加密交易所在充当影子银行：BIS 2026 年报告揭示的 10 大结构性风险

国际清算银行在过去两年里，一直观察着加密交易所悄然演变成全球金融体系早已见过、并为之后悔过的一种形态：影子银行。

其 2026 年 4 月发布的报告，承载着机构记忆的重量，直接将 2008 年金融危机中放大风险的非监管放贷载体，与当今大型数字资产平台内部的收益产品、保证金账户和抵押品链条进行类比。

报告发布的时间点并非巧合。全球零售加密交易量在 2026 年一季度下降了 11%，至 9790 亿美元，但交易所资产负债表上的放贷敞口却持续膨胀。交易量下滑与信用风险上升之间的背离，正是系统性压力累积前常见的那种“静悄悄的聚集”。

TL;DR

BIS 发现，加密交易所如今提供的类银行放贷和收益产品，其经济实质是无担保贷款，却没有存款保险或审慎监管。

零售用户承担着自己无法定价的信用风险，这是核心危险点，类似 2008 年放大损失的结构化产品不透明问题。

监管套利、抵押品再质押，以及易引发挤兑的稳定币储备，共同加剧了 BIS 所指出的 10 条结构性断层。

1. BIS 正式点名：交易所就是影子银行

多年来，“影子银行”这一标签在加密圈评论中被随意使用。如今 BIS 则以更精准的方式加以应用。其 2026 年 4 月报告按照功能而非注册形式来定义影子银行：在传统银行体系之外从事信用中介、期限转换和流动性提供的实体。

加密交易所完全符合这三个标准。它们吸收客户资金，对闲置余额支付收益，将这些资金借给保证金交易者和机构借款人，同时承诺随时可提现。

这与货币市场基金的运作几乎一模一样，而正是这种结构在 2008 年 9 月于储备初级基金跌破面值时发生了冻结。

BIS 按功能而非法律形式定义影子银行，这意味着不论加密交易所以何种方式注册或持牌，本质上都属于影子银行。

Coinbase、Binance 与 OKX 目前都提供不同形式的“赚取”“理财”或借贷产品。BIS 并未点名具体公司，但其结构性批评适用于任何在缺乏资本缓冲、处置机制以及存款人保护安排的前提下，在出借人与借款人之间进行信用中介的平台。传统金融的前车之鉴已经说明：这种结构在表面上能长期运转，直到某一刻突然不再运转。

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2. “收益”包装之下隐藏着无担保放贷

BIS 在其报告中指出的最直接风险之一，是面向零售用户、被包装成“储蓄账户”的收益产品，其经济实质是零售用户向交易所提供的无担保贷款。用户是债权人，交易所是债务人，用户的本金没有任何抵押物作保障。

在传统银行中，存款人在 FDIC 框架下，可获得单账户 25 万美元以内的存款保险。受保银行必须为信用损失计提资本，并接受定期审查。而当零售用户在中心化交易所点击“年化 6% 收益”时，上述保护完全不存在。用户对平台的权利请求是无担保负债，在任何破产清算中都从属于有担保债权人。

将资产投入交易所“赚取计划”的零售用户，本质上只是持有平台的一笔无担保债权，没有存款保险、没有资本缓冲，也在破产程序中没有优先受偿权。

FTX 在 2022 年 11 月已经给出了一次清晰示范。客户资金被与交易所自营头寸混用，普通零售无担保债权人的最终回收率远低于面值。BIS 警告，导致这一结局的结构性条件，并未在整个行业被系统性地纠正。

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3. 抵押品再质押制造隐形杠杆链条

在 2008 年危机中，影子银行放大风险，并非源自某一笔坏账，而是来自被反复质押、再质押、再度质押的抵押品链条。每一环单独看似乎都比较稳健，但整体杠杆水平却在暗中攀升，直到崩溃时才暴露。BIS警告，加密交易所正通过宽松的抵押品再质押条款，复制这一结构。

当用户将比特币(BTC)作为保证金抵押物时，在许多司法辖区，并没有明确禁止交易所将该抵押物用于自身借款。同一枚 BTC，可能同时支撑着用户的头寸、交易所的回购融资，以及第三方贷款。关于传统市场抵押品再利用的学术研究发现，每一单位抵押品可支持 2–3 倍的信用扩张，这种乘数效应会在压力环境下一并蒸发。

单一单位的加密抵押品，理论上可以在交易所资产负债表上同时支撑多项义务，形成任何单一交易对手都无法全面观察到的杠杆。

在加密领域，不透明性更为严重，因为交易所的资产负债表并不会以市值为基础向公众披露。BIS 指出，由于缺乏标准化披露要求，交易对手无法评估真实的再质押敞口。这与当年监管者长期无法看清 AIG 信用违约掉期头寸的情况，本质上是同一种信息不对称。

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4. 稳定币储备本质上是不受保险保障的货币市场基金

稳定币正日益成为交易所放贷业务的资金货币。平台接受稳定币存款，支付收益，再将这些资金投放到借贷资产中。

这种结构与货币市场基金几乎没有区别，只是有一项关键差异：美国的货币市场基金受 1940 年投资公司法约束，接受 SEC 监管，并须遵守流动性要求与压力测试；而稳定币储备并没有类似监管框架。

主导交易所稳定币交易量的 Tether 的 Tether(USDT)，根据其最新披露，约有 83% 的储备配置在美国国库券及等同现金资产中。乍看之下相当保守，但如果对 USDT 发起挤兑，就意味着需要在短时间内抛售数百亿美元的短期国债，这可能在抛售过程中推低市场价格。2023 年硅谷银行倒闭事件表明，即便是高质量流动性资产，在集中抛售的情境下，也难以不产生价格冲击。

配置在短久期美债中的稳定币储备同样无法免疫挤兑风险；同步的大规模赎回浪潮将迫使发行方抛售资产，在全部赎回完成前便可能打破锚定。

欧元计价稳定币在 2026 年一季度的交易量增长了 12 倍，表明稳定币资金基础正在进行地域多元化。这种多元化在压力情景下会带来更多复杂性：多种货币计价的储备池可能同时遭遇赎回压力。

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5. 没有最后贷款人的期限转换

任何类银行实体的核心结构性脆弱点，都是期限转换：短借长贷。存款人今天就能提现，而贷款的到期则是数周或数月之后。

缺口得以弥合，是因为假定不会所有存款人同时提款。当这一假定失效时，无论机构长期上是否具备偿付能力，也会立刻陷入失败。

各国央行的存在，正是为了向“资不抵债”与“暂时流动性不足”相区分、且属于后者的银行提供紧急流动性，因为期限转换在系统层面是必要但结构上又脆弱。美联储贴现窗口、英国央行的 Sterling Monetary Framework，以及各大司法辖区的类似安排，均服务于这一目的。而执行期限转换的加密交易所，并没有类似的安全阀。

尚无央行承诺向遭遇挤兑的加密交易所提供紧急流动性，这意味着加密体系中的期限错配风险，没有制度化的救助与处置机制。

Celsius Network 在 2022 年的崩溃便是典型案例。根据公开报道，Celsius持有约 47 亿美元的客户存款，却将大量资金投入流动性较差的 DeFi 产品与长期锁仓头寸，当用户集中提现时，其期限错配立刻暴露，最终只能通过暂停提款、申请破产保护来应对。 positions and staked assets with multi-month lock-up periods. When withdrawals accelerated in June 2022, the maturity mismatch became terminal within days. No lender of last resort was available. Customers with assets on the platform had no recourse until bankruptcy proceedings began months later.

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6. Regulatory Arbitrage Lets Risk Accumulate Across Jurisdictions

Shadow banking in traditional finance thrives at the edges of regulatory perimeters. An activity regulated in one jurisdiction migrates to another where it is not. The BIS has documented this dynamic repeatedly in its work on non-bank financial intermediation. Crypto exchanges execute it with greater speed and lower friction than any traditional financial actor.

在传统金融中，影子银行往往活跃在监管边界的边缘地带。一项在某个司法辖区受到监管的活动，会迁移到另一个没有相关监管的辖区。BIS 在其关于非银行金融中介的研究中，多次记录了这种动态。相比任何传统金融机构，加密货币交易所以更高的速度和更低的摩擦成本来实施这一点。

The same exchange can book lending activities in a jurisdiction with no lending regulations, hold stablecoin reserves in an offshore trust, and serve retail customers in the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom simultaneously. The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) in the EU imposes reserve and disclosure requirements on stablecoin issuers but does not fully address exchange lending books. The SEC's ongoing enforcement actions in the US address securities law violations but not prudential soundness standards. No single regulator has comprehensive visibility.

同一家交易所可以在没有放贷监管的司法辖区记账其借贷业务，在离岸信托中持有稳定币储备，同时向美国、欧盟和英国的零售客户提供服务。欧盟的**《加密资产市场监管条例》**（MiCA）对稳定币发行方设定了准备金和信息披露要求，但并未全面覆盖交易所的借贷业务账簿。美国 SEC 正在进行的执法行动，侧重于证券法违规，而非审慎稳健性标准。没有任何单一监管机构能够实现全面穿透式监管。

Crypto exchanges can legally book lending, custody, and trading activities across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously, creating regulatory gaps that no single supervisor can close unilaterally.

加密货币交易所可以在多个司法辖区同时、且在法律允许的范围内开展借贷、托管和交易活动，由此形成的监管空白，任何单一监管者都无法单方面弥合。

The Financial Stability Board identified cross-border regulatory fragmentation as a primary systemic risk in its 2023 stablecoin recommendations. As of April 2026, implementation of those recommendations remains uneven. The BIS report implicitly reinforces this conclusion: the problem is not the absence of regulatory frameworks in any single jurisdiction, it is the absence of coordination across all of them.

金融稳定理事会在其 2023 年关于稳定币的建议中，将跨境监管碎片化视为主要系统性风险之一。截至 2026 年 4 月，这些建议的落实情况依然极不均衡。BIS 的报告在事实上强化了这一结论：问题不在于某个单一司法辖区缺乏监管框架，而在于各辖区之间缺乏协调。

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7. Liquidation Cascades Amplify Volatility Into Systemic Events

Crypto markets are structurally more prone to liquidation cascades than traditional markets because of the high leverage available on exchanges and the speed at which automated liquidation engines operate. When collateral values fall, margin calls trigger automatic position liquidations, which push prices lower, which triggers more liquidations. The feedback loop can compress months of price discovery into hours.

相较于传统市场，加密市场在结构上更容易出现清算瀑布，因为交易所提供的高杠杆以及自动清算引擎的高运行速度。当抵押品价值下跌时，追加保证金会触发自动平仓，平仓又进一步压低价格，进而引发更多清算。这样的反馈回路，会把原本需要数月才能完成的价格发现过程压缩到数小时之内。

Research published on the mechanics of DeFi liquidations found that liquidation spirals can drain protocol reserves faster than governance mechanisms can respond. Centralized exchanges face the same dynamic with additional opacity: the timing and size of forced liquidations are not publicly disclosed in real time, preventing other market participants from calibrating their own risk accordingly.

关于 DeFi 清算机制的研究发现，清算螺旋可以在协议治理机制尚未来得及响应之前，就迅速耗尽协议准备金。中心化交易所同样面临这种动态，但还叠加了更高的不透明性：强制平仓的时间点和规模并不会实时公开，其他市场参与者因此无法据此及时校准自己的风险敞口。

Automated liquidation engines on centralized exchanges can transmit price shocks across markets faster than any human risk management intervention, turning localized margin calls into market-wide events.

中心化交易所的自动清算引擎，可以以远超任何人工风控干预的速度，将价格冲击在各市场之间传导，把局部的保证金问题演化为全市场性事件。

The March 2020 crypto crash, the May 2021 correction, and the June 2022 deleveraging all featured liquidation cascades that exceeded $1 billion in forced selling within 24-hour windows, according to data tracked by CoinGlass. Each event stress-tested exchange solvency. So far, the largest platforms have survived. The BIS warning is that the next cascade may occur at a scale where survival is not guaranteed without external intervention.

根据 CoinGlass 追踪的数据，2020 年 3 月的加密崩盘、2021 年 5 月的回调以及 2022 年 6 月的去杠杆过程，都在 24 小时内出现了超过 10 亿美元的强制平仓抛售。每一次事件都对交易所的偿付能力构成压力测试。迄今为止，最大的平台幸存下来。BIS 的警示是：下一次清算瀑布可能会达到这样一种规模——如果没有外部干预，平台未必能继续存活。

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8. Opacity in Proof-of-Reserves Falls Short of Genuine Solvency Assurance

After the FTX collapse, "proof of reserves" emerged as the industry's self-regulatory response to questions about exchange solvency. The concept has merit in principle: a cryptographic attestation that an exchange holds assets equal to or greater than its liabilities. In practice, the BIS and independent auditors have found that current proof-of-reserves implementations fall far short of genuine financial transparency.

在 FTX 崩溃之后，“储备金证明”（proof of reserves）作为一种自律性机制，在行业内兴起，用以回应外界对交易所偿付能力的质疑。这个概念在原则上是有价值的：通过加密学方式证明交易所持有的资产大于或等于其负债。但在实践中，BIS 和独立审计机构发现，目前的储备金证明做法距离真正的财务透明还有很大差距。

The core problem is that proof of reserves addresses only the asset side of the balance sheet. It confirms that the exchange holds $X in crypto assets. It does not disclose the liability structure, the off-balance-sheet obligations, the maturity profile of borrowings, or the extent of collateral encumbrance. A bank holding $10 billion in assets but $12 billion in liabilities would pass a proof-of-reserves check while being insolvent.

核心问题在于，储备金证明只关注资产负债表的资产端。它只能确认交易所持有了价值 X 美元的加密资产，却并不披露负债结构、表外义务、借款期限结构，或抵押品被再质押/设限的程度。一家持有 100 亿美元资产、却承担 120 亿美元负债的银行，完全有可能通过储备金证明审查，但实际上已经资不抵债。

Proof-of-reserves attestations confirm asset holdings but reveal nothing about liabilities, off-balance-sheet exposure, or collateral encumbrance, leaving the solvency question unanswered.

储备金证明只是在确认资产持有量，却对负债、表外风险敞口以及抵押品被占用或再质押的情况只字未提，从而并不能回答实体是否真正具有偿付能力。

Mazars Group, one of the accounting firms initially engaged for crypto exchange attestations, suspended all such work in December 2022 citing concerns about how the results were being interpreted by the public. The gap between what proof-of-reserves actually certifies and what retail users believe it certifies is itself a systemic risk. Misplaced confidence suppresses the precautionary behavior that would otherwise discipline exchange risk-taking.

**玛泽集团（Mazars Group）**作为最早为多家加密交易所提供储备金证明服务的会计师事务所之一，于 2022 年 12 月暂停了全部相关业务，理由是担心公众对结果的解读方式存在偏差。储备金证明在事实上所能证明的内容，与散户用户所“以为”它证明了的内容之间的落差，本身就是一种系统性风险。错误的信心会抑制本应约束交易所冒险行为的审慎举动。

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9. Interconnectedness With DeFi Multiplies Contagion Pathways

The BIS report focuses primarily on centralized exchanges, but the risk picture is incomplete without accounting for the dense interconnectedness between centralized platforms and decentralized protocols. Centralized exchanges are among the largest liquidity providers to DeFi lending markets. Their stablecoin issuances are the primary collateral in DeFi vaults. Their custody services hold assets that are simultaneously pledged as collateral on-chain.

BIS 的报告主要聚焦于中心化交易所，但如果忽视中心化平台与去中心化协议之间高度密集的关联性，风险图景就不完整。中心化交易所是 DeFi 借贷市场中最大的流动性提供方之一；它们发行的稳定币是 DeFi 仓位中的主要抵押品；它们的托管服务则保管着那些同时在链上被用作抵押的资产。

Aave, currently trending with a market cap of approximately $1.42 billion according to CoinGecko data as of April 24, 2026, holds billions in protocol-controlled assets that are partially sourced from centralized exchange activity. If a major exchange were to face a liquidity crisis, rapid withdrawal of funds from DeFi protocols to meet exchange obligations could destabilize protocol collateral ratios simultaneously across multiple platforms.

以 Aave 为例，根据 CoinGecko 截至 2026 年 4 月 24 日的数据，其当前市值约为 14.2 亿美元，协议控制的资产规模则高达数十亿美元，其中一部分资金来源直接与中心化交易所的活动相关。如果某大型交易所遭遇流动性危机，为满足自身兑付需求而迅速从 DeFi 协议中撤资，就可能在多个平台上同时打破抵押率平衡。

The boundary between centralized and decentralized finance is functionally porous, meaning stress in a centralized exchange can propagate into DeFi protocol solvency within hours.

中心化金融与去中心化金融之间在功能上是“多孔”的——也就是说，中心化交易所上的压力，可以在数小时内传导至 DeFi 协议的偿付能力。

Academic work on financial network contagion demonstrates that interconnected systems fail in non-linear ways: the failure of one node does not cause proportional stress, it causes sudden, discontinuous stress as network effects amplify the shock. Crypto's integration of centralized and decentralized layers creates a contagion topology that no existing stress-testing framework fully captures.

关于金融网络传染性的学术研究表明，高度互联的系统往往以非线性方式失效：单个节点的失败并不会带来成比例的压力，而是在网络效应的放大下，造成突然且不连续的冲击。加密体系中，中心化与去中心化层的深度整合，构建出一种现有压力测试框架尚无法完整刻画的“传染拓扑结构”。

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10. The Path Forward Requires Prudential Standards, Not Just Disclosure

The BIS report does not call for the elimination of crypto exchange lending. It calls for the application of prudential standards that are already standard in traditional finance. Capital adequacy requirements proportional to lending book size, mandatory separation of customer assets from proprietary assets, liquidity coverage ratios calibrated to run scenarios, and resolution planning that protects retail creditors in insolvency.

BIS 的报告并没有要求取消加密交易所的借贷业务，而是呼吁将传统金融中已成常规的审慎标准应用到这一领域。包括：与借贷账簿规模相匹配的资本充足要求、强制性客户资产与自营资产隔离、针对挤兑情景校准的流动性覆盖率、以及在破产时优先保护零售债权人的处置与重组规划。

These are not exotic regulatory innovations. The Basel III framework already encodes capital, liquidity, and leverage requirements for traditional banks. The FDIC's Orderly Liquidation Authority provides a non-bankruptcy resolution path for systemically important financial institutions. The Financial Stability Oversight Council has the authority to designate non-bank entities as systemically important. None of these frameworks currently apply to crypto exchanges in a comprehensive way.

这些并非陌生的监管创新。巴塞尔协议 III 已经对传统银行的资本、流动性与杠杆率提出了明确要求；美国联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的“有序清算权”则为系统重要性金融机构提供了一条区别于普通破产程序的处置路径；金融稳定监督委员会（FSOC）也拥有将非银行机构指定为系统重要性机构的权力。而目前，上述任何一个框架，都尚未以全面方式适用于加密货币交易所。

Applying existing prudential frameworks from Basel III and FDIC resolution authority to crypto exchanges would address the majority of systemic risks the BIS identifies, without requiring new regulatory architecture.

若能将巴塞尔协议 III 与 FDIC 清算处置框架中的既有审慎标准延伸至加密货币交易所，BIS 所指出的大部分系统性风险都将得到应对，而无须额外构建全新的监管架构。

The question is not whether the regulatory tools exist. They do. The question is political and jurisdictional: which regulator has the mandate and the resources to extend those tools to a global, multi-jurisdictional industry that has resisted classification as a banking activity? The BIS cannot mandate regulation. It can only articulate the risk with enough clarity that national authorities face reputational cost for inaction. The April 2026 report is precisely that articulation.

问题不在于监管工具是否存在——这些工具已经存在。问题在于政治与司法管辖：究竟由哪个监管机构，来动用足够的授权和资源，把这些工具扩展到一个全球化、多司法辖区、并且长期抗拒被归类为“银行业务”的行业？BIS 无权直接强制立规，它能做的，是以足够清晰的方式阐明风险，使得各国当局在继续不作为时需要承担声誉成本。2026 年 4 月发布的这份报告，正是这种阐明。

Conclusion

The BIS report is not alarmist literature. It is a technical document written by the central bank to central banks, using the measured language of

BIS 的报告并非危言耸听的作品，而是一份“央行写给各国央行”的技术性文件，使用的是央行一贯克制、谨慎的语言风格。institutional finance to say something urgent: the structure that failed in 2008 has been rebuilt in crypto, and the lessons have not been applied. Exchanges that accept deposits, pay yield, lend funds, and promise instant withdrawal are performing maturity transformation without capital buffers, without deposit insurance, and without a lender of last resort.

机构化金融界需要紧急发声：在 2008 年崩溃过的那套结构，如今已经在加密领域被重新搭建起来，而当年的教训并未得到汲取。那些既接受存款、又支付收益、发放贷款、并承诺即时提现的交易所，正在进行期限转换，却没有资本缓冲、没有存款保险，也没有最后贷款人。

The ten structural risks examined here are not independent. They compound each other. Rehypothecated collateral inflates the apparent asset base that proof-of-reserves attests to. Regulatory arbitrage ensures that no single jurisdiction can enforce prudential standards unilaterally. DeFi interconnectedness means that exchange stress propagates faster than any governance mechanism can respond. Stablecoin reserve fragility means the funding base itself can become run-prone before the lending book deteriorates. Each risk is manageable in isolation. Together, they describe a system where the failure of a single large platform could produce contagion across centralized and decentralized markets simultaneously.

这里讨论的十项结构性风险并非彼此独立，而是相互叠加、彼此放大。重复质押的抵押品抬高了储备证明所显示的表观资产基数。监管套利则保证了没有任何单一司法辖区可以单方面有效执行审慎监管标准。DeFi 的互联性意味着，一旦交易所承压，压力扩散的速度会快于任何治理机制可以响应的速度。稳定币储备的脆弱性则意味着，在贷款资产真正恶化之前，资金来源本身就可能因挤兑而动摇。单独来看，每一项风险都还算可控；合在一起，它们描绘的是这样一个系统：只要有一家大型平台倒下，就可能在中心化和去中心化市场之间同时引发连锁反应。

The policy window is open. Retail crypto volume fell 11% in Q1 2026, institutional attention is focused, and the BIS has provided a framework for action. The historical pattern from traditional finance is that regulatory reform follows crisis rather than precedes it. The BIS report represents a rare opportunity to break that pattern. Whether regulators in the US, EU, and Asia coordinate fast enough to apply prudential standards before the next stress event is the most important question in crypto finance right now.

政策窗口已经打开。2026 年第一季度散户加密交易量下降了 11%，机构正在高度关注，而国际清算银行（BIS）已经给出了可操作的框架。传统金融领域的一贯模式是：监管改革总是滞后于危机，而不是先于危机。BIS 的这份报告提供了一个打破这一模式的难得机会。美国、欧盟以及亚洲的监管机构能否在下一次压力事件到来之前，迅速协调并落实审慎标准，是当前加密金融领域最关键的问题。