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遭制裁國家之加密貨幣:受限國家如何採用比特幣與穩定幣

Kostiantyn TsentsuraSep, 12 2025 11:37
遭制裁國家之加密貨幣:受限國家如何採用比特幣與穩定幣

2024年,遭制裁國家收到了158億美元的加密貨幣佔全球非法數位資產交易的39%,這顯示加密貨幣已從實驗科技轉變為在國際限制下維生的關鍵經濟基礎設施。這波增長主要由伊朗資本外流以及俄羅斯立法轉向國家支持加密貨幣導致,展現去中心化科技正在重塑傳統金融戰爭的格局。

這種採納規模史無前例。僅伊朗2024年加密貨幣外流就暴增70%,達到41.8億美元;而俄羅斯僅2023年四季度至2024年第一季期間就處理了490億美元的加密貨幣支付。北韓駭客組織Lazarus Group於2024年竊取超過13.4億美元加密貨幣,佔全球加密貨幣盜竊總額的61%。這些數據不僅是統計,更挑戰自二戰以來支撐全球金融穩定的國際制裁體系。其意義不僅僅在於交易量,受制裁司法管轄區目前掌控幾乎60%的與制裁有關的加密貨幣價值,而以往多為個別實體。

這種變化代表加密貨幣從零星犯罪工具,轉為國家層級規避制裁的基礎設施。過去設計用來迫使金融機構執行限制的傳統措施,在由程式碼決定交易有效性的去中心化世界裡面臨適應困難。

故事要從制裁的本質講起:現代制裁透過將目標國家自美元主導、以及SWIFT等機構把持的全球金融體系中切割出去來發威。2022年2月俄烏戰爭爆發時,西方國家啟動「金融核彈」——將主要俄羅斯銀行剔除SWIFT並凍結央行資產。自2018年伊朗、2019年委內瑞拉以至北韓數十年來皆因類似措施陷入孤立。

這些制裁帶來現實難題:被制裁國如何支付進口、收取出口費用、或讓國民接觸全球金融服務?加密貨幣提供了部分答案。比特幣運作於去中心化網路,無中央機構可拒絕用戶;泰達幣等穩定幣允許持有人無需美國銀行體系也能擁有美元本位價值;以太坊則可藉智能合約實現複雜財務安排。雖然這些系統非完全匿名——區塊鏈交易皆有永久紀錄——但卻脫離了西方政府容易掌控的傳統銀行渠道。

各被制裁國加密採用程度不一:俄羅斯建構出先進的國家級加密交易基礎,包括合法化挖礦與莫斯科、聖彼德堡籌設交易所。伊朗憑便宜電力大量挖礦,同時與俄夥伴開發黃金掛鉤穩定幣。北韓則透過Lazarus Group將加密竊盜「工業化」,作為軍備資金來源。

委內瑞拉國民在政府的Petro加密貨幣失敗後,轉用泰達幣對抗惡性通膨。本文以俄羅斯、伊朗、北韓、委內瑞拉、古巴等六大案例,分析加密貨幣採用隨制裁嚴重度、技術能力及政府態度而現異。並探討加密貨幣究竟是有效的制裁規避工具,還僅能在經濟限制邊緣帶來些許紓解?證據顯示現實十分複雜:加密貨幣為規避制裁提供某些便利,但在規模、易用性和監管因應上面臨重大限制。

理解全球制裁

現代經濟制裁象徵國際關係從軍事征服轉為金融戰爭的演進。現行體系以美國財政部外國資產控制辦公室(OFAC)及歐盟制裁措施為核心,運用美元主導的全球金融架構實踐外交政策目標,而不需動用武力。了解這體系如何運作、以及加密貨幣產生哪些脆弱點,對理解數位資產如何成為規避制裁策略的核心至關重要。

制裁效力建立在三大支柱:美元主導、銀行中介和網路效應。美元佔全球央行外匯存底58%、外匯交易90%,使得國際貿易幾乎無法避開美國金融體系。

經濟學家稱此為「美元陷阱」——即便非美國間的交易,常因結算需經美元清算,也讓參與者暴露於美國司法管轄及制裁之下。銀行中介則透過代理銀行加強了這項權力。像伊朗企業向中國供應商付款,資金會經伊朗本地、歐洲代理、中國代理到中國銀行,每一環節都必須遵循制裁規範,任何銀行如涉被制裁對象,皆可隨時攔截交易,西方金融機構因此獲得全球執行權限。

網路效應令制裁擴展後規避難度呈指數上升。2022年美國制裁俄羅斯銀行時,不僅中止美俄直接業務,也讓所有與俄交易的全球銀行面臨合規風險,俄羅斯被排除於全球金融體系之外。二級制裁進一步擴及全球,連非西方銀行若不配合亦恐失去西方市場准入。

OFAC運作著全球最精密的制裁系統,截至2025年,特列國民和實體名單超過1.1萬人。加密時代下,OFAC執法力度大增,2024年有13次涉及加密貨幣地址列管,為七年內第二高。2024年,OFAC針對加密的罰款高達4.3億美元,較2023年增長40%。歐盟則透過不同法規實現類似效果。針對俄羅斯的第16輪制裁明確將加密禁令從俄公民擴大至白俄羅斯,《加密資產市場規範》則建立能強制落實制裁合規的全面規章。

2024年12月MiCA全面生效後,全球最完備的加密監管架構上線,規定加強境外對象盡職調查要求。SWIFT銀行通訊網是重點執行工具,每日處理四千二百萬筆金融訊息,連結全球兩百國、一萬一千多家機構。SWIFT斷聯——2012年伊朗,2022年俄羅斯——徹底將目標國家逐出全球體系。俄羅斯被踢出後立即採用替代方案,如今莫斯科交易所有54%交易以人民幣進行,俄自建SPFS網路連接20國、550機構。

歷史上,前加密時代的制裁規避展現了這類措施的威力與局限。1990年代伊拉克石油換糧方案,理論上監督540億美元石油交易以換取民生物資,卻因貪腐及空殼公司、回扣等手法繞開制裁。2012-2015年間,伊朗透過土耳其前公司打造複雜黃金交易鏈,將石油收益轉為約200億美元黃金,再於杜拜等地兌現硬通貨。

傳統規避方式依靠跨國司法漏洞、友邦中介及複雜產權結構掩蓋最終受益人,須高技術力和龐大合作網絡,過程中亦多有高成本與重大時滯,更易受偵查與中斷。這一切仍運作於傳統體系內,使得執法機關能隨國際協作強化打擊。現今反洗錢及制裁執法標準主要由金融行動特別工作組織(FATF)協調。

2019年FATF針對虛擬資產頒布的「旅行規則」,要求VASP於逾千美元交易時須交換客戶資訊。但實施上問題重重——即使2025年已有117國中85國立法,FATF於2025年6月仍批評落實成效有限。 remains "lagging" with many jurisdictions struggling with basic risk assessments and supervisory inspections.
目前仍「落後」,許多司法管轄區在基本的風險評估和監管稽核方面仍舉步維艱。

The Travel Rule faces technical challenges that illustrate broader enforcement difficulties in the cryptocurrency space. Fragmented country-specific systems lack interoperability, creating compliance barriers for legitimate transactions while providing limited benefits for sanctions enforcement. Advanced evasion techniques - including the use of privacy coins, mixing services, and decentralized exchanges - often circumvent Travel Rule requirements entirely, forcing regulators to pursue more aggressive enforcement strategies against the technology itself rather than its misuse. G7 and G20 coordination efforts have intensified in response to cryptocurrency-enabled sanctions evasion.
Travel Rule(轉帳規則)面臨技術上的挑戰,顯示出加密貨幣領域內更廣泛的執法困難。各國系統分散且缺乏互通性,為合法交易帶來合規障礙,但對制裁執行幫助有限。進階的規避手法——包含隱私幣的使用、混幣服務以及去中心化交易所——經常完全繞過轉帳規則要求,迫使監管機構不得不對技術本身而非濫用行為採取更強硬的執法策略。G7與G20的協調因此因應加密貨幣造就的制裁規避而日益加強。

The September 2024 G7 joint guidance on preventing Russian sanctions evasion included specific crypto-related indicators and enhanced export control enforcement measures. The G20 Crypto-Asset Policy Implementation Roadmap endorsed IMF-FSB joint guidelines, with a comprehensive review of implementation status planned for end-2025. However, policy coordination faces the persistent challenge that cryptocurrency networks operate globally while regulatory authority remains primarily national. The dollar's role in enforcing sanctions has created both dependencies and vulnerabilities that cryptocurrency potentially exploits.
2024年9月G7聯合發布阻止俄羅斯制裁規避指引,內容納入特定加密貨幣相關指標,並強化出口管制執行措施。G20的加密資產政策落實路線圖則支持IMF與FSB的聯合指引,預計於2025年底全面檢視執行情況。然而,政策協調始終面臨一項持續的挑戰:加密貨幣網絡運作遍及全球,而監管權力主要仍屬於各國。美元在執行制裁上的角色,造成了依賴性與脆弱點,成為加密貨幣可能運用的突破口。

While the dollar maintains its dominant position - accounting for over half of international payments and maintaining 58% of global central bank reserves - sanctioned nations are actively developing alternatives. Russia-China bilateral trade reached $240 billion with 90% conducted in yuan, completely bypassing dollar settlement. The mBridge project for cross-border digital payments has processed $190 million annually, demonstrating technical feasibility of dollar-independent settlement systems. These developments represent more than technical alternatives - they signal a potential paradigm shift in international monetary arrangements. If major economies can conduct international trade without touching the dollar-dominated financial system, the enforcement mechanism underlying modern sanctions begins to break down.
雖然美元依然維持主導地位——占全球國際支付過半,持有量佔全球央行儲備的58%——但受制裁國積極開發替代方案。俄中雙邊貿易額達2400億美元,其中90%以人民幣結算,完全繞過美元清算。跨境數位支付的mBridge專案每年處理1.9億美元,證明了不依賴美元的結算系統具技術可行性。這些發展不僅僅是技術替代,更預示國際貨幣體系潛在的典範轉移。如果主要經濟體能在不經過美元主導體系下進行國際貿易,現代制裁背後的執行機制將逐步瓦解。

Cryptocurrency accelerates this trend by providing technical infrastructure for alternative payment systems while reducing dependence on Western financial institutions that have historically enforced sanctions compliance.
加密貨幣透過提供替代支付系統的技術基礎設施,加速這一趨勢,同時減少對過往執行制裁合規的西方金融機構的依賴。

The emergence of sanctions-resistant payment infrastructure creates a feedback loop that reinforces adoption. As traditional financial institutions implement stronger compliance measures to avoid penalties, legitimate users in sanctioned countries face increasing difficulties accessing basic financial services. This drives adoption of alternative systems, including cryptocurrency, which increases transaction volumes and improves infrastructure quality for both legitimate and illicit users. The result is a growing parallel financial ecosystem that operates largely outside traditional regulatory oversight.
抗制裁支付基礎設施的出現,產生強化採用的正向循環。隨著傳統金融機構為避免罰款而實施更嚴格的合規措施,受制裁國家的合法用戶獲取基本金融服務的難度也隨之加大,進而推動他們採用包含加密貨幣在內的替代系統,促成交易量成長並提升基礎設施品質,無論合法或非法用戶皆受益於此。最終導致一個不斷擴大的平行金融生態系,主要運作於傳統監管監督之外。

Case Studies: Crypto in Sanctioned Economies

Russia: State-Sanctioned Digital Asset Infrastructure

Russia's approach to cryptocurrency under sanctions represents the most sophisticated state-level adoption program globally, evolving from outright hostility to strategic embrace as traditional payment systems became unavailable. The February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered unprecedented Western sanctions that excluded major Russian banks from SWIFT, froze central bank reserves, and created immediate needs for alternative payment mechanisms that cryptocurrency helped address.

俄羅斯制裁下對加密貨幣的政策,代表全球最先進的國家層級採用計畫,其立場也隨傳統支付系統失效,從起初的極力排斥轉為戰略性擁抱。2022年2月入侵烏克蘭,引爆前所未見的西方制裁,將多家主要俄羅斯銀行踢出SWIFT、凍結央行外匯資產,立即催生急需由加密貨幣協助解決的替代支付機制。

The scale of Russian cryptocurrency adoption is staggering. Russian entities processed $49 billion in cryptocurrency payments during just the fourth quarter of 2023 through first quarter of 2024, while estimates suggest $1.38 trillion in total crypto trading volume during 2024, ranking among the top five globally. This represents a complete transformation from Russia's previous antagonistic stance toward digital assets, which included proposals for criminal penalties for cryptocurrency use as recently as 2021. Legislative changes in 2024 formalized this strategic pivot.
俄羅斯採用加密貨幣的規模令人驚嘆。單2023年第四季至2024年第一季,俄羅斯實體就處理了490億美元的加密支付,預估全年加密交易額高達1.38兆美元,全球排名前五。這已徹底改變過去俄羅斯對數位資產強烈敵視的立場,2021年甚至曾有使用加密貨幣要處刑的提案。2024年立法進一步正式確立了這一戰略轉向。

August 2024 legislation legalized cryptocurrency mining operations, while November 2024 amendments authorized the use of cryptocurrencies for international payments. These changes weren't merely regulatory adjustments - they represented official state policy to develop sanctions-resistant financial infrastructure using digital assets. The Central Bank of Russia, previously crypto's strongest opponent, now oversees cryptocurrency mining operations and authorized organizations for cross-border crypto payments. Mining operations have become central to Russia's crypto strategy, leveraging abundant cheap energy resources to produce "virgin Bitcoin" that lacks transaction history connecting it to sanctions violations. Russia operates among the world's largest Bitcoin mining operations, with significant capacity in Siberia where cold climates reduce cooling costs and hydroelectric power provides cheap electricity.
2024年8月,立法使加密貨幣挖礦業務合法化。同年11月的修法則允許加密貨幣用於國際支付。這些並非單純的法令調整,而是官方著手運用數位資產發展抗制裁金融基礎設施的政策決定。原本最反對加密貨幣的俄羅斯央行,如今成為監督挖礦業務和跨境加密支付授權機構。挖礦作業成為俄羅斯加密戰略的核心,活用豐富且廉價的能源生產「處女比特幣」,這種新產出的比特幣沒有承載與制裁違規有關的交易紀錄。俄國是世界上比特幣挖礦量最大的國家之一,西伯利亞地區由於氣候寒冷、可用水力發電,挖礦規模與成本均具優勢。

More controversially, large-scale mining operations in shadow territories like Transnistria, Donbas, and Abkhazia produce cryptocurrency outside international oversight, with electricity costs as low as $0.005 per kilowatt-hour in some locations. The Garantex exchange case study illustrates both the scale and persistence of Russian crypto operations. Despite sanctions by OFAC and the UK's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, Garantex processed over $100 billion in transactions since its 2018 founding.
更具爭議的是,德涅斯特河沿岸、頓巴斯與阿布哈茲等灰色地帶的大規模挖礦作業,在國際監管缺席下產出加密貨幣,在部分地點電費低至每度0.005美元。Garantex交易所的案例突顯了俄國加密業務的規模和韌性。雖然已被美國OFAC與英國金融制裁局制裁,該平台自2018年成立以來仍完成逾千億美元的交易。

When enforcement actions targeted the original Garantex entity in March 2025, operators immediately launched successor exchange Grinex, demonstrating the technical ease of reconstituting cryptocurrency services under new corporate structures. Russian sanctions evasion has developed sophisticated technical capabilities that extend beyond simple cryptocurrency transactions. The TGR Group, sanctioned in December 2024, operated a complex money laundering network using U.S. corporate structures to process hundreds of millions in transactions for Russian elites.
2025年3月執法針對原始Garantex實體時,營運者立即啟動下一代交易所Grinex,顯示以新法人架構重啟加密服務毫無技術門檻。俄羅斯透過加密貨幣規避制裁的技術,早已超越一般的交易層次。2024年12月受制裁的TGR集團,就是以美國公司架構為俄國菁英進行數億美元資金洗錢的複雜網絡。

KB Vostok, a UAV manufacturer, used cryptocurrency to sell $40 million worth of military drones, processing payments through Garantex to circumvent traditional banking restrictions. State-sponsored blockchain projects represent Russia's long-term vision for sanctions-resistant financial infrastructure. Sberbank launched its Digital Financial Assets platform in September 2024, targeting 1 trillion rubles ($10.6 billion) in market value by 2027. The platform enables tokenization of commodities and other assets for international trade settlement outside traditional banking channels. Plans for cryptocurrency exchanges in Moscow and St. Petersburg specifically target BRICS trade relationships, providing infrastructure for conducting international commerce entirely outside Western financial oversight.
無人機製造商KB Vostok利用加密貨幣出售價值4000萬美元的軍用無人機,通過Garantex辦理付款以繞開傳統銀行限制。國家主導的區塊鏈專案則是俄羅斯規劃長期抗制裁金融架構的體現。例如Sberbank在2024年9月推出數位金融資產平台,目標2027年達到1兆盧布(106億美元)市值。該平台允許商品與資產代幣化,供國際貿易結算使用,完全不經傳統銀行。莫斯科與聖彼得堡的加密貨幣交易所建設,則聚焦於與金磚國家的貿易關係,打造完全不受西方金融監管的新國際商業基礎設施。

Russia's SWIFT alternative, the System for Transfer of Financial Messages, increasingly supports cryptocurrency transactions as a mechanism for sanctions circumvention. SPFS connects 550 organizations across 20 countries and enables settlement in multiple currencies including digital assets. Integration with China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System provides additional redundancy, while bilateral cooperation with Iran on payment systems bypasses traditional correspondent banking relationships entirely. Recent enforcement actions demonstrate both the scale of Russian cryptocurrency operations and their resilience to disruption. Operation Final Exchange in September 2024 saw German authorities seize 47 Russian-language cryptocurrency exchanges operating without KYC requirements.
俄羅斯的SWIFT替代系統「金融資訊傳送系統」(SPFS),日益支援加密貨幣交易,用作規避制裁的工具。SPFS連接20國、550個組織,可用包括數位資產在內的多種貨幣結算。該系統與中國人民幣跨境支付系統(CIPS)整合,增加備援能力,與伊朗的支付系統雙邊合作則完全避開傳統對敲銀行。近期執法行動也展示俄國加密業務的規模及其抗干擾力。2024年9月「終極交易行動」中,德國當局查封了47家無KYC要求的俄語加密貨幣交易所。

However, these takedowns typically prompt migration to new platforms rather than cessation of activity. The $10 million bounty placed on Sergey Sergeevich Ivanov, operator of the sanctioned Cryptex exchange, highlights law enforcement challenges when targets operate from jurisdictions beyond Western legal reach.
但這些取締行動通常只是促使業者轉移陣地,而非真正終止活動。被制裁的Cryptex交易所營運者Ivanov被懸賞1000萬美元通緝,突顯目標若身處西方司法力量及其所不及之處,執法困境極為明顯。

Iran: Energy Conversion and Capital Flight Patterns

Iran's relationship with cryptocurrency reflects the country's decades-long experience operating under comprehensive international sanctions, creating both government-level adoption programs and grassroots capital flight patterns that demonstrate crypto's utility for isolated economies. Unlike Russia's recent embrace of digital assets, Iran has pursued cryptocurrency adoption since 2019, making it one of the first sanctioned nations to develop systematic policies for leveraging blockchain technology.

伊朗與加密貨幣的關係,反映出該國長期在全面國際制裁下的運作經驗,促使不但有政府層級的應用計畫,也出現民間資本外逃模式,體現加密貨幣對孤立經濟體的功能。不像俄羅斯近期才轉向擁抱數位資產,伊朗自2019年以來便推動加密貨幣採用,是全球首批建立系統化區塊鏈政策的受制裁國家之一。

The foundation of Iran's crypto strategy rests on Bitcoin mining operations that convert the country's abundant energy resources into digital assets that can circumvent banking restrictions. Iran controls approximately 4.5% of global Bitcoin mining hashrate, operating nearly 180,000 mining devices that consume electricity equivalent to 10 million barrels of crude oil annually - representing 4% of Iran's total oil exports. This energy-to-cryptocurrency conversion provides approximately $1 billion in Bitcoin annually, collected by the central bank for import financing. Mining operations face persistent infrastructure challenges that illuminate broader adoption constraints.
伊朗的加密貨幣策略,以比特幣挖礦為基礎,將自身豐富的能源轉化為繞開銀行管制的數位資產。伊朗掌控全球約4.5%的比特幣算力,運作近18萬台礦機,每年耗電相當於1,000萬桶原油——相當於伊朗石油出口總量的4%。這種能源轉加密貨幣,一年約為中央銀行帶來10億美元的比特幣,用於進口融資。但挖礦營運面臨持續的基礎建設挑戰,也反映出加密貨幣更廣泛應用上的限制。

Illegal mining activities consume up to 2 gigawatts of electricity during peak periods, causing a 16% increase in national power demand that contributes to blackouts affecting 27 of Iran's 31 provinces. Despite these grid impacts, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operates protected mining facilities that continue operations even during mandatory shutdowns, demonstrating how cryptocurrency mining has become integral to state revenue generation.
非法挖礦高峰期用電量可達2GW,使全國電力需求大增16%,導致全國31省中的27省發生停電。儘管這種電網衝擊嚴重,伊斯蘭革命衛隊仍設有受保護的挖礦設施,即便全面停工令下也繼續運作,顯示加密貨幣挖礦已成國家財政的重要一環。

Iranian cryptocurrency adoption correlates directly with geopolitical tensions and currency devaluation 伊朗加密貨幣的採用情況,與地緣政治局勢緊張及本幣貶值息息相關pressures. During 2024, crypto outflows reached $4.18 billion, representing a 70% year-over-year increase that coincided with the Iranian rial losing 37% of its value against the dollar. Sharp outflow spikes occurred during Iran-Israel conflicts on April 14 and October 1, 2024, demonstrating how cryptocurrency serves as a hedge against both currency devaluation and geopolitical risk. The Iranian government's December 2024 decision to halt cryptocurrency exchange withdrawals illustrates the tension between enabling sanctions circumvention and preventing capital flight.

壓力。在2024年,加密貨幣外流金額達到41.8億美元,較去年成長70%,此現象正值伊朗里亞爾兌美元貶值37%的時期。2024年4月14日及10月1日伊朗與以色列衝突期間,外流金額出現劇烈激增,顯示加密貨幣如何作為對抗貨幣貶值與地緣政治風險的避險工具。伊朗政府於2024年12月決議暫停加密貨幣交易所提領,突顯協助規避制裁與防止資本外逃之間的矛盾。

As regional tensions escalated and the rial depreciated rapidly, Iranian authorities moved to prevent cryptocurrency from facilitating massive capital outflows that could destabilize the domestic economy. This action affected 18 million Iranians who hold crypto assets across 300-600 digital exchanges, highlighting the scale of grassroots adoption. Iran's approach to stablecoin adoption reveals sophisticated understanding of cryptocurrency's utility for international trade. Licensed miners are required to surrender mined Bitcoin to the central bank for import purchases, while traders increasingly prefer Tether for settlements due to its dollar stability and resistance to banking sanctions. The development of a joint Iran-Russia gold-backed stablecoin specifically targets cross-border trade settlement outside the dollar system, with technical specifications designed for use in the Astrakhan special economic zone.

隨著區域緊張加劇且里亞爾快速貶值,伊朗當局為避免加密貨幣促使資本大舉外逃、威脅國內經濟穩定,迅速採取管制。本措施影響了全國1800萬名持有加密資產、分散在300至600家數位交易所的伊朗人,突顯其普及基層的規模。伊朗對穩定幣採用的做法,展現對加密貨幣於國際貿易用途的深入理解。合格礦工必須將挖出的比特幣交由央行,用於進口採購;而交易商因Tether的美元穩定性及對銀行制裁的抵抗力,日益偏好用Tether進行結算。伊朗與俄羅斯共同開發的黃金支撐穩定幣,專為非美元體系下的跨境貿易結算所設,並針對亞斯特拉罕(Astrakhan)經濟特區量身打造技術規範。

Enforcement actions have illuminated Iran's cryptocurrency ecosystem connections to regional proxy organizations. The Nobitex exchange, Iran's largest with 87% market share and $3 billion in trading volume during 2025, has been linked to transactions with Hamas, IRGC units, and Houthis. TRM Labs traced cryptocurrency flows from Iranian entities to Houthi operations in Yemen, demonstrating how digital assets enable funding of proxy activities across the region.

執法行動顯示,伊朗加密貨幣生態系與區域代理組織存在聯繫。Nobitex 作為市占率87%、2025年交易量達30億美元的伊朗最大交易所,被發現與哈瑪斯、伊斯蘭革命衛隊及胡塞武裝有交易往來。TRM Labs 追蹤到來自伊朗實體的加密貨幣流向葉門胡塞武裝行動,突顯數位資產如何資助區域內的代理衝突活動。

Iran's central bank digital currency initiative, the digital rial, represents efforts to maintain monetary sovereignty while enabling sanctions circumvention. Built on Hyperledger Fabric technology, the digital rial launched retail pilot programs on Kish Island in June 2024. The CBDC leverages Iran's existing Shetab payment network, which processes transactions in under two seconds, providing technical infrastructure that could support broader digital asset adoption. The December 2024 approval of comprehensive cryptocurrency regulations marked Iran's evolution toward formal recognition of digital assets as sanctions circumvention tools.

伊朗中央銀行數位貨幣(CBDC)計畫,即「數位里亞爾」,展現該國在維護貨幣主權的同時,也尋求避開制裁。數位里亞爾採用 Hyperledger Fabric 技術,並於2024年6月在基什島啟動零售試點。該CBDC結合現有 Shetab 支付網路,能在兩秒內完成交易,提供有助擴大數位資產應用的技術基礎。2024年12月通過全面加密貨幣法規,標誌伊朗正式認可數位資產作為規避制裁工具的重要轉折。

New licensing requirements for mining operations above certain thresholds are designed to capture revenue for the state while providing legal frameworks for continued operations. The regulatory approach contrasts sharply with outright bans in neighboring countries, reflecting Iran's assessment that cryptocurrency provides essential economic benefits despite compliance risks. Recent developments in Iran-Russia payment system integration demonstrate how sanctioned nations are coordinating cryptocurrency adoption. The October 2024 connection of Iran's banking system to Russia's MIR network enables bilateral trade settlement outside SWIFT, while joint development of blockchain-based payment mechanisms could provide comprehensive alternatives to Western financial infrastructure.

新的大型加密礦場特許規定,旨在為國家創造稅收,同時賦予營運合法性。這種監管方式與鄰近國家的全面禁令形成鮮明對比,反映出伊朗認為,加密貨幣雖有合規風險,但對經濟裨益至關重要。近期伊俄支付系統整合進展,也說明受制裁國家正協同推動加密貨幣應用。2024年10月伊朗銀行體系連接俄羅斯 MIR 支付網,不需經SWIFT即可完成雙邊貿易結算;雙方共同開發區塊鏈支付工具,有機會成為西方金融基礎設施的全面替代方案。

North Korea: Industrialized Cryptocurrency Theft

North Korea's approach to cryptocurrency differs fundamentally from other sanctioned nations through its focus on systematic theft rather than adoption for legitimate economic activity. The Lazarus Group, North Korea's primary cyber warfare unit, has industrialized cryptocurrency theft as a revenue generation mechanism that provides significant funding for the country's weapons programs while demonstrating sophisticated technical capabilities that challenge global cybersecurity assumptions.

北韓:產業化的加密貨幣竊盜

北韓對加密貨幣的策略與其他受制裁國截然不同——不是為合法經濟活動採用,而是聚焦於系統性的竊盜。拉撒路集團(Lazarus Group),即北韓的主力網路戰部門,將加密貨幣偷竊產業化,做為創收手段,為該國武器計劃提供大量資金,同時展現高度複雜的技術能力,對全球資安體系形成重大挑戰。

The scale of North Korean cryptocurrency theft reached unprecedented levels in 2024, with over $1.34 billion stolen representing 61% of all cryptocurrency theft globally. The February 2025 Bybit exchange hack, resulting in $1.46 billion losses, marked the largest cryptocurrency theft in history and demonstrated Lazarus Group's evolving capabilities. These operations aren't random criminal activities - they represent systematic state-sponsored programs that U.N. experts directly tie to nuclear and missile development funding.

2024年北韓加密貨幣竊案規模史無前例,竊得金額超過13.4億美元,佔全球加密貨幣竊盜總額的61%。2025年2月 Bybit 交易所駭客事件更造成14.6億美元損失,創史上最大單一加密貨幣竊案,突顯拉撒路集團技術持續進化。這些行動並非普通犯罪,而是有系統的國家支持計畫,聯合國專家直接將之與核武及飛彈發展資金來源連結。

Lazarus Group's attack methodologies have evolved significantly from early social engineering approaches to sophisticated infiltration techniques targeting cryptocurrency infrastructure. The group's 2024 operations showed particular sophistication in compromising private keys through extended surveillance campaigns and fake employment schemes.

拉撒路集團的攻擊手法從早期社交工程,演變為專門針對加密貨幣基礎設施的高級滲透技術。2024年該集團特別擅長以長期監控與假冒就業手法,竊取私鑰。

The KnowBe4 incident, where Lazarus operatives secured employment at a major security company using fake identities, demonstrated willingness to invest months in establishing access to cryptocurrency systems. Attack patterns reveal systematic targeting of centralized exchanges and DeFi protocols that hold large cryptocurrency reserves. Recent major thefts include the $235 million WazirX exchange hack, $100 million Atomic Wallet compromise, and numerous smaller operations that collectively establish North Korea as the dominant threat actor in cryptocurrency crime. Unlike profit-motivated criminals, Lazarus Group operations focus on maximizing overall theft rather than minimizing risk, leading to increasingly bold attacks on well-defended targets. Money laundering infrastructure demonstrates sophisticated understanding of blockchain analytics and cryptocurrency obfuscation techniques.

拉撒路成員曾以假身分進入資安公司 KnowBe4 任職,證明其願意花數月布局,以滲透加密系統。其攻擊模式有系統地鎖定擁有大量資產的中心化交易所與DeFi協議。近期重大案件包括WazirX交易所2.35億美元駭案、Atomic Wallet 1億美元竊案以及數起規模較小的盜竊,確立北韓在加密犯罪領域的主導威脅地位。不同於單純逐利的犯罪者,拉撒路集團著重整體竊取規模,多選擇高防禦標的進行大膽攻擊。其洗錢網絡展現對區塊鏈分析及資金混淆技術的高超掌握。

Despite widespread sanctions against mixing services, Tornado Cash usage by North Korean operatives surged 108% in 2024 following the March 2022 hack of the Ronin bridge. The group disperses stolen funds across thousands of addresses using multiple blockchains, with heavy utilization of TRON and USDT for final cash-out stages due to lower transaction fees and reduced regulatory oversight. Attribution techniques developed by blockchain analytics firms provide unprecedented visibility into North Korean operations, enabling law enforcement responses that were impossible with traditional financial crimes.

雖然混幣服務普遍受制裁,北韓操作員借用 Tornado Cash 的頻率,較2022年3月Ronin橋駭案後,於2024年激增108%。該組織將贓款分散於數千地址、跨多條鏈處理,最終階段大量使用TRON和USDT套現,因其交易成本低且監管較鬆。區塊鏈分析公司開發的歸因技術,使北韓活動前所未有地透明,讓執法機關執行加密犯罪打擊變得可行。

TRM Labs, Chainalysis, and Elliptic use transaction pattern analysis, timing correlations, and infrastructure fingerprinting to attribute attacks to Lazarus Group with high confidence. FBI public service announcements now routinely include specific cryptocurrency addresses and recovery bounties, demonstrating integration of blockchain analytics into traditional law enforcement responses. The revenue destination for stolen cryptocurrency highlights the strategic importance of these operations to North Korea's broader objectives. U.N. Panel of Experts reports estimate that cryptocurrency theft provides significant revenue for weapons development programs, with the Security Council emphasizing how cyber activities enable circumvention of sanctions designed to prevent nuclear proliferation.

TRM Labs、Chainalysis 與 Elliptic 等公司,透過交易模式分析、時間相關性與基礎設施指紋,能高度確定地將攻擊歸因於拉撒路集團。FBI 現在在公開通告中經常列出特定加密貨幣地址及懸賞金,反映區塊鏈分析已成傳統執法流程一環。失竊的加密貨幣流向顯示,這些行動對北韓實現大戰略至關重要。聯合國專家小組評估,加密貨幣竊案為武器計畫挹注大量經費,安理會更強調,網路行動促使制裁失效,威脅核不擴散目標。

The scale of theft suggests cryptocurrency crime has become a major revenue stream for an isolated regime with limited alternative funding sources. International cooperation in responding to North Korean cryptocurrency theft has improved significantly, with joint operations involving Korean, Japanese, and European authorities. However, the decentralized nature of cryptocurrency systems and North Korea's sophisticated technical capabilities create persistent challenges. Recovery rates for stolen funds remain extremely low at 3.8%, while the group's use of multiple blockchains and privacy tools complicates both prevention and recovery efforts. The Lazarus Group's operations illuminate broader vulnerabilities in cryptocurrency infrastructure that extend beyond North Korean threats. Social engineering attacks that compromise private keys remain highly effective against targets regardless of technical security measures.

竊案規模顯示,加密犯罪已成為這個孤立政權的主要財源之一。國際間針對北韓竊幣行為的協作大幅提高,韓國、日本和歐洲機構都有聯合行動。不過,因加密貨幣系統去中心化,且北韓擁有高度技術能力,查緝始終困難。贓款追回率僅3.8%,加上多鏈與隱私工具的應用,令預防和追回更棘手。拉撒路集團的行動曝露整個加密生態基礎設施的更廣泛漏洞,而非僅限於北韓的威脅。用社交工程取得私鑰依舊對個人與機構資產造成極大風險,無論系統防護多嚴密。

The group's success demonstrates that human factors often represent the weakest link in cryptocurrency security, with implications for both individual users and institutional custodians. Recent developments suggest Lazarus Group capabilities continue expanding as cryptocurrency markets grow. The shift from primarily targeting DeFi protocols to major centralized exchanges indicates growing sophistication and ambition. Enhanced targeting of infrastructure providers, including wallet services and blockchain bridges, suggests recognition that upstream attacks can provide access to larger pools of cryptocurrency than individual platform compromises.

該集團的成功案例說明,人為因素往往是加密資安的致命弱點,對個人與機構託管者皆構成威脅。近況顯示,隨著加密市場擴張,拉撒路組織的攻擊能力持續提升。其攻擊焦點從主攻DeFi協議轉向大型中心化交易所,表現出日趨成熟與進取;如今更積極鎖定錢包服務和跨鏈橋等基礎設施供應商,反映出其認知直接滲透底層設施,比針對單一平台能取得更多資產。

Venezuela: Petro Failure and Grassroots USDT Adoption

Venezuela presents a unique case study in cryptocurrency adoption driven by economic necessity rather than sanctions circumvention, though U.S. sanctions against the Venezuelan government created additional pressures that accelerated digital asset adoption. The spectacular failure of the government's Petro cryptocurrency contrasts sharply with organic adoption of Tether as an inflation hedge, demonstrating the difference between state-imposed digital assets and market-driven cryptocurrency usage.

委內瑞拉:Petro挫敗與民間USDT自發採用

委內瑞拉案例顯示,加密貨幣的普及是出於經濟壓力而非單純規避制裁,雖然美國對委國政府的制裁確實加重了推動數位資產普及的急迫性。Petro國家加密貨幣的慘敗,和民眾自發以Tether對抗惡性通膨的現象形成鮮明對比,突顯國家強推數位資產與市場主導數位貨幣運用的根本差異。

The Petro cryptocurrency's January 15, 2024 termination marked the end of one of history's most ambitious but unsuccessful state digital asset experiments. Launched in 2018 amid hyperinflation and international sanctions, the Petro was designed to circumvent sanctions while providing a stable store of value backed by oil reserves.

2024年1月15日,Petro加密貨幣終止流通,為歷史上最雄心勃勃、卻以失敗告終的國家數位資產實驗劃下句點。Petro於2018年,在惡性通膨與國際制裁雙重壓力下推出,原意在於對抗制裁,並以石油儲備為基礎,打造一種穩定的價值儲藏工具。

Despite raising $735 million in pre-sales and receiving extensive government promotion, the Petro never achieved meaningful adoption among Venezuelan citizens or businesses. The Petro's failure illustrates fundamental challenges in state-sponsored cryptocurrency adoption. Technical problems included limited wallet availability, complex purchase procedures, and lack

儘管 Petro 在預售階段募得7.35億美元且政府大力宣傳,卻始終未能被委內瑞拉民眾和企業廣泛接受。Petro的失敗凸顯國家推動加密資產制度所面臨的根本難題:其技術問題包括錢包普及率低、購買流程複雜,以及...of merchant acceptance infrastructure. More fundamentally, Venezuelan citizens viewed the Petro as government currency subject to the same political risks that had destroyed the bolívar's value.

的商戶收單基礎設施。更根本地,委內瑞拉公民將Petro視為政府貨幣,認為其同樣會受到導致玻利瓦爾價值崩潰的政治風險影響。

The National Assembly's declaration that the Petro represented illegal debt issuance reflected broader political opposition that undermined confidence in government digital currency initiatives. Corruption scandals surrounding the Petro program culminated in the SUNACRIP investigation, where estimates suggest between $3-20 billion disappeared from state oil company accounts through cryptocurrency-related schemes. The arrest of 80 individuals connected to the program demonstrated how state cryptocurrency initiatives can become vehicles for corruption when proper oversight mechanisms are absent. The scandal contributed to the program's termination and influenced subsequent government skepticism toward digital asset initiatives. In contrast to Petro's failure, grassroots Tether adoption has flourished as Venezuelans seek alternatives to hyperinflationary bolivars. Venezuela ranks 18th globally in cryptocurrency adoption according to Chainalysis data, reaching 9th on a per-capita basis with 110% growth in crypto activity during 2024.

國民議會聲稱Petro涉及非法債務發行,反映了更廣泛的政治反對,進一步削弱了民眾對政府數位貨幣計畫的信心。圍繞Petro計畫的貪腐醜聞最終導致SUNACRIP調查,據估計,透過加密貨幣相關計畫,國營石油公司帳戶流失了30億至200億美元。與該計畫相關的80人被逮捕,顯示當缺乏適當監督機制時,國家層級的加密貨幣計畫容易成為貪腐工具。這起醜聞不僅導致該計畫終止,也影響了政府對後續數位資產計畫的懷疑態度。與Petro失敗形成對比,民間對Tether的採用蓬勃成長,委內瑞拉人積極尋找對抗惡性通膨玻利瓦爾的替代方案。依據Chainalysis數據,委內瑞拉在全球加密貨幣採用度排名第18,人均排名第9,2024年加密活動量成長110%。

Annual inflation of 229% and the bolívar's 70% depreciation since October 2024 have created persistent demand for dollar-denominated alternatives that Tether provides. USDT functions as a de facto parallel currency in Venezuelan commerce, with businesses routinely quoting prices and accepting payments in Tether for goods and services ranging from utilities to security services. The existence of three parallel exchange rates - official bolívars at 151.57 per dollar, parallel market rates at 231.76, and Tether/Binance rates at 219.62 - illustrates how cryptocurrency has become integrated into Venezuelan monetary arrangements.

年通膨率達229%,自2024年10月以來玻利瓦爾貶值達70%,這種狀況使得對Tether等美元計價替代資產的需求長期存在。USDT已成為委內瑞拉商業中的事實上的平行貨幣,企業慣常以Tether報價並接受Tether支付各類商品與服務(從電力到保全服務)。三種平行匯率——官方玻利瓦爾151.57兌1美元,平行市場231.76,Tether/Binance匯率219.62——說明加密貨幣已經融入委內瑞拉的貨幣體系。

Small businesses have emerged as primary drivers of USDT adoption, with bodegas, restaurants, and service providers preferring cryptocurrency payments over cash due to convenience and inflation protection. Unlike formal banking systems that require government permits and currency controls, Tether transactions enable immediate settlement and value preservation without regulatory compliance burdens. The preference for stablecoins over Bitcoin reflects practical utility for daily transactions rather than speculation or investment purposes. Remittances represent another critical use case for cryptocurrency in Venezuela, with digital assets accounting for approximately 9% of the $5.4 billion in remittances received during 2023.

小型企業成為USDT採用的主要推手,包括雜貨店、餐館及各類服務提供者,由於便利性及抗通膨特性,他們偏好用加密貨幣收付款而非現金。相較於需政府許可與匯兌管制的正式銀行體系,Tether交易可實現即時結算及價值保存,無需繁重合規手續。民眾偏好穩定幣而非比特幣,顯示加密貨幣於日常交易上的實用性,而非僅為投資或投機工具。匯款則是加密貨幣在委內瑞拉的另一個重要應用場景,2023年數位資產佔總匯款金額(54億美元)約9%。

Traditional remittance services face regulatory challenges and high fees, while cryptocurrency enables direct family-to-family transfers at costs below 1% compared to 6-7% for traditional services. The volume savings on annual remittances could amount to millions of dollars in reduced transaction costs. Government responses to grassroots cryptocurrency adoption have been inconsistent and sometimes counterproductive.

傳統匯款服務不僅受監管挑戰,費用也很高;相對之下,加密貨幣讓家庭間可以直接低成本轉帳,手續費通常低於1%,而傳統服務費率為6-7%。光是匯款交易成本的年節省額就可能達數百萬美元。針對民間加密貨幣採用,政府回應態度搖擺且有時適得其反。

The May 2024 cryptocurrency mining ban due to power grid strain attempted to address infrastructure limitations but also reduced domestic cryptocurrency supply. Exchange controls and capital restrictions create artificial demand for cryptocurrency as one of the few mechanisms for Venezuelans to access dollar-denominated assets. The absence of effective regulatory oversight following the SUNACRIP corruption scandal has created regulatory uncertainty that affects both legitimate and illicit cryptocurrency usage. Suspended oversight bodies and inconsistent enforcement make compliance challenging for businesses seeking to integrate cryptocurrency payments legally. This regulatory vacuum contrasts with more structured approaches in other sanctioned nations that have developed comprehensive frameworks for cryptocurrency adoption. Infrastructure challenges limit broader cryptocurrency adoption despite strong economic incentives.

2024年5月,政府為減輕電網壓力,全面禁止加密貨幣挖礦,試圖解決基礎設施瓶頸,但同時也減少國內加密貨幣供給。外匯管制與資本限制令加密貨幣成為少數可讓民眾接觸到美元計價資產的管道,而SUNACRIP貪腐醜聞後缺乏有效監理,導致無論合法或非法的加密貨幣活動皆籠罩於監管不確定性。監理機關停擺,執法標準不一,使得有意合法納入加密貨幣支付的企業面臨合規困難。這種監理真空與其他制裁國家發展出完整配套架構形成鮮明對比。儘管經濟誘因強烈,基礎設施挑戰仍限制更廣泛的加密貨幣普及。

Poor internet connectivity outside major cities restricts digital asset usage to urban areas, while limited access to smartphones and technical education creates adoption barriers for rural populations. Power outages and telecommunications disruptions periodically affect cryptocurrency transactions, highlighting dependence on basic infrastructure that remains unreliable in many regions.

大城市以外的網路連線品質不佳,將數位資產的應用限制於都會區;而智慧型手機普及率不足與數位素養不足,讓鄉間地區面臨採用障礙。頻繁的停電與通訊中斷不時影響加密貨幣交易,凸顯委內瑞拉對脆弱基礎設施的高度依賴。

Cuba: Crypto Remittances Amid Banking Isolation

Cuba's cryptocurrency adoption primarily addresses remittance needs created by U.S. sanctions and banking restrictions that have eliminated traditional money transfer mechanisms. The 2020 shutdown of Western Union services - which previously handled the majority of Cuban remittances - created immediate needs for alternative transfer mechanisms that cryptocurrency has partially filled, though adoption remains constrained by infrastructure limitations and regulatory uncertainty.

古巴:銀行孤立下的加密匯款

古巴加密貨幣的應用主要是為了滿足美國制裁與銀行限制下產生的匯款需求,傳統匯款管道因制裁全數停擺。2020年西聯匯款(Western Union)關閉服務(此前該公司處理了大多數古巴匯款),使得民眾急需新轉帳方式,加密貨幣雖部分滿足需求,但其普及仍受基礎設施及監管不確定性所限制。

Remittances historically represented approximately 6% of Cuba's GDP during the 2005-2020 period, providing critical hard currency inflows that supported millions of Cuban families. The elimination of traditional remittance channels created a significant humanitarian impact while driving innovation in cryptocurrency-based transfer mechanisms. Specialized services like BitRemesas.com emerged to facilitate family transfers using Bitcoin and other digital assets, though volumes remain limited compared to pre-restriction levels.

2005-2020年間,匯款約占古巴GDP的6%,是支撐數百萬個家庭的重要外匯來源。傳統匯款渠道的消失帶來嚴重人道衝擊,也促使加密貨幣創新轉帳模式出現。例如BitRemesas.com等專門服務興起,以比特幣或其他數位資產實現家庭間匯款,惟目前規模仍遠低於管制前水準。

The cost advantages of cryptocurrency remittances are substantial, with digital asset transfers typically costing less than 1% compared to 6-7% for traditional money transfer services. For Cuban families receiving remittances, these savings are significant given average remittance amounts of $100-500 per transaction. However, technical complexity and limited access to cryptocurrency exchanges in Cuba create practical barriers that prevent broader adoption. Peer-to-peer trading networks have developed to address exchange access limitations, with activity coordinated through WhatsApp groups, Telegram channels, and specialized platforms like LocalBitcoins. The typical transaction flow involves Miami-based family members purchasing Bitcoin and transferring it to Cuban contacts who exchange the cryptocurrency for pesos or dollars through local networks.

加密貨幣匯款的成本優勢顯著,手續費通常低於1%,傳統轉帳服務則高達6-7%。對平均單筆匯款在100-500美元之間的古巴家庭來說,省下的費用相當可觀。然而,技術複雜性與加密貨幣交易所進入門檻,形成阻礙普及的實際障礙。為了克服無法自由上下交易所的限制,民眾發展出同儕買賣網絡,透過WhatsApp、Telegram等訊息群組及LocalBitcoins等平台協調。一般交易流程為:美國邁阿密的家人購買比特幣,轉給古巴聯絡人,再通過本地網絡兌換為比索或美元。

These informal arrangements carry counterparty risks but provide essential services unavailable through formal channels. Exchange access represents the primary constraint on Cuban cryptocurrency adoption, with major platforms like Binance and Coinbase geo-blocking Cuban users due to sanctions compliance requirements. This forces reliance on peer-to-peer networks and smaller exchanges that may lack security features and regulatory oversight available on major platforms. The limited availability of secure exchange services increases risks for users while reducing overall transaction volumes. Cuba's August 2021 Central Bank Resolution 215 provided legal recognition for cryptocurrencies and established licensing frameworks for virtual asset service providers, representing a more permissive regulatory approach than most sanctioned nations.

這類非正式安排雖存在交易對手風險,但彌補了正式渠道無法提供的服務。交易所進入障礙成為古巴加密貨幣普及的最大限制,因制裁規定,如Binance、Coinbase等主流平台都封鎖古巴用戶。這迫使民眾仰賴同儕網絡及較小規模的交易所,而這些平台往往缺乏大型平台的安全或監管措施。安全交易所難以使用,提升用戶風險同時壓縮交易總量。2021年8月,古巴中央銀行第215號決議給予加密貨幣法律地位,並設立虛擬資產服務供應商(VASP)許可制度,這較大多數受制裁國家更為寬容。

The 2024 comprehensive framework included anti-money laundering rules and reporting requirements designed to prevent illicit usage while enabling legitimate remittance activity. This regulatory clarity contrasts with prohibition approaches in some neighboring countries, reflecting Cuban assessment that cryptocurrency provides essential economic benefits. Internet infrastructure limitations represent a fundamental constraint on broader cryptocurrency adoption throughout Cuba. The country maintains some of the world's slowest internet speeds with limited penetration outside urban areas, restricting cryptocurrency usage to populations with reliable connectivity. Mobile data costs remain prohibitive for many Cubans, while power outages periodically disrupt internet access necessary for cryptocurrency transactions.

2024年全面規範納入反洗錢與舉報條款,一方面防止非法用途,一方面允許合法匯款行為。這種監管明確、非禁止式的態度,與鄰近部分國家不同,反映出古巴官方認同加密貨幣給經濟帶來的關鍵益處。只是,網路基礎設施始終是古巴推動加密貨幣擴大的根本障礙。當地網速全球墊底,城市以外的覆蓋極差,使可靠連線的群體才能應用加密貨幣。行動數據費用之高讓多數居民難以負擔,且停電不時中斷網路,加深交易不便。

Political uncertainty affects long-term cryptocurrency adoption prospects, particularly regarding U.S. sanctions policy changes. The Biden administration's removal of Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list was reversed by the returning Trump administration, creating compliance risks for any entity facilitating Cuban cryptocurrency transactions. These policy reversals make long-term planning difficult for both Cuban users and international service providers. KYC and compliance requirements create additional complications for Cuban cryptocurrency users, as international compliance standards often conflict with sanctions restrictions. Major exchanges that implement comprehensive identity verification may reject Cuban users regardless of transaction legitimacy, while services that accept Cuban users may face regulatory scrutiny in Western jurisdictions.

政治不確定性影響加密貨幣長遠應用,特別是美國制裁政策變動。拜登政府雖曾將古巴移出恐怖主義支持國,但川普回鍋後又恢復,導致任何協助古巴加密貨幣交易的實體都面臨合規風險。政策反覆不定,使得無論是古巴用戶還是國際服務商都難以長遠規劃。KYC身份查核及合規要求是另一層阻力,因國際標準往往與制裁限制牴觸。主流交易所即使交易合法,只要來自古巴一律拒絕,而能夠接受古巴用戶的平台,則可能受西方司法轄區的監理審查。

This compliance maze makes it difficult for Cubans to access secure, regulated cryptocurrency services. The Cuban government's dual approach of regulating rather than prohibiting cryptocurrency reflects recognition that digital assets provide essential services that traditional financial systems cannot deliver under current sanctions. However, limited technical infrastructure and persistent sanctions uncertainty constrain adoption to a small urban population with internet access and technical sophistication necessary to navigate complex peer-to-peer networks.

這種合規迷宮讓古巴人難以安全並合規地取得加密貨幣服務。古巴官方選擇規範而非禁止加密貨幣,反映認同數位資產在現行制裁下能提供傳統金融體系所無法做到的關鍵服務。不過,技術基礎設施有限和制裁持續的不確定性,使加密貨幣的應用僅侷限在少數具有網路連線與技術能力、能夠遊走複雜同儕網絡的城市群體。

Other Sanctioned Nations: Syria, Myanmar, and Afghanistan

Beyond the major case studies, several other sanctioned nations demonstrate varying degrees of cryptocurrency adoption constrained by conflict, infrastructure limitations, and varying sanctions regimes. Syria, Myanmar, and Afghanistan each present unique circumstances that illuminate different aspects of how cryptocurrency functions under comprehensive international restrictions.

其他受制裁國家:敘利亞、緬甸與阿富汗

除了主要個案外,還有不少其他受制裁國家展現出不同程度的加密貨幣應用,但都受到戰亂、基礎設施薄弱和不同制裁體系的嚴格約束。敘利亞、緬甸與阿富汗分別呈現出加密貨幣在國際全面限制下運作的不同面向。

Syria's cryptocurrency adoption remains limited due to ongoing conflict and infrastructure destruction, though available evidence suggests

敘利亞由於戰爭持續與基礎設施毀壞,加密貨幣應用仍十分有限,但現有證據顯示some usage for cross-border transactions and sanctions circumvention. OFAC sanctioned Syria-based Tawfiq Muhammad Said Al-Law in 2024 for facilitating cryptocurrency transfers to Hezbollah, demonstrating how digital assets enable funding of proxy organizations despite comprehensive sanctions.

然而,廣泛的電信基礎設施遭受毀壞及有限的電力供應,使其在推廣面上受到限制,與其他受制裁國家相比,普及度較低。緬甸已浮現為加密貨幣相關犯罪活動的重要樞紐,特別是大規模「殺豬盤」詐騙集團,這些集團利用強迫勞動,進行針對全球受害者的加密詐騙。美國財政部海外資產管理辦公室(OFAC)於2025年對緬甸和柬埔寨19個實體實施制裁,因其運營龐大的加密詐騙網絡,造成美國受害者超過一百億美元的損失。這些詐騙作業通常與克倫民族軍(KNU)合作,以利潤分享換取保護,凸顯了管治薄弱如何助長基於加密貨幣的犯罪企業。

緬甸詐騙行動體現了加密貨幣作為制裁規避工具,亦成為國際犯罪新媒介的雙重性,促使加強監管的理由更加堅實。據報導,超過十二萬人被強迫捲入區域內的加密詐騙行業,既引發人道危機,也產生了對制裁執行帶來困擾的大量加密貨幣流動。這些作業的工業規模——甚至被形容為“人類史上最大型的犯罪企業”——顯示出加密貨幣能啟動超越傳統司法管轄界限的犯罪運作。自塔利班接管及施行全面國際制裁後,阿富汗的加密貨幣採納情況相關數據仍然有限。

塔利班對女性教育與就業的嚴格限制進一步造成社會性制約,阻礙更廣泛的加密貨幣採用,而OFAC的全面制裁則進一步限制了該國金融部門的發展。雖然有部分與巴基斯坦及伊朗之間的跨境加密活躍被記錄在案,但相較於其他受制裁地區,交易量似乎有限。這些案例顯示當地條件對於受制裁國家下加密採用模式具有重大影響。

持續衝突中的國家,其基礎建設限制抑制數位資產的使用,即使存在經濟誘因;另一方面,管治薄弱又會促使犯罪分子利用加密系統,最終侵蝕正規採用的努力。這些多樣化結果顯示,針對加密貨幣的制裁成效,極度仰賴當地技術條件、治理質素及執法能力。

Impact on Global Crypto Markets & Compliance

The $15.8 billion in cryptocurrency received by sanctioned jurisdictions during 2024 represents more than an academic statistic - it reflects fundamental tensions between decentralized technology and traditional regulatory enforcement that are reshaping global crypto markets. These tensions manifest through compliance costs, liquidity effects, technology developments, and enforcement actions that affect every participant in cryptocurrency markets regardless of their involvement with sanctioned entities.

合規成本大幅提升,隨著加密貨幣業者導入制裁篩查和風險管理方案。2024年,幣安(Binance)因2017年8月至2022年10月共發生1,667,153宗制裁違規,被美國當局處以創紀錄的43億美元和解金,其中包括OFAC 9.68億美元罰款,凸顯出合規不足所帶來的財務風險。

和解協議要求幣安完全退出美國市場,接受為期五年的監管機制,並實施涵蓋29國,包括所有主要受制裁國家,的地理屏蔽措施。這宗案件重置了業界合規標準,迫使整個行業作出在營運和風控方面的重大變革。主要交易所現已實施即時交易監控、強化地理屏障(透過GPS和行動數據)、IP阻擋及VPN偵測系統,並對員工設生日常制裁訓練。幣安的合規團隊人數擴增至750人,並投資數千萬美元於合規基建,小型交易所則因競爭壓力難以負擔同樣成本。

交易所的合規措施,對受制裁地區獲取加密服務帶來明顯影響。與伊朗服務有關的交易所互動於2022至2024年間下降23%,而俄語交易所雖受到執法打壓,卻透過接棒與司法套利得以繼續營運。荷蘭因監管審批未通過,勒令幣安退出市場,而奈及利亞則拘留高層並關閉奈拉服務,顯示合規失敗可造成完全退出。去中心化交易所(DEX)的興起,亦反映用戶企圖以技術創新及監管套利,迴避合規重的中心化平台。

2024年,DEX 交易量突破1.5兆美元,市場佔有率於2025年1月達到20%歷史高位,相比中心化交易所;Solana 區塊鏈上的 Raydium 市佔率從7.6%升至26%,永續合約去中心化交易所市佔由4.5%增加至10%。去中心化交易所的發展,帶來傳統監管難以應對的執法挑戰。不同於有明確經營者與境內實體的中心化交易所,DEX協議由智能合約驅動,無論監管態度如何都可持續運作。

2024年11月,美國法院裁定限制OFAC對智能合約的權限,隨後2025年1月撤銷Tornado Cash制裁命令,為政府面對真正去中心化系統建立了權力邊界。面對愈趨嚴格的監控和合規措施,隱私工具開發加速,掀起監管者與增強匿名技術開發者之間的軍備競賽。儘管有制裁及開發者遭逮捕,Tornado Cash 資金流於2024年激增108%,展現去中心化隱私基礎設施的韌性。新的混幣服務與隱私協議不斷湧現,Layer2 解決方案為區塊鏈分析帶來更多挑戰。

隱私導向基礎設施擴展,反映市場對金融隱私的實質需求,遠超僅作為制裁規避用途範疇,亦適用於個人安全、企業機密、防範極權等正當場景。然而,監管機關愈來愈傾向將隱私工具視為疑點工具,引發隱私權與制裁執行之間的矛盾,目前法院亦開始透過憲法層面分析檢視相關爭議。

受制裁地區相關活動對市場流動性的效應雖難以量化,但在部分細分市場已現明顯影響。例如俄羅斯Garantex等交易所,雖被制裁,仍處理超過一千億美元,影響全球夥伴銀行與交易所之合規風險評估。區域價格溢價現象——如南韓持續出現的「泡菜溢價」、伊朗里亞爾貶值刺激加密需求——展示地緣政治張力下的套利機會與區域市場扭曲。穩定幣的使用則顯示Tether主導制裁規避活動,USDT佔所有非法加密交易的63%,遠高於競爭對手USDC等穩定幣。此一集中化體現了USDT流動性廣泛並且Tether合規態度相對寬鬆,相較於執行更嚴格篩查的競品。

T3金融犯罪單位(TRON、Tether、TRM Labs)於2024年上半年凍結1.3億美元非法所得,展現穩定幣發行方與合規公司間日益緊密的合作。隨著業者尋找監管友善且處罰有限的司法管轄區進行合規套利趨勢加劇。2024年9月「Final Exchange」行動,一舉查封47家俄羅斯無KYC交易所,但結果促交易轉向新平台而非終止活動;而針對Cryptex營運者 Ivanov 所懸賞一千萬美元,彰顯當犯罪目標超出西方法律觸及時的執法困難。

2024年,跨鏈橋攻擊損失達22億美元,一方面反映技術漏洞,另一方面突顯跨鏈互通基建對規避制裁的重要戰略意義。橋接技術能讓資產於不同合規要求的鏈間流動,潛在讓用戶利用監管漏洞或篩查技術限制規避制裁。橋被攻擊造成的損失增加17%,指出這些弱點正被有系統地加以利用。

執法能力亦隨之進化以因應加密違制裁行為,區塊鏈分析工具已成檢調及訴訟案件的標準工具。即時交易監控整合至合規系統,使制裁違規可即時偵測,而加強國際合作,則促成如德國主導的Final Exchange查緝行動等聯合打擊。不過,資源限制及技術門檻仍使相關單位在面對快速變化科技時應對困難。制裁合規下的科技發展,為執法與規避雙方帶來新契機。增強區塊鏈分析技術可追蹤多種加密貨幣...and exchanges, while artificial intelligence enables pattern recognition that identifies suspicious activity.

同時,人工智慧技術賦予模式識別能力,有助於發現可疑活動。

Conversely, new privacy technologies and cross-chain protocols create additional obfuscation capabilities that challenge existing detection methods, leading to perpetual technological competition between regulators and sanctions evaders. The global nature of cryptocurrency markets means that sanctions compliance failures in any major jurisdiction affect worldwide market stability and regulatory frameworks. The interconnected nature of cryptocurrency liquidity means that sanctioned jurisdiction activity affects global price discovery, while compliance costs and enforcement actions impact all market participants regardless of their direct involvement with restricted entities.

另一方面,嶄新的隱私技術與跨鏈協議為用戶提供更多混淆手法,對現有偵測方式構成挑戰,導致監管機構與制裁規避者之間持續性的技術競賽。加密貨幣市場具有全球性,其任何主要司法管轄區的制裁合規失敗皆會影響全球市場穩定與監管體系。加密貨幣流動性的互聯特性,意味著受制裁地區的活動會左右全球價格發現;而合規成本及執法行動也將影響所有市場參與者,無論他們是否直接涉入受限實體。

Is Crypto Really a Sanctions Loophole?

加密貨幣真的是制裁漏洞嗎?

The $15.8 billion in cryptocurrency received by sanctioned jurisdictions during 2024 represents a significant absolute amount but must be evaluated within broader context to assess whether digital assets truly constitute an effective sanctions loophole. While cryptocurrency enables some circumvention of traditional financial restrictions, evidence suggests its utility as a sanctions evasion tool faces substantial limitations that constrain its effectiveness relative to the total scale of international sanctions regimes.

2024年,受制裁地區收到的加密貨幣高達158億美元,雖然這是一個相當龐大的數字,但若要判斷數位資產是否真正構成有效的制裁漏洞,仍需置於更廣闊的背景下分析。加密貨幣的確讓部分傳統金融限制得以規避,然而,相關證據顯示,以制裁規避工具來說,其效用存在顯著侷限,難以對抗國際制裁體系的總體規模。

The fundamental question centers on proportionality and scope. Sanctioned nations collectively represent trillions of dollars in economic activity that international restrictions target, while even generous estimates of crypto-enabled sanctions evasion reach tens of billions annually. Russia's pre-2022 international trade exceeded $800 billion, Iran's pre-sanctions economy approached $500 billion, and Venezuela's oil exports alone previously generated $50+ billion annually.

最根本的問題在於比例與範圍。受制裁國家的經濟活動總額以兆美元計,國際社會正是這些活動設下限制,而即使以最寬鬆的估計,透過加密貨幣規避制裁的金額一年頂多達到數百億美元。俄羅斯在2022年前的國際貿易超過8,000億美元,伊朗在制裁前的經濟規模逼近5,000億美元,委內瑞拉單靠石油出口一年最高也達至少500億美元。

Against this backdrop, cryptocurrency's role appears supplementary rather than transformative. Blockchain analytics provide unprecedented visibility into cryptocurrency transactions that traditional sanctions evasion methods lack entirely. Unlike cash, gold, or complex shell company structures that can obscure transaction flows indefinitely, cryptocurrency transactions leave permanent records on distributed ledgers that become more analyzable over time as forensic techniques improve. Chainalysis, TRM Labs, and Elliptic can now trace cryptocurrency flows across multiple blockchains and exchanges with high confidence, enabling law enforcement responses that would be impossible with traditional financial crimes.

在上述情境下,加密貨幣的角色與其說是顛覆性的工具,不如說是輔助性質為多。區塊鏈數據分析帶來前所未有的透明度,這是傳統制裁規避手法無法比擬的。與現金、黃金或難以追查的空殼公司結構不同,加密貨幣交易會在分散式帳本上留下永久紀錄,隨著鑑識技術進步,這些紀錄越來越容易分析。Chainalysis、TRM Labs,以及 Elliptic 等公司,如今已能在多條區塊鏈及交易所間高信心追蹤加密貨幣流向,協助執法部門進行以往傳統金融犯罪難以實現的偵查。

The traceability advantage extends beyond initial transactions to longer-term analysis that can identify patterns and relationships invisible to traditional financial surveillance. The attribution of North Korea's Lazarus Group activities, tracking of Iranian capital flight patterns, and mapping of Russian sanctions evasion networks all demonstrate how blockchain transparency enables comprehensive analysis of illicit financial networks. This transparency creates persistent compliance risks for sanctions evaders that don't exist with traditional methods. However, the development of privacy-enhancing technologies creates counterpressures that reduce cryptocurrency's transparency advantages.

這種可追蹤性的優勢,不僅限於個別交易,更延伸到長期分析,能發掘傳統金融監控所無法察覺的模式與關聯。例如,北韓 Lazarus Group 活動的歸因、伊朗資本外流模式的追蹤、俄羅斯制裁規避網路的繪製,都展現出區塊鏈透明度能促成對非法金融網路的全面剖析。這種透明性,對於制裁規避者而言,構成了傳統手法所不存在的持續合規風險。然而,隱私強化技術的發展也帶來反作用力,使加密貨幣的透明優勢逐漸被稀釋。

Despite sanctions against Tornado Cash and arrests of developers, the mixing service saw 108% growth in usage during 2024, demonstrating resilience of decentralized privacy infrastructure. New privacy protocols, Layer 2 solutions, and cross-chain bridges continue emerging that provide enhanced anonymity capabilities, creating an ongoing technology competition between privacy developers and regulatory enforcement. Scale limitations represent perhaps the most significant constraint on cryptocurrency's utility for sanctions evasion.

儘管Tornado Cash遭到制裁、開發者被逮捕,其混幣服務在2024年仍迎來108%的成長,顯示去中心化隱私基礎建設的韌性。新的隱私協議、Layer 2方案與跨鏈橋樑持續推陳出新,提升匿名能力,展現出隱私技術開發者與監管執法之間不斷升級的科技競賽。而規模限制,也許仍是加密貨幣作為制裁規避用途時最大的實際障礙。

Even major centralized exchanges struggle to process transactions at the scale necessary for significant sanctions circumvention, while decentralized alternatives face liquidity constraints that limit large transaction processing. The $1.46 billion Bybit hack by North Korea's Lazarus Group - the largest cryptocurrency theft in history - illustrates both the potential scale of crypto operations and the practical limits imposed by exchange security and liquidity constraints.

即使是主要的中心化交易所,若要處理足以規模化規避制裁的交易量,也會力有未逮;而去中心化替代方案則受限於流動性,難以應付大額交易。2024年北韓Lazarus Group對Bybit的14.6億美元駭客攻擊——史上最大宗加密貨幣竊案——便彰顯了加密幣操作的潛在規模,同時也暴露交易所安全性與流動性限制下的實際障礙。

Regulatory countermeasures have proven effective in constraining cryptocurrency's utility for sanctions evasion, though implementation remains inconsistent globally. Exchange interactions with Iranian services declined 23% between 2022 and 2024, while major platform geo-blocking has forced sanctions evaders toward smaller, less liquid alternatives with higher costs and greater risks. The $4.3 billion Binance settlement established compliance standards that make large-scale sanctions evasion increasingly expensive and risky for cryptocurrency businesses. The argument that cryptocurrency provides meaningful sanctions circumvention capabilities rests primarily on its decentralized architecture and global accessibility. Unlike traditional banking systems where transactions require intermediary approval, cryptocurrency networks enable peer-to-peer transactions that no central authority can prevent. This creates theoretical capabilities for sanctions evasion that don't exist within traditional financial systems, particularly for smaller transactions and individuals rather than large institutional flows.

監管對策已被證明能有效限制加密貨幣作為制裁規避工具的效用,儘管全球落實程度仍不一致。2022至2024年間,交易所與伊朗服務的互動量下降了23%;主要平台的地區封鎖亦迫使制裁規避者轉向規模更小、流動性較低、成本和風險更高的替代方案。Binance 43億美元的和解案建立了合規新標準,讓大規模規避制裁的行為對加密產業來說代價愈發高昂且危險。之所以認為加密貨幣有助於制裁規避,主要是因為其去中心化架構及全球可及性。相比傳統銀行體系需要中介審核,加密貨幣網路允許用戶點對點交易,無任何中央機構得以全面阻止,從而產生了理論上可避開制裁的能力——但這主要適用於小額或個人層次,而非大筆機構資金流動。

Practical adoption patterns suggest cryptocurrency serves more as a supplementary tool than primary sanctions circumvention mechanism. Iranian cryptocurrency outflows of $4.18 billion in 2024, while significant in absolute terms, represent a small fraction of Iran's total economic activity and international trade needs. Similarly, Russian cryptocurrency adoption, despite reaching impressive scale in relative terms, remains marginal compared to Russia's overall economic requirements and international transaction volumes. The effectiveness of cryptocurrency for sanctions circumvention varies significantly based on transaction type, amount, and intended use. Individual remittances, small business payments, and personal capital preservation may find cryptocurrency highly effective for circumventing banking restrictions.

實際採用情形顯示,加密貨幣更像是制裁規避的輔助工具,而非主要機制。2024年伊朗加密貨幣外流41.8億美元,雖在絕對數字上可觀,卻僅佔伊朗總體經濟活動與國際貿易需求的一小部份。同理,俄羅斯的加密貨幣採用即使在相對而言已具規模,和其大體經濟需求與國際交易量相比,仍屬邊緣。加密貨幣在規避制裁方面的效用,依使用類型、金額和目的截然不同;個人匯款、小型商業支付、與財富保值對於繞過銀行限制可能特別有效。

However, large-scale trade financing, government operations, and industrial transactions face practical constraints that limit cryptocurrency's utility regardless of its theoretical capabilities. Academic research suggests cryptocurrency's sanctions evasion utility is constrained by network effects that favor compliance with traditional regulatory frameworks. Major cryptocurrency exchanges, stablecoin issuers, and infrastructure providers face stronger incentives to maintain access to Western markets than to serve sanctioned jurisdictions, creating structural biases toward compliance that limit crypto's utility for sanctions evasion as markets mature and consolidate.

然而,大規模貿易融資、政府作業和工業型交易都面臨實際層面的限制,使加密貨幣的規避空間縱有理論可能,卻難以發揮太大效用。學界研究指出,網絡效應讓加密貨幣市場更傾向於遵循傳統監管規範。主要交易所、穩定幣發行方與基礎設施業者比起服務受制裁區域,維持對西方市場的准入更具誘因,這形成了偏向合規的結構性傾向,並隨著市場成熟與整合進而壓縮了加密貨幣作為制裁規避工具的用途。

The temporal dimension of sanctions effectiveness complicates assessment of cryptocurrency's impact. Sanctions typically aim to impose costs and change behavior over time rather than achieve immediate economic collapse. Even if cryptocurrency enables partial circumvention of specific restrictions, it may not provide sufficient relief to prevent the broader economic and political pressures that sanctions are designed to create. Intelligence community assessments suggest cryptocurrency enables tactical sanctions evasion but doesn't fundamentally undermine strategic sanctions objectives. While North Korean cryptocurrency theft provides revenue for weapons programs, it hasn't prevented broader international isolation from constraining the country's economic development. Similarly, Iranian and Russian cryptocurrency adoption may provide partial relief from specific restrictions without enabling full normalization of international economic relationships.

時間維度也使制裁成效評估變得複雜。制裁通常著眼於長期提高成本並改變行為,而非立刻讓經濟崩潰。即便加密貨幣確實讓部分限制得以被規避,這類緩衝卻不足以抵消制裁所帶來的廣泛經濟與政治壓力。情報界評估也指出,加密貨幣只是在戰術層面協助規避制裁,無法從根本上動搖其戰略目標。雖然北韓透過加密貨幣竊盜籌措武器經費,但仍阻擋不了國際孤立對其經濟發展的遏制。同樣地,伊朗與俄羅斯的加密貨幣採用,或許能緩解某些具體限制,卻無法讓其全面恢復正常國際經濟關係。

The debate over cryptocurrency's sanctions evasion effectiveness ultimately reflects deeper questions about the future of monetary sovereignty and international economic governance. If cryptocurrency technologies continue developing in ways that enhance privacy and reduce regulatory oversight, they may eventually provide more comprehensive alternatives to traditional financial systems. However, current evidence suggests cryptocurrency remains more effective as a tool for specific use cases rather than comprehensive sanctions circumvention.

有關加密貨幣規避制裁效果的爭論,本質上反映了對未來貨幣主權與國際經濟治理的更深層問題。倘若加密技術持續朝向強化隱私、抑制監理發展,未來不無可能成為傳統金融全面的替代選擇。然而,現階段的證據顯示,加密貨幣目前仍僅在特定應用場景下具優勢,並不適宜做為全面性的制裁規避手段。

Regulatory and Geopolitical Implications

監管與地緣政治影響

The intersection of cryptocurrency adoption and international sanctions creates profound implications for global governance, monetary policy, and technological development that extend far beyond the immediate transactions conducted by sanctioned entities. These implications are reshaping fundamental assumptions about state power, financial sovereignty, and the future architecture of international economic relationships in ways that policymakers are only beginning to understand.

加密貨幣的普及與國際制裁的交錯,為全球治理、貨幣政策與科技發展帶來深遠影響,遠非受制裁方的個別交易所能概括。這些影響正逐步重塑國家權力、金融主權與國際經濟關係未來架構的根本假設,且政策制定者才剛開始理解其全貌。

The Financial Action Task Force's struggle to implement effective Travel Rule requirements illustrates broader challenges in applying traditional regulatory frameworks to decentralized technologies. Despite 85 of 117 jurisdictions implementing Travel Rule legislation by 2025, FATF's assessment concluded that global implementation remains "lagging" due to technical complexity, fragmented national approaches, and limited enforcement capabilities. This implementation gap creates exploitable vulnerabilities that sanctioned actors can leverage while imposing compliance costs on legitimate users.

金融行動特別工作組(FATF)在推行有效旅行規則上所遭遇的困難,即反映了將傳統監管架構應用於去中心化技術時所面臨的廣泛挑戰。儘管2025年時已有117國中的85國落實了相關立法,FATF評估認為全球推動成效仍顯「落後」,原因包括技術複雜度、各國做法分歧以及執行能力有限。此類落實鴻溝,為受制裁行為人提供了可乘之機,同時也為守法用戶帶來額外合規負擔。

G7 and G20 coordination efforts have accelerated in response to cryptocurrency-enabled sanctions evasion, but face persistent challenges in achieving consistent implementation across diverse regulatory environments. The G20 Crypto-Asset Policy Implementation Roadmap provides comprehensive frameworks, but enforcement depends on national-level implementation that varies significantly in scope, timing, and effectiveness. The planned end-2025

G7及G20現已加快在加密貨幣規避制裁所引發的問題上進行協調,但在實現不同監管環境下的一致落實時,仍面臨長期挑戰。G20加密資產政策執行路線圖雖制定出完整架構,但最終效率仍取決於各國層級的實施,無論在範圍、時機或成效上皆有極大落差。預計於2025年底......FSB 審查可能會揭露持續存在的漏洞,這些漏洞為監管套利創造了機會。

2024-2025 年的法院判決確立了限制政府對去中心化加密貨幣基礎設施權限的重要先例。第五巡迴法院在 Tornado Cash 訴財政部案件中的裁決認為,OFAC 在制裁不可更改智能合約時已超越法定授權,而後續推翻 Tornado Cash 制裁的命令則確立了政府在真正去中心化系統中的權力界限。這些判決顯示,傳統監管方式可能不足以全面監管加密貨幣。

替代支付系統的出現對以美元為主導的全球金融體系構成了超越特定制裁體系的系統性挑戰。BRICS Pay 的開發,佔世界經濟的 35%,結合像 mBridge 這樣的區塊鏈結算系統,證明了在西方金融基礎設施之外進行國際商業往來的技術可行性。川普政府曾威脅對脫離美元的金磚國家徵收 100% 關稅,這反映了對這些系統戰略意義的認識。

受制裁及未受制裁國家同時開發中央銀行數位貨幣(CBDC),為國際貨幣安排帶來了更複雜的層次。伊朗在基什島的數位里亞爾試點、俄羅斯與 19 家以上銀行合作進行的數位盧布實驗,以及聯合開發的黃金支撐穩定幣,都顯示 CBDC 技術能在維持規避制裁能力的同時,為國家控制的法幣提供替代私人加密貨幣的選擇。

全球加密貨幣市場的分歧風險反映出技術創新與監管控制之間更廣泛的緊張關係,而這種矛盾在現有國際架構下可能難以調和。完全依循反洗錢/打擊資恐規範的西方合規加密基礎設施,可能將與依循不同監管標準運作的替代系統並存,形成平行的金融生態系統,互通性有限且系統性風險上升。

針對加密貨幣規避制裁的國會立法,展現監管方式向更全面監督去中心化系統的演化。《數位資產反洗錢法案》和 CANSEE 法案把傳統金融法規延伸至驗證者、礦工與 DeFi 協議,並更新財政部特別措施權限以涵蓋非銀行的加密交易。然而,加密貨幣網絡具有全球性,意味著單方面立法若無廣泛國際合作,效果可能有限。

創新政策的影響產生了維持技術領先與防止制裁規避之間的根本張力,這需要謹慎平衡。過於嚴苛的加密監管可能迫使創新流向監理較寬鬆的司法管轄區,導致技術優勢拱手讓人,同時未必有效阻止藉由離岸替代方案規避制裁。這一挑戰更因科技發展速度持續超越監理調適能力而加劇。

國際合作框架在因應加密貨幣全球且去中心化特性同時維護國家主權及多元監管方式時,面臨前所未有的挑戰。傳統雙邊和多邊合作機制是為具有明確管轄權的中心化金融體系設計的,而加密貨幣網絡則透過技術協定跨境運作,而非機構關係。

有效執行加密貨幣制裁所需的資源,無論在技術專業、分析工具、國際協調機制,都超過政府現有能力。區塊鏈分析需要特殊知識和昂貴技術平台,而跟上隱私技術發展則要求在人力和技術資源上的持續投入,這是許多執法單位所欠缺的。

地緣競爭越來越多地將加密貨幣與區塊鏈科技納入國家戰略工具,既可以支撐也可能瓦解現存的國際貨幣安排。中國的數位人民幣開發、俄羅斯的數位盧布試點、金磚區塊鏈計畫,皆展現了致力打造可取代西方主導金融基礎設施、同時維持貨幣政策國家控制的戰略意圖。

隨著目標國建立先進規避手段以降低傳統制裁壓力,制裁成效面臨根本挑戰。學術研究顯示,像俄羅斯這類大型、全球一體化經濟體,可能天生比規模較小、連結性較低的國家對制裁更具抵抗力,而無論經濟規模與整合程度如何,加密貨幣都為規避提供額外工具。

金融監管機關、國家安全機構與創新推廣單位在技術政策協調上,需建立新的制度框架以平衡競爭目標,同時保持民主監督與問責。加密貨幣技術的複雜性及其全球影響力,已超越傳統監管單位在狹隘部門職權下的能力範圍。

展望未來發展,加密貨幣監管的走向很可能涉及隱私增強與監控技術間的持續競賽、企業追求有利監理環境的監管套利,以及國際貨幣體系架構上的地緣政治競爭。這些競爭的結果將對國際制裁效力以及全球金融基礎設施的整體演變產生深遠影響。

相關利害關係表明,加密貨幣監管將愈來愈成為高層次戰略競爭領域,而非僅止於技術政策的落實。要同時維持技術創新與有效執行制裁,政府對加密貨幣監督及國際經濟治理的思維或許需有根本性的轉變。

最後的思考

證據揭示了一種難以簡單歸類的複雜現實:加密貨幣既非制裁規避的萬靈丹,也非無足輕重的技術新奇。2024 年,受制裁國家共接收了 158 億美元加密貨幣,金額雖高但相較於制裁所針對的數兆美元經濟活動總體,仍屬邊緣現象。

這一規模顯示,加密貨幣能為特定應用提供戰術性優勢——如個人匯款、小型企業交易、資金外流——但在大規模制裁規避上則受到顯著限制。最值得注意的發現是各被制裁司法管轄區間手法的多樣性,反映不同技術能力、政府政策和制裁架構。俄羅斯建立了最成熟的國家級加密貨幣基礎設施,利用廉價能源進行挖礦並制定明確允許規避制裁的監管框架。伊朗採取能源轉換加密貨幣模式,與資本外逃系統性地緊密聯動,並直接與地緣緊張局勢相關。

北韓已將加密貨幣竊盜產業化,作為創造收入的手段,展現出驚人的技術能力。委內瑞拉則說明政府主導的加密推動可能徹底失敗,但民間自發採用卻能作為抗通膨避險工具而茁壯。這些多樣經驗凸顯加密貨幣既是全球性科技,也是受地區條件塑造的工具。擁有強大技術基礎設施和政府支援的國家,比面臨衝突或電力受限國家能更有效利用加密貨幣。這顯示加密貨幣的制裁規避效果高度仰賴背景脈絡,而非隨處可得的萬用工具。

監管方面的回應,比批評者預期更有效,但仍面臨持續落實上的挑戰。主要加密交易所的合規措施讓伊朗相關服務互動減少 23%,而 43 億美元的 Binance 和解案亦確立了讓大規模制裁規避愈發高成本的產業標準。然而,去中心化替代方案和隱私增強技術的不斷出現,帶來傳統監管難以全面因應的永續挑戰。也許更重要的是,受制裁國正合作打造可能永久性改變國際貨幣安排的替代金融基礎設施。金磚支付的開發(36% 全球經濟體),加上像伊朗-俄羅斯黃金支持穩定幣等數位貨幣聯合計畫,顯示加密貨幣促使全球去美元化步伐加快,而非僅為實現策略性制裁規避的手段。

對決策者而言,分析結果顯示加密貨幣監管須在防範制裁規避與維繫技術創新間謹慎取得平衡。過度嚴格的做法可能使活動轉向監理鬆散的替代方案,同時喪失技術主導優勢。

反之,過度寬鬆則可能助長規避制裁,削弱外交政策效力及國際穩定。而國際協作的挑戰尤其突出,因為加密貨幣網絡以全球規模運作,卻——regulatory authority remains primarily national. FATF Travel Rule implementation struggles demonstrate the difficulty of achieving consistent standards across diverse jurisdictions, while court decisions limiting government authority over decentralized protocols suggest that traditional regulatory approaches may prove insufficient for comprehensive oversight. For cryptocurrency investors and businesses, the sanctions landscape creates both risks and opportunities that require sophisticated risk management approaches. Compliance costs are rising dramatically, particularly for exchanges and service providers, while regulatory uncertainty creates ongoing challenges for strategic planning.

然而,監管權限仍以國家層級為主。FATF 旅行規則實施上的困難,顯示在多樣化司法管轄區中難以達成一致標準,而法院對政府權限在去中心化協議上的限制,也說明傳統監管方式在全面監管上可能顯得不足。對於加密貨幣投資者及企業而言,制裁相關的情勢一方面帶來風險,也創造機會,這需要成熟精密的風險管理方式。合規成本正大幅上升,尤其對交易所與服務提供者來說,而監管的不確定性也給策略規劃帶來持續挑戰。

However, the growing institutional adoption and clearer regulatory frameworks in major jurisdictions suggest the industry is maturing toward greater stability and legitimacy. Exchange operators face particular challenges in balancing compliance requirements with competitive positioning, as demonstrated by Binance's forced U.S. exit and the ongoing compliance burden affecting smaller platforms. The trend toward geo-blocking and enhanced sanctions screening appears likely to continue, potentially creating fragmented markets with different compliance standards and risk profiles. The future trajectory appears likely to involve continued technological competition between privacy enhancement and surveillance capabilities, regulatory arbitrage as businesses seek favorable jurisdictions, and geopolitical competition over alternative payment systems. The outcome will significantly influence both sanctions effectiveness and the broader architecture of international finance.

然而,機構性採納的增加以及主要司法管轄區監管框架更加明確,顯示產業正朝向更高穩定性與合法性邁進。交易所營運者在合規要求與市場競爭力之間面臨特殊挑戰,正如Binance被迫退出美國市場,以及合規負擔持續影響較小平台一樣。地理封鎖與強化制裁審查等趨勢可能會持續,進一步造成市場分裂,各自擁有不同的合規標準與風險輪廓。未來發展很可能涉及隱私強化與監管技術的持續競賽、企業尋求有利監管地帶的監管套利,以及圍繞替代支付系統的地緣政治競爭。結果將深刻影響制裁的有效性,以及全球金融體系的整體架構。

The evidence suggests cryptocurrency is neither the sanctions circumvention silver bullet that critics fear nor the irrelevant technical novelty that skeptics dismiss. Instead, it represents one element in a broader transformation of international monetary arrangements that is accelerating geopolitical competition while creating new tools for both state power projection and individual financial autonomy. Success in managing these transitions will require unprecedented coordination between financial regulators, national security agencies, technology policy experts, and international partners.

證據顯示,加密貨幣既不是批評者所畏懼的制裁規避靈丹妙藥,也不是懷疑者所貶抑的無關痛癢技術新玩意。相反地,它乃是國際貨幣體系廣泛變革的一環,加速了地緣政治競爭,同時為國家權力投射與個人金融自主創造嶄新工具。要成功管控這些轉型,需要前所未有的金融監管機關、國安部門、科技政策專家與國際夥伴間的協作。

The challenge is compounded by rapid technological development that consistently outpaces regulatory adaptation, creating persistent gaps that sophisticated actors can exploit. The ultimate question may not be whether cryptocurrency enables effective sanctions evasion, but whether traditional sanctions remain effective in a world of increasing financial fragmentation and technological alternatives to established monetary systems. The answer will significantly influence how democratic nations project power internationally while maintaining technological competitiveness and individual freedom in an increasingly complex global environment. The $15.8 billion in sanctioned entity cryptocurrency transactions during 2024 represents both a significant enforcement challenge and a relatively small component of global cryptocurrency activity totaling $10.6 trillion.

這一挑戰因科技發展迅速且總是快於監管調適而更加複雜,導致持續存在足以被精明分子利用的漏洞。最根本的問題或許不在於加密貨幣能否有效幫助規避制裁,而是傳統制裁手段在金融分裂日增、科技替代既有貨幣系統的世界中,是否仍能維持效力。答案將直接影響民主國家如何持續在國際間投射權力,同時保持技術競爭力及個人自由,在日益複雜的全球環境中取得平衡。2024年受制裁實體的加密貨幣交易額達158億美元,這一數字既代表重大執法挑戰,也僅佔全球加密貨幣總體交易(10.6兆美元)很小一部分。

This proportion suggests that cryptocurrency's primary impact may be in enabling incremental changes that accumulate over time rather than dramatic immediate shifts in sanctions effectiveness. As this technological and regulatory evolution continues, success will likely require approaches that embrace cryptocurrency's benefits while mitigating its risks through sophisticated technical understanding, international cooperation, and adaptive governance frameworks that can evolve alongside rapidly advancing technology.

這種比例顯示,加密貨幣的主要影響可能在於促成長期累積的漸進式變化,而非立即、大幅改變制裁成效。隨著技術與監管的不斷演化,未來的成功將需要一方面善用加密貨幣的優勢,一方面透過精深的技術理解、國際合作,以及能隨新科技快速發展而調整的治理架構,有效減緩其風險。

免責聲明與風險警告: 本文提供的資訊僅供教育與參考用途,並基於作者觀點,不構成財務、投資、法律或稅務建議。 加密貨幣資產具有高度波動性並伴隨高風險,包括可能損失全部或大部分投資金額。買賣或持有加密資產可能並不適合所有投資者。 本文中所表達的觀點僅代表作者立場,不代表 Yellow、其創辦人或管理層的官方政策或意見。 請務必自行進行充分研究(D.Y.O.R.),並在做出任何投資決策前諮詢持牌金融專業人士。
遭制裁國家之加密貨幣:受限國家如何採用比特幣與穩定幣 | Yellow.com