。
The leaked Chainalysis video about Monero suggests that even privacy coins are getting attention. It appears that no technology is off-limits to surveillance attempts. If chain analysts can’t break the encryption, they might try network-level attacks or statistical analysis to reduce anonymity sets. In Monero’s case, one proposed attack involves flooding the network with spy nodes to capture transaction origins and using decoy analysis to improve guessing which inputs are real. Monero’s design uses “ring signatures” to mix each transaction with decoys, but those decoys aren’t perfect if someone controls a lot of the network and can see timing and IP clues. It’s a cat-and-mouse: as of 2025, Monero is still considered highly secure for most users (the community regularly upgrades the tech to strengthen privacy), but the very existence of a leak that Chainalysis is working on it shows how dogged the surveillance side is.
關於 Monero 的 Chainalysis 洩漏影片顯示，連隱私幣如今也被盯上，似乎沒有任何技術能完全擋住監控嘗試。如果區塊鏈分析師無法破解密碼學，可能會轉而從網路層發動攻擊，或用統計分析縮小匿名集。以 Monero 為例，他們提出的一種攻擊方式是用大量間諜節點灌入網路，蒐集交易起點，再結合誘餌偵測提高判斷某些輸入是真實的機率。Monero 設計會用「環簽章」將每筆交易混入多個誘餌，但若有人掌控大量節點又能得到時間和 IP 線索，這些誘餌就不完美。這正是一場貓與老鼠的戰爭：截至 2025 年，Monero 對大多數人來說依然極安全（社群也持續升級技術加強隱私），但光是 Chainalysis 洩漏顯示他們正努力針對 Monero，足見監控方的執著。
Other techniques people use for privacy include coinjoins (coordinated mixing among a group of users – popular in wallets like Wasabi and Samourai for Bitcoin) and stealth addresses (one-time addresses for each transaction to avoid reuse). Investigators have had some success against coinjoins – for instance, there have been cases where careless implementation or usage led to de-mixing of transactions. One such case in 2023 saw the FBI and Europol help bust a dark web money laundering service called ChipMixer; they likely used blockchain analysis to trace funds that had gone through ChipMixer and identify its infrastructure.
除了混幣之外，還有其他隱私方法，例如「coinjoin」協作混合（多人協同混幣，Wasabi 與 Samourai 這些比特幣錢包常見）、隱匿地址（每次交易都產生一次性新地址，避免重複）。在 coinjoin 方面，調查員也有過成功案例——例如某些粗糙實作或用戶操作失誤導致混合交易被拆解。2023 年就有 FBI 和歐洲刑警協助破獲 ChipMixer 這家暗網洗錢服務，推測他們也是靠區塊鏈分析追查經過 ChipMixer 的資金並定位其基礎設施。
From a broader view, what do these privacy measures mean for “what they know about your wallet”? If you, as a privacy-conscious user, employ these techniques, the amount of information that Chainalysis or the FBI can glean is reduced. For example, if you religiously coinjoin your Bitcoin, an analyst might see your wallet cluster as part of a larger mixed cluster with no clear trail of where your coins originally came from. Or if you use Monero for certain transactions, those particular transfers
從更宏觀的角度來看，這些隱私手段對於「他們能掌握你錢包多少資訊」意味著什麼？如果你是重視隱私的用戶並善用這些技術，Chainalysis 或 FBI 能夠獲悉的資料就會大幅減少。例如，假如你每一筆比特幣交易都固定 coinjoin，分析者只能看到你的錢包群被包在更大的混合集群裡，完全無法追溯原本的來源。又或者你在特定情境下使用 Monero，那些指定的轉帳同樣……might be invisible to tracing (though the points where you enter or exit Monero – say buying XMR on an exchange – are visible and become the focus). Essentially, privacy tools can restore some degree of anonymity, but often at the cost of convenience and with the risk of drawing extra scrutiny. It’s well-known that using mixers or privacy coins will put a target on those funds whenever they do touch a regulated exchange; compliance systems assign higher risk scores to funds coming out of mixers, because a large share of mixer volume is illicit, as data has shown. (In fact, after Tornado Cash was sanctioned and mostly legitimate usage disappeared, the proportion of remaining Tornado volume that was illicit nearly doubled, albeit of a much smaller total volume. This means almost everything coming out of Tornado now is presumed dirty, making it easy to justify blocking it.)
雖然追蹤上可能是隱形的（但你進出台幣如Monero的錢包——例如在交易所買入XMR——這些節點是可見的，往往成了風控焦點）。本質上，隱私工具確實能恢復一定程度的匿名性，但經常需要為此犧牲便利性，並承擔可能被特別關注的風險。眾所周知，只要使用幣混合器或隱私幣，當這些資金重新回到受到監管的交易所時，必定會受到標記；因為根據數據顯示，有很大一部分幣混合器的交易量確實涉及非法行為，所以合規系統會對這些資金給出較高的風險分數。（事實上，自從Tornado Cash被制裁、多數合法用途消失之後，Tornado上剩餘交易量的非法比例幾乎翻倍——雖然整體量也大幅縮少。這意味著現在幾乎所有來自Tornado的資金都被預設為有問題，讓封鎖這些資金變得名正言順。）
For law-abiding users, there are legitimate reasons to worry about over-surveillance. Crypto was built with a philosophy of personal freedom and privacy. Seeing firms boast about mapping out wallets and linking identities can be unsettling. There’s an argument to be made that financial privacy is a component of civil liberty – people might not want every transaction they make, donation they give, or investment they hold to be traceable by either corporations or governments. Organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have raised concerns about indiscriminate blockchain surveillance and have supported challenges against things like the Tornado Cash sanctions on free speech grounds.
對守法用戶來說，過度監控確實有其令人擔憂的正當理由。加密貨幣本來就是以個人自由及隱私作為核心理念。看到一些公司大肆宣傳自己的錢包追蹤與身份連結技術，難免讓人不寒而慄。有人主張，財務隱私是公民自由的一部分——不是每個人都希望自己的每一筆消費、每一次捐款、甚至持有什麼資產通通被企業或政府追蹤。像電子前哨基金會（EFF）這類組織，就曾對無差別區塊鏈監控提出疑慮，也公開批評類似Tornado Cash的制裁作法，認為它們侵犯了言論自由。
Regulators, meanwhile, insist that the same rules that apply to stopping money laundering and illicit finance in banks must apply in crypto. They argue that crypto shouldn’t be a loophole in the global financial system where criminals can operate unimpeded. The challenge is finding the balance: ensuring bad actors can be caught, without treating every user as a suspect. In practice, the focus in 2025 remains largely on illicit activity – that is what drives surveillance efforts. There isn’t evidence of authorities using blockchain analysis to monitor regular users’ spending habits for arbitrary reasons. But the infrastructure being built could, in theory, enable granular tracking of anyone’s financial activity if it were abused. This is why some in the crypto community stress the importance of decentralization and encryption – to prevent a future where financial censorship or social credit scoring could be imposed by analyzing blockchain data.
監管單位則堅持，銀行防制洗錢與非法資金的規定，也必須一樣適用於加密貨幣。他們認為，加密貨幣不能成為全球金融體系的漏洞，讓犯罪分子有機可乘。困難在於如何拿捏這條線：一方面要能抓到壞人，但不能把所有用戶都當成嫌疑犯。在實務上，2025年的監控重點仍然是圍繞非法活動——這才是推動這些監督機制的主要動力。並沒有證據顯示當局會任意用區塊鏈分析來監控一般用戶的消費習慣。不過，現有的基礎建設理論上如果被濫用，確實很可能達到極為細緻的財務追蹤。因此，幣圈有些人特別強調去中心化與加密技術的重要性——要預防未來出現所謂的金融審查與社會信用評分，因為這可能光靠分析區塊鏈數據就可以實現。
Conclusion: A New Era of Accountable Anonymity?
結論：可責任化匿名新時代？
As 2025 unfolds, the world of crypto is maturing under the watchful gaze of both machines and investigators. We’re entering an era one might call “accountable anonymity.” On the surface, you still transact with a string of letters and numbers (your wallet address) and can control your funds independently. But behind the scenes, blockchain analytics and AI-driven surveillance have made that anonymity highly conditional. If your activities raise no red flags, you might feel as free as ever. But if your wallet intersects with wrongdoing – even peripherally – don’t be surprised if it gets flagged in a compliance database or if law enforcement comes knocking to ask questions.
隨著2025年展開，加密世界正日益成熟，時時刻刻都在機器與調查人員的監控下運作。我們正進入一個可稱為「可責任化匿名」的時代。表面上，你依然透過一串字母跟數字（錢包地址）來交易，資金完全自己掌控。但實際上，有了區塊鏈分析與AI加持的監控手段，要完全匿名已經變得附帶很多前提限制。如果你的行為沒觸及任何紅線，可能還是一如往常自由無虞。但若你的錢包曾經——哪怕只是間接——碰上非法事件，也不要意外錢包會被合規資料庫標記，或哪天執法單位敲門來問話。
For the average crypto user, this new reality has a few clear implications. Privacy requires effort: if you value it, you must take conscious steps (and accept some trade-offs) by using privacy-enhancing tools or coins, and even then, it’s not absolute. Conversely, if you’re transacting above-board, it’s wise to assume your transactions are effectively public and traceable to you, especially once you’ve touched an exchange. As one slogan puts it: Don’t do anything on crypto you wouldn’t do with your name attached, because it might well be.
對一般加密用戶來說，這個新現實有幾個明確的意涵。隱私必須靠自己努力維護：重視隱私的人，需要主動採用各種隱私增強工具或幣種，並接受某些權衡犧牲，而且就算如此，也不會百分百匿名。反過來說，如果你的交易全都合法合規，最好預設自己的所有交易都是公開並且可被追蹤到本人，特別是只要有跟交易所互動。一句流行口號這樣說：在加密世界不要做任何你不敢用本名做的事情，因為到頭來很可能一切都與你息息相關。
From the perspective of regulators and law enforcement, the increased transparency is largely a win. Crypto is no longer the unregulated Wild West it was a decade ago. Huge sums that criminals once thought they had escaped with are being clawed back – over $12.6 billion in seizures with Chainalysis’ assistance alone by 2025. Ransomware actors and hackers now know that even if they get paid in crypto, they might not keep those funds for long if investigators can find a crack in their laundering scheme. This could have a deterrent effect: if the odds of getting caught (or losing the loot) go up, the incentive to carry out such crimes goes down. Indeed, we saw ransomware payments drop in 2024 in part due to aggressive tracing and enforcement.
以監管單位跟執法機構的角度來說，這種高透明度基本上是利大於弊。加密貨幣已經不再是十年前那種毫無管制的「西部荒野」了。犯罪分子以為已經全身而退的大筆資金正在陸續被追回——光是靠Chainalysis協助的案件，截至2025年就已有超過126億美元被查扣。勒索軟體集團與駭客如今早已意識到，即使收到了加密貨幣贖金，只要調查人員有辦法突破他們的洗錢手法，這些錢根本撐不了多久。這直接產生嚇阻效果：被抓（或被沒收）的風險提高了，幹壞事的誘因自然減少。事實上，部分因為積極追查和執法，我們在2024年就看到勒索贖款的總額出現下滑。
Meanwhile, the crypto industry itself is trying to build bridges with regulators to craft sensible rules that harness these new surveillance capabilities without smothering innovation. Industry leaders often speak of a future where blockchain and AI improve financial integrity at a systemic level. In an ideal scenario, regulators could get real-time reporting of suspicious crypto movements (somewhat like banks file instant fraud alerts), potentially stopping crimes as they happen. Victims of hacks might have a better shot at recovering funds if global cooperation becomes fast enough – the Caesars casino case where funds were frozen just hours after moving is a promising example.
同時，加密產業本身也在尋求與監管單位搭建橋樑，想制定出既能善用新監控能力又不會扼殺創新的規則。產業領袖常提到一個願景：未來區塊鏈結合AI，能在體系層級全面提升金融誠信。理想情境下，監管機構可以即時收到可疑加密資金流動的通報（有點類似銀行的即時詐騙通報），有機會在案發時直接阻止犯罪。如果全球合作速度夠快，受害者追回資金的機率也可大增——像凱薩皇宮賭場那起案件，資金在移動數小時內就被凍結，就是令人振奮的例子。
At the same time, there’s also an emphasis on not treating all crypto activity as criminal. Technologies like zero-knowledge proofs hint at a compromise where users can retain privacy for lawful transactions while proving compliance. For instance, you might prove “I’m not mixing coins from North Korea or terrorism” without revealing all your addresses – something researchers are actively working on. Some DeFi protocols are exploring embedding such compliance checks so they won’t accept tainted funds, theoretically keeping out bad actors without logging all user data. These are complex solutions, but they show the direction the industry is headed: trying to reconcile the open, decentralized nature of crypto with the necessity of oversight to prevent abuse.
同時，也強調不能將所有加密活動都當做犯罪行為。像零知識證明這類新技術，展現出一種折衷做法——讓用戶合法交易時仍可保有隱私，但又能證明他們有遵守規則。舉例來說，你可以證明「我沒有攙雜北韓或恐怖主義的資金」，卻不必曝光所有錢包地址——研究人員正積極開發這類機制。有些DeFi協議也在研究把這種合規檢查內建進來，這樣即可拒收不乾淨的資金，在理論上排除壞人但不用記錄所有用戶資料。雖然這些都是複雜的方案，但明確展現產業走向：試圖兼顧加密貨幣開放、去中心化的本質與監督防弊的必要性。
In sum, crypto surveillance in 2025 is both more pervasive and more refined than ever. Firms like Chainalysis and tools powered by AI have given authorities a high-definition window into blockchain activity, converting the once opaque flow of digital coins into intelligible, actionable information. The FBI and their international counterparts have embraced the mantra of “follow the money, no matter what form it takes” – and the money trail is increasingly yielding to their pursuit. And yet, innovation on the privacy side continues, ensuring that crypto’s cat-and-mouse game is far from over.
總結來說，2025年的加密監控比以往任何時候都更全面、更精細。像Chainalysis這樣的公司，加上AI加持的工具，給了當局一個高解析度的區塊鏈活動觀察窗，把原本不透明的加密幣流動，轉換成可操作、可行動的資訊。FBI及其海外夥伴都奉行「無論資金變成什麼樣子都要追蹤到底」的信條——而如今，錢的軌跡也越來越擋不住他們的追查。不過，隱私這一方的創新也沒有停下來，確保這場貓捉老鼠遊戲還遠遠沒有落幕。
For common crypto users reading this, the key takeaway is awareness. Know that your wallet is not as invisible as you might assume. Every transaction tells a story, and today’s analytics can read most of those stories. But also know that this transparency is part of crypto growing up – earning trust by weeding out misuse. Many in the community believe cryptocurrencies can achieve mainstream adoption only if the worst abuses (like huge hacks and laundering for criminal regimes) are curtailed, and surveillance tools are instrumental in that. The challenge will be maintaining the original spirit of crypto – empowering individuals – while operating in a framework where bad actors can’t hide in the crowd.
對多數加密用戶而言，最重要的就是保持警覺。要知道你的錢包並不像自己想像的那麼隱身。每一筆交易都在說一個故事，而現代分析工具絕大多數都能讀懂這些故事。但也別忘了，這種透明度其實是加密貨幣「長大」的一部分——它經由除去濫用、獲得社會信任。很多幣圈人士相信，唯有把最嚴重的問題（例如惡意駭客與替犯罪政權洗錢等）遏止住，加密貨幣才能真正普及，而監控工具就是達成這點的核心。最大難題，是如何在一個壞人無法躲藏、但又能守住原始「賦能個人」精神的框架裡前進。
The year 2025 finds crypto at this crossroads. Chainalysis, the FBI, AI algorithms – they know a lot about your wallet already. The balance of power between anonymity and accountability is being negotiated in real time, on every blockchain, with each new tool and each new tactic. Whether this leads to a future of greater security or a loss of financial freedom will depend on how wisely these powers are exercised and where the community draws the line. One thing is certain: the era of complete anonymity in crypto is ending, and a new paradigm of transparent finance – for better and for worse – is taking hold.
2025年的加密世界正處於這個十字路口。Chainalysis、FBI、AI演算法——他們對你的錢包已經知之甚詳。匿名與問責之間的權力平衡，正隨著每一項新工具、每一個新策略，在每一條區塊鏈上現場實時地拉鋸。這會引領我們進入更安全的新時代，還是回到金融不自由的舊桎梏？全看大家行使這些權力時，能多麼睿智、以及社群畫下界線的位置。唯一確定的是：加密貨幣的「完全匿名」時代已經走到終點，而一個透明金融的新典範——不論利弊——正在接手。